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THE

MEMOIRS

OF

JOSEPH FOUCHÉ,

DUKE OF OTRANTO,

MINISTER OF THE GENERAL POLICE OF FRANCE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND CORRECTED.

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MEMOIRS

OF

JOSEPH FOUCHÉ,

DUKE OF OTRANTO.

I IMPOSE upon myself a great and weighty task, in again offering myself to all the severity of a public investigation; but I impose it on myself as a duty, to destroy the prejudices of party spirit, and the impression of hatred. I have, however, little hope that the voice of reason will have strength enough to make itself heard in the midst of the clamours of the two violent factions which divide the political world. No matter; it is not for the present moment that I write, but for that of a more tranquil period. As to what concerns the present, let my destiny be accomplished? And what a destiny, just heaven! What have I left of such grandeur and of that enormous power, which I never abused, except for the purpose of avoiding still greater evils? That which I least value, that which I accumulated for others, indeed remains to

me, who, with the simplicity of my tastes, could have dispensed with wealth altogether; to me, who, in the midst of splendour, always showed the moderation of a philosopher, and the sobriety of a hermit. By turns powerful, dreaded or disgraced, I sought for authority I own, but I detested oppression. What services have I not rendered? What tears have I not dried? Dare, if you can, to deny it, ye whose good opinion I succeeded in gaining, notwithstanding the dreadful events that had passed! Did I not become your protector? Did I not guard you against your own resentments, and the impetuous passions of the chief of the state? I confess that there never was a more absolute police than that whose sceptre I held; but did you not admit that there never was one more protecting under a military government; more adverse to violence; more gentle in the means with which it penetrated into the secret recesses of domestic life, and whose action was less obnoxiously obvious? Did you not say, then, that the Duke of Otranto was, beyond a doubt, the ablest and the most moderate of all Napoleon's ministers? You hold a different language—for this sole reason: that times have changed. You form your opinion of the past by the present! I do not judge it so. I have committed errors I own; but the good I have done must be taken in the account. Plunged in the chaos of public affairs, occupied with the unravelling of all kinds of intrigues, I took pleasure in

calming hostilities, in extinguishing passions, and conciliating men. It was with a degree of luxury that I sometimes tasted repose in the bosom of my domestic affections, which, in their turn, were poisoned. In my recent disgrace, and in my great misfortunes, can I forget that the supporter and guardian of an immense empire, my sole disapprobation put it in peril, and that it fell down the moment I ceased to support it with my hand? Can I forget, that if, by the effect of a great re-action, and of a return which I had foreseen, I again re-possessed myself of the scattered elements of so much greatness and power, the whole vanished like a dream? Yet, nevertheless, I was considered as far superior, in consequence of my long experience—I may add, perhaps, of my sagacity—to all those, who, during the catastrophe, suffered the power to escape.

Now that, undeceived upon all points, I look down from a superior region upon all the miseries and fallacious splendours of greatness; now that I no longer contend for any object but the justification of my political intentions, I recognise, too late, the emptiness of those contrary parties who struggle for the government of the universe. I see and feel that a more powerful First Mover modifies and guides them, in spite of all our deepest speculations.

It is, nevertheless, but too true, that the wounds of ambition are incurable. In spite of my reason,

and in spite of myself, I am pursued by the delusive chimeras of power, by the phantoms of vanity; I am as strongly tied to them as Ixion was to his wheel. A deep and painful feeling oppresses my mind.

And will it be said now that I do not show all my weaknesses, all my errors, and all my repentance? A confession like this, I should think, is a sufficient pledge of the sincerity of my revelations. That pledge I owed to the importance of this second part of the memoirs of my political life; I am thus irrevocably placed under the rigorous obligations of retracing all its peculiarities, of unfolding all its secret mysteries. This is my last labour. I shall, however, experience some compensating enjoyment in the charms of reflection, and in the fragrance of a certain number of recollections; this pleasure I have experienced in my first narrative.

In preparing these memoirs, one consoling idea has never abandoned me. I shall not entirely descend into the grave, perhaps, into that grave which already yawns to receive me, at the termination of my exile. I cannot dissemble it from myself. However I may elude the decay of my spirit, I have but too strong conviction of the decay of my bodily strength. Pressed by the fates, I must hasten to offer, with sincere feelings, the account of the events which passed between my disgrace in 1810 and my fall in 1815. The compli-

ment is the most serious and the most thorny of all my political confessions. How numerous are the incidents, the mighty interests, the conspicuous characters, and the turpitudes which are associated with this last scene of a transitory power! But fear nothing, enemies or friends; the police is not going to denounce here—it is history which reveals.

But, if I pretend to place myself above frivolous considerations and regards in sparing no one, I am as firmly determined to keep as far from satire and libelling as from falsehood and dissimulation. I will brand with disgrace that which must be despised, I will respect whatever is deserving of respect. In a word, I will hold my pen with a firm hand; and, in order that it may not deviate, I will keep my eyes on the synchronism of public events.

From these preliminaries, intended to awaken attention and recal remembrances, I will proceed to the facts which confirm, to the particulars which reveal, and to those deeds which characterize. The result will, I hope, be a picture, to which the reader may give, as he pleases, either the name of history or materials for its composition.

At the end of the first part of these memoirs is the point whence I resume my narrative; it is marked by the event of my disgrace, which transferred the *porte feuille* of the high police of the State into the hands of Savary. It must not be forgotten that the empire was then in the zenith of

its power, and that its military limits had no longer any bounds. Possessor of Germany, master of Italy, absolute ruler of France, invader of Spain, Napoleon was, moreover, the ally of the Cæsars, and of the autocrat of the north. So dazzling was the halo of his power, that the ulcer of the Spanish war, which was gnawing the vitals of the empire in the south, was forgotten. Everywhere else, Napoleon had only to desire, in order to obtain. All moral counterpoise had disappeared from his government. Every thing gave way; his agents, his functionaries, his dignitaries, exhibited nothing but a group of flatterers and mutes, anxious to catch the least sign of his decisions. In short, he had just dismissed, in me, the only individual of his council, who would have dared to check the long chain of his encroachments; in me, he had removed a zealous and watchful minister, who never spared him useful admonition, nor courageous reproof.

An imperial decree constituted me governor-general of Rome*. But I never, for a single mo-

* *Letter of the Emperor to the Duke of Otranto.*

My Lord Duke of Otranto,

The services which you have rendered us, in the difficult circumstances which have occurred, induce us to confide to you the government of Rome, until we have provided for the execution of article eight of the act of the constitution of the 17th of last February. We have determined, by a special decree, the extraordinary powers with which the particular circumstances, in which that department is at present placed, require that you should be invested. We expect that you will

ment, thought that it was the emperor's wish that I should exercise so important a trust. This nomination was nothing but an honourable veil, woven by his policy, in order to conceal and mitigate, in the eyes of the public, my disgrace, of which his intimates alone had the secret. I could not be mistaken; the very choice of my successor was in

continue, in your new post, to give us proofs of your zeal for our service and attachment for our person.

This letter having no other object, we pray God, my Lord Duke of Otranto, to take you into his holy keeping.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

St. Cloud, the 3d of June, 1810.

Letter of the Minister of General Police to S. M., I., and R.

Sire,

I accept the government of Rome to which your Majesty has had the goodness to raise me, as a recompence for the humble services which I have been so fortunate as to render you.

I must not, however, dissemble, that I experience a very poignant regret in quitting your Majesty; I lose at once the happiness and instruction which I daily derived from my interviews with you.

If any thing can mitigate at regret, it is the reflection that I give in this circumstance, by my absolute resignation to the will of your Majesty, the strongest testimony of my boundless devotion to your person.

I am, with the most profound respect,
Sire,
Your Majesty's very humble and
Most obedient servant, and
Faithful subject,
(Signed) DUKE of OTRANTO.

Paris, June 3, 1810. —*Note by the French Editor.*

itself a frightful omen. In every house, in every family, in short, throughout Paris, there was a general horror manifested at seeing the general police of the empire thenceforth confounded with the military police of the chief magistrate; and, moreover, given up to the fanatical subserviency of a man who considered it as the greatest honour to execute the secret orders of his master. His name alone created an universal suspicion, a kind of stupor, the impression of which was, perhaps, carried too far.

I no longer communicated, except under extreme precaution, with my intimate friends and private agents. I soon obtained the confirmation of all I had foreseen. For several days, my wife's apartments were crowded with distinguished visiters, who carefully masked the object of their visits under the appearance of paying their congratulations on the subject of the imperial decree which raised me to the government-general of Rome. I received the confidential testimonies of crowds of exalted personages, who, while expressing their regrets, assured me that my retreat carried with it the disapprobation of all such men as were most esteemed in all opinions and all ranks of society. "We are not indeed satisfied," said they, "whether the regret of the Faubourg Saint Germain be not, at least, as deep as that displayed by the multitude of eminent men, who have at heart the interests of the revolution." Testimonials of this kind, offered to a fallen minister, were neither suspicious nor doubtful.

My position and propriety imposed upon me the disagreeable task of acting for several days the part of Savary's mentor, during the *début* of his ministerial noviciate. It may easily be supposed, that I did not carry good nature so far as to initiate him in the upper mysteries of the political police. I took care not to give him a key, which might one day contribute to our common safety. Neither did I initiate him in the rather difficult art of arranging the secret bulletin, the ideas, and often even the writing of which must be left to the minister alone. The poor talents of Savary, in this walk, were already known to me; I had previously obtained, without his being aware of it, copies of the bulletins of his counter-police. What villanies did they not contain! To confess the truth, I was so out of patience with his perpetual questions, and heavy conceitedness, that I amused myself with talking nonsense to him * *(conter des sornettes.)*

By way of amends, I pretended to acquaint him with the forms, the customs, and the traditions of the ministry; I particularly magnified the profound views of the three councillors of state, who, under his direction, would each of them work as much as

* It was, doubtless, this circumstance, which since occasioned the Duke de Rovigo, in referring to Fouché, to say, "That personage has imposed upon us often enough!" It must be, however, understood that this phrase, as we have heard it quoted in society, comprises all the Imperial government.—*Note by the French Editor.*

four in administering the police of France, which they would divide among themselves. He was quite dazzled. I introduced, and sincerely recommended to him the principal agents and clerks whom I had had under my orders. He only received well the treasurer, a little round personage, and the little inquisitor, Desmarets, on whom I never placed any reliance. This latter individual, endowed with a certain degree of tact, had instinctively bowed to the rising sun. He was completely Savary's right hand *(cheville ouvrière)*.

Nothing in the world was ever more ludicrous than to see this soldier-like minister giving his audiences, *spelling* the list of those who solicited, drawn up by the *Huissiers** of the chamber, with notes written by Desmarets in the margin. It was his guide (*guide-âne*) for promises and refusals, which were almost always accompanied by oaths or invectives. I had not failed to tell him that I had disobliged the emperor by being *trop bon;* and that to watch over his master's valuable days with more efficacy, he ought sometimes to make a show of resistance†.

* *Huissiers* are a sort of *Vergers*, whose office it is to introduce visiters, and people in general, calling on business. They previously write down the names of such persons, and, presenting the list to the ministers or high official personages, are instructed to give or refuse admittance accordingly.—*English Editor.*

† This would be going much too far for any other individual but Fouché, by nature revengeful, and indulging towards the

Puffed up by an insolent self-conceit, he affected, from the first moment of his accession to office, to imitate his master in his frequent fits of passion, and his broken and incoherent phrases. He considered that there was nothing of any utility in the whole police, but secret reports, *espionnage*, and the money-chest. I had the good fortune to witness his gambols and fits of joy, on the day I put in his hands the agreeable calculation of all the budgets which were merged in the private chest; *it appeared* to him like a new wonderful lamp.

I burnt with impatience to get rid of this ministerial pedagogueship; but on the other hand, I resorted to pretexts, in order to prolong my stay at Paris. Ostensibly, I carried on my preparations for my departure for Rome, as if I had never for a moment doubted that I was about to be installed there. The whole of my household was arranged upon the scale of a governor-generalship, and even my equipages were superinscribed in large characters, "*Equipages of the Governor-general of Rome.*" Informed that all my proceedings were watched, I paid great attention to little things.

At length, receiving neither decision nor instructions from court, I requested Berthier to obtain my audience of leave from the emperor. The only reply I got was, that the emperor had not appointed

Duke de Rovigo a hatred, the evidences of which he suffers too conspicuously to transpire.—*Note by the French Editor.*

a day for my audience, and that it would be prudent, in consequence of the popular gossip, for me to go to my country-seat, and there await the orders that would be immediately sent me. I accordingly went to my *château de Ferrières* *, but not without indulging in the venial malice of causing it to be inserted in the Paris Journals, by underhand means, that I had set out for my new government †.

In my last interview with Berthier, I had not found much difficulty in detecting the emperor's inclinations towards me; I saw how vexed he was in finding public opinion decidedly pronounced against my dismissal, and as strongly declared against my successor. The ministry of the police then appeared to be nothing else than a Prevôté

* The *château de Ferrières* is distant about three-quarters of a league from the estate of Pont Carré, emigrant landed property, about six leagues from Paris, which Fouché had acquired from the state, but for which it is asserted that he had paid the full value to the proprietor. The *château* of Pont Carré being then in a dilapidated state, it would seem that Fouché caused it to be demolished, and devoted its site to pasture land. Ferrières and Pont Carré, united with immense wooded estates, which are now attached to them, constitute, according to report, one of the most magnificent domains in the kingdom; it comprises an extent of four leagues. It was to the *château de Ferrières* that Fouché retired immediately after his disgrace, and subsequently after his return from his senatorship at Aix, as will be seen in the progress of these Memoirs.—*Note by the French Editor.*

† The author almost always neglects dates. We believe that it was on the 26th of June, 1810.—*Note by the French Editor.*

and Gendarmerie*. All these indications confirmed me in the opinion that I should, with great difficulty, escape the consequences of an actual fall.

In fact, I had scarcely arrived at Ferrières, when a relation of my wife, who had secretly quitted Paris, hastened to me, at midnight, to convey the important intelligence that I should be arrested on the following day, and that my papers would be seized. Although the particulars were magnified, the information was positive; it came from an individual attached to the emperor's private cabinet, and long engaged in my interest. I immediately went to work, and put in a secure place all my most important papers. As soon as the operation was completed, I resigned myself with stoical fortitude to whatever might occur; and at eight o'clock my confidential emissary J—— arrived, having galloped all the way, with a letter from Madame de V—— in a feigned hand, informing me that Savary had just told the emperor that I had carried off his secret correspondence and confidential orders to Ferrières. I saw, at once, from whom Madame de V—— obtained her information. It confirmed the first intelligence, but the papers now appeared to be the only thing thought of. Although I had no longer any apprehension as to their offering violence to my person, I was picturing to myself the arrival of the chief *Sbire* and his archers, when my people informed me that a carriage, preceded

* See note, Vol. I. page 196.—*English Editor.*

by outriders, was entering the court of the *château.* But Napoleon, restrained, I presume, by some remains of decency, had spared me the mortification of coming in contact with his police minister. It was Berthier who entered my apartment, followed by the councillors of state Réal, and Dubois.

From their embarrassment, I could see that I still kept them in awe, and that their mission was conditional. In fact, Berthier, commencing the business, told me, with some constraint, that he came by the emperor's orders to demand his correspondence; that he imperiously insisted upon it; and that, if I refused, the police prefect, Dubois, who was present, had orders to arrest me, and place a seal on my papers. Réal, assuming a tone of persuasion, and addressing me with more feeling, as an old friend, begged of me, nearly with tears in his eyes, to submit to the emperor's wishes. "I," said I calmly, "I resist the emperor's wishes? how can you think of it? I, who have always served the emperor with so great a degree of zeal, although wounded by his unjust suspicions, even at those times when I served him most effectually. Come into my closet; search everywhere, gentlemen; I will give my keys into your hands; I will myself put you in possession of all my papers. It is lucky for me that the emperor has put me to this unexpected trial, out of which it is impossible I should not come with advantage. The rigorous

examination of all my papers, and my correspondence, will give the emperor means of convincing himself of the injustice of the suspicions with which the malice of my enemies alone could have inspired him against the most devoted of his servants, and the most faithful of his ministers." The calmness and firmness which I had assumed, while making this short harangue, produced its effect, and I proceeded in these words: "As to the private correspondence of the emperor with me during the exercise of my functions, as it was of a nature which required its being buried in eternal secrecy, I partly burned it, when I resigned my office, not wishing to expose papers of so great an importance to the chances of an indiscreet investigation. As to the rest, gentlemen, you will still find, with this exception, the papers which the emperor requires; they are, I believe, in two locked and ticketed boxes; you will have no difficulty in recognising them, nor will you be likely to confound them with my private papers, which I give up with the same confidence to your research. Once more, I fear nothing, and have nothing to fear from such a trial."

The commissioners overwhelmed me with protestations and excuses. They proceeded to examine my papers, or rather I examined them myself, in the presence of Dubois. I must do this justice to Dubois, that although he was my personal enemy, and more especially charged with the execution of

the emperor's orders, he conducted himself with as much reserve as decorum; whether it was that he already had a presentiment that his own disgrace would shortly follow mine *, or whether he judged it prudent not to disgust too much, a minister who, after two falls, might again re-ascend the pinnacle of power.

Moved, probably, by my sincerity†, the imperial commissioners contented themselves with some insignificant papers, which I was pleased to let them have; finally, after the customary forms of politeness, Berthier, Réal, and Dubois re-entered their carriage, and returned to Paris.

At the close of night, making my exit by the little gate in my park, I got into the *cabriolet* of my *homme d'affaires*, and, accompanied by a friend, hurried to Paris, where I alighted *incognito* at my mansion in the *Rue du Bac*. There I learnt, two hours afterwards, (for all my strings were laid out,) that the emperor, on the report of what had passed at Ferrières, had fallen into a violent passion; that after having broken out in threats against me, he had exclaimed, that I had played off a trick upon the commissioners; that they were fools; and

* M. the Count Dubois was succeeded by M. Pasquier, in his functions of prefect of police, on the 14th of October, 1810. Fouché has intimated one of the motives of his disgrace, in the first part of his memoirs.—*Note by the French Editor.*

† The word *openness* (*candeur*) was underlined in the original notes.—*Note of the French Editor.*

that Berthier was, in regard to state affairs, no better than an old woman, who had suffered himself to be mystified by the craftiest man in the empire.

The next day, at nine o'clock in the morning, having concerted my plan, I hastened to Saint Cloud, and there presented myself to the grand *maréchal* of the palace. "Here I am," said I to Duroc; "it is of the greatest consequence for me to see the emperor instantly, and to prove to him, that I am very far from deserving his cruel mistrust, and unjust suspicion. Tell him, I entreat you, that I am waiting in your closet, till he deigns to grant me a few minutes' audience." "I will go instantly," replied Duroc, "and I am very glad to see that you have cooled a little (*que vous mettiez de l'eau dans votre vin.*)" Such was the exact phrase he used, and it squared with the idea which I wished to give him of my step. Duroc, returning, took me by the hand, led me forward, and left me in the emperor's closet. From the first aspect and deportment of Napoleon, I guessed what was passing in his mind. Without giving me time to say a single word, he embraced me, flattered me, and went even so far as to testify a kind of repentance for the dissatisfaction he had expressed with regard to me; then, with an accent which seemed to say that he himself offered me a pledge of reconciliation, he concluded by requiring, and, in short, demanding his cor-

respondence. "Sire," I replied, with a firm voice, "I have burnt it."—"That is not true; I must have it," replied he, with compressed vehemence and anger. "It is reduced to ashes."—"Withdraw!" These words were pronounced with a motion of the head, and a terrible look. "But, Sire"—"Withdraw, I say!" This was repeated with such emphasis, as to dissuade me from staying. I held ready in my hand a brief memorial, which I laid on the table as I retired; an action which I accompanied with a respectful bow. The emperor, bursting with anger, seized the paper, and tore it to pieces.

Duroc, who saw me so soon returning, perceiving neither trouble nor emotion depicted in my appearance, imagined that I was restored to favour. "You have come off well," said he; "I prevented the emperor yesterday from having you arrested." "You have saved him," I returned, "from committing an act of folly,—an act which, at all events, had been impolitic, and which had furnished matter to malignity. The emperor, by such an action, would have thrown alarm among those individuals who are most devoted to the interests of his government." I perceived from Duroc's manner, that this was also his opinion, and taking him by the hand, I said, "Do not suffer yourself to be discouraged, Duroc; the emperor stands in need of your prudent counsel."

I quitted Saint Cloud, somewhat re-assured by

this half-confidence of the grand *maréchal*, for which I was indebted to a mistake; and returned, pondering on the posture of the affair, to my mansion.

I was about to return to Ferrières, after having despatched some urgent business, when the Prince de Neufchâtel (Berthier) was announced. "The emperor," said he, "is very angry. I never saw him in so violent a passion; he has taken it into his head, that you have played with us; that you have carried audacity so far, as to maintain, to his face, that you had burnt his letters, in order to avoid giving them up; he pretends that it is a punishable state offence, to persist in retaining them." "This suspicion," said I to Berthier, "is the most injurious of all. The correspondence of the emperor would, on the contrary, be my only safeguard, and, if I possessed it, I would not give it up." Berthier urgently implored me to yield; but finding me silent, he concluded by threats in the emperor's name. "Go to him," I replied, "and tell him, that I have been accustomed for these five and twenty years to sleep with my head on the scaffold; that I know the extent of his power, but that I do not fear it; and add, that if he wishes to make a Strafford of me, he is the master." We then separated; I more than ever resolved to stand firm, and scrupulously retain the undeniable proofs that all which was most violent and iniquitous in the exercise of my ministerial functions had been imperiously pre-

scribed, by orders emanating from the cabinet, and invested with the sign manual of the emperor.

Neither was it the effect of public disgrace, which I so much feared, as ambuscades prepared against me in darkness. Determined by my own reflections, as well as the entreaties of my friends and of all I held most dear, I threw myself into a post-chaise, taking with me only my eldest son and his tutor. I then took the road to Lyon; there I found my old secretary, Maillocheau, general commissary of police, who was indebted to me for his place; I obtained from him all the papers which I thought I might want, and rapidly traversed a great part of France. Thence, passing with the same celerity into Italy, I arrived at Florence with a boldly-conceived design, which I thought was calculated to secure me from the emperor's resentment. But such was the state of my physical irritability, and the excess of the fatigue with which so rapid and so long a journey had overwhelmed me, that it was necessary to give up two whole days to repose, before I could find myself in a proper condition to provide for my own safety.

It was not unintentionally, and this I will explain presently, that I had sought refuge in that classic land, beloved from time immemorial by gods and men. The beautiful and free Tuscany, which had at first fallen under the dominion of the Medicis, subsequently under the sceptre of the

house of Austria, princes who had always governed it rather in the character of fathers than of king, was at that time plunged in the gulf of the French empire. I pass over the mock cession made by Napoleon to the infant of Parma, under the title of King of Etruria, a cession revoked almost as soon as it was concluded. Tuscany was reserved for other destinies. Ever since 1807, Eliza, Napoleon's sister, reigned there under the title of grand duchess. And it was I, who through the most inconsistent and unaccountable vicissitudes, now came to place myself under the protection of a woman I disliked; who, formerly giving strength to the coterie Fontanes and Molé, had contributed to my first disgrace; of that woman of whom I shall have to say, in this place, more in her favour than against her, in order to be just—for I have a habit of speaking and writing according to the associations of the epoch, but without passion or resentment. Such ought, in fact, to be the standing maxim of the statesman; the past ought in his eyes to appear in no other light than history; every thing is comprised in the present.

When, besides, the question concerns females subjected to the influence of strong passions, it admits of an easy explanation. At my resumption of the ministry I had an opportunity to conciliate Eliza; I had successively protected two

individuals Hin**** and Les******, to whom she was much attached, and who, within a short interval, had rendered themselves in the strongest degree necessary to her imperious inclinations. The one, a contractor, had been bitterly persecuted by the emperor; the other, more obscure, had plunged himself into a disgraceful transaction. It was not without difficulty that I succeeded in hushing the matter up.

I had, moreover, prèvailed upon Napoleon, in 1805, to confer on his sister the sovereignty of Lucca and Piombino; I was, therefore, almost certain of still finding the heart of Eliza disposed to feelings of gratitude; and I had not neglected to make myself sure of it, on the very day when my disgrace was aggravated by my last interview with the emperor. Having presented myself to the grand duchess, who was then at Paris to attend the marriage fêtes, I had solicited from her, without entirely confiding to her all the thorny points of my position, letters for her dominions, through which, as I told her, I was about to pass, in order to proceed to Rome. Eliza assented with infinite affability, warmly recommending me, and designating me in her letters by the amiable epithet of the *common friend*. This is easily explained. I had in Tuscany some friends, for whom I had procured very lucrative places, and the grand duchess gave them all the latitude I required to serve me. Such

was the steadiness of their character, that I could, without risk, reveal to them all the difficulties of my situation.

The news which I received, nearly at the same time, from Paris, and from my family, which had stopped at Aix, brought nothing of a comforting description. On the contrary, they represented the emperor as urged by Savary, and inclined to break out into violence against my alleged obstinacy, which was termed indiscreet, and even mad. No one at that time could entertain the idea of a single individual daring to resist the will of him before whom all things, whether potentates or nations, bowed. "What!" wrote one of my friends to me, "would you be more powerful than the emperor?" My head turned, and I was in my turn intimidated. In my sleepless nights, and in my dreams, I imagined myself surrounded by executioners, and seemed as if I beheld, in the native country of Dante, the inexorable vision of his infernal gates. The spectre of tyranny depicted itself on my imagination with more frightful features than during the most sanguinary despotism of Robespierre, who had condemned me to the scaffold. Here I was less in dread of the scaffold than the *oubliettes**. I knew, alas, but too well

* This is an untranslatable word. The name was given to certain dungeons, under ground, in which it is reported that state criminals, or more properly speaking, the victims of ty-

the man with whom I had to deal. My head becoming more and more heated, I returned to the first idea which had presented itself to my mind; and I took the desperate resolution of embarking for the United States, that common refuge of the unfortunate friends of liberty. Secure of Dubois*, director of police in the grand duchy, who was indebted to me for his place, I obtained blank passports; and proceeded to Leghorn, where I freighted a vessel, giving out that I was going by sea to Naples, whence I intended to proceed to Rome. I went on board; I even set sail fully determined to pass the straits, and cross the Atlantic. But, just heavens! to what a terrible affliction was my frail irritable habit of body subjected. A dreadful sea sickness attacked me with the greatest violence. Overcome by my sufferings, I began to regret that I had not attended to the remonstrances of my friends and family, whose future existence I was about to compromise. I nevertheless struggled on; and resisted as much as possible the

ranny, were formerly cast, there to be left to die with hunger. It comes from *oubli*, forgetfulness. The persons there confined never being heard of.—*English Editor.*

* This individual must not be confounded with Count Dubois, prefect of police. We have been informed that the Dubois, director of police in Tuscany, and M. Maillocheau, commissary general of police at Lyon, were severely reprimanded by the Duke of Rovigo, for having favoured the furtive journey of Fouché. The commissary general of Lyon was even cashiered. —*Note by the French Editor.*

idea of yielding to the tyrannical ruler. But I had already lost my senses, and was about to expire, when I was put on shore. Overwhelmed by this rough trial, I subsequently declined the offer of a generous English captain, who wished to convey me to his native island, on board of a commodious vessel and a good sailer, promising me at the same time such attention and antidotes as would secure me against the return of sea-sickness. I could not find resolution enough to comply. I was resolved to endure every thing sooner than again trust myself to an element incompatible with my existence. This cruel trial had besides changed my ideas ; I no longer saw objects under the same point of view. By degrees, I perceived that there was a possibility of coming to some kind of compromise with the emperor, whose rage pursued me even to the shores of the Tuscan Sea. I still wandered there for a short time, in order to mature my plan, and obtain opportunities for its realization. At length my resolution being taken, and my batteries prepared, I returned to Florence. There I wrote to Eliza, already well-disposed to do me service ; I conveyed a letter to the emperor under cover to her, in which, without flattery or humiliation, I confessed that I was sorry for having displeased him ; but, that being in dread of falling a defenceless victim to the malignity of my enemies, I had considered myself entitled, perhaps wrongfully, to retain possession of papers, which

composed my only guarantee. That, on reflection, and deeply regretting having incurred his displeasure, I had placed myself under the protection of a princess who, by the ties of blood, as well as by the goodness of her heart, was worthy of being his representative in Tuscany; that to her I consigned my interests, and that I entreated his majesty to grant me, under the auspices of the grand duchess, in exchange for the papers which I had determined to give up in compliance with his wish, some kind of *irresponsibility* for all the measures and acts which I might have executed by his orders, during the duration of my two ministries; that a pledge of this description, which was necessary to my security and repose, would be as a sacred Egis, which would defend me against the attacks of envy, and the shafts of malice; that I had already several reasons to believe that his majesty, out of regard to my zeal and services, would deign to re-open the only access which remained to his goodness and justice, by permitting me to retire to Aix, the chief place of my senatorship, and to reside there in the bosom of my family, till further orders.

This letter, sent by a special messenger to the grand duchess, had a full and entire effect; Eliza interested herself zealously. The courier's return announced to me that the Prince de Neufchâtel, vice-constable, was commissioned, by an express order from the emperor, to deliver to me a *motived*

receipt in exchange for the correspondence and orders which the emperor had addressed to me during the exercise of my functions, and that I might, with full security, retire to the chief place of my senatorship.

In this way, through the intervention of the grand duchess, was effected, not certainly a reconciliation between me and the emperor, but a kind of compromise, which I should have regarded as impracticable three weeks before. I was less indebted for it to inclination on my part, or sincere submission, than to the results of a sea-sickness, the tortures of which I was, from habit of body, incapable of supporting.

Restored to my family, I was, at length, enabled, at Aix, to enjoy the tranquillity so necessary to the decay of my strength, and the state of my mind, which was irritated without being vanquished. It was not without a very painful inward struggle that I had consented to bend before the violence of the despot. If at length I decided upon yielding, it was only upon capitulation; but sacrifices such as these are not made without effort by any one who feels the native dignity of man; and who has no other wish than to live under a reasonable government. There were for me many other motives of bitterness and alarm, in contemplating the secret and hurried march of a power advancing to self-destruction, and the springs of which were

so familiar to me, that their results could no longer escape the foresight of my calculations.

Although I had reason to believe myself condemned for a length of time to perfect obscurity and nullity, this mode of life, which might have conducted me to apathy and indiffererence, was very ill accordant with a mind broken in to the habits and exercise of great affairs. Those things which escaped others did not escape me; flashes of light escaped from the insipid and lying columns of the *Moniteur*, which attracted my notice. The cause of the events of the day was revealed to me by the very announcement of its result; I could always supply the truth in the place of those half hints and broken sentences contained in that paper; and the lucubrations of the chief magistrate alternately revealed to me the joy and torments of his ambition. I penetrated the most secret actions, even the servile eagerness of his intimate partisans and most unshaken agents.

Nevertheless, I wanted to know the details; I was too far from the scene of action. How, for example, could I divine the sudden incidents, and the unforeseen accidents, which occurred out of the ordinary circle of things? There was always some commotion or some storm in the interior of the palace. If some scattered and broken rumours of these transpired, they seldom reached the extreme limits of the provinces without being

altered or mutilated through ignorance or passion.

The inveterate custom of knowing every thing pursued me; and I yielded the more easily to it, in the midst of the *ennui* of a tranquil and monotonous state of exile. By the assistance of steady friends and faithful emissaries, I arranged my secret correspondence, corroborated by regular bulletins, which, as they reached me from various quarters, might be reciprocally corroborated; in a word, I established my counter-police at Aix. This amusement, which was at first weekly, was repeated subsequently more than once a week, and I was informed of all that occurred in a more *piquante* manner than when I was at Paris. Such were the occupations of my retreat. There, surrounded by the calm atmosphere of reflection, my Parisian bulletins arrived in such a manner as to stimulate my political meditations. Oh! ever courageous, sprightly, and faithful V——; you who held almost all the threads of that net-work of information and truth; you who, endowed with superior sagacity and reason, and who, always active and calm, remained faithful, under all circumstances, to gratitude and friendship—accept the tribute of respect and tenderness, which my heart will ever feel the want of expressing, even to my last sigh. You were not, however, the only agent employed for the common interest, in weav-

ing the patriotic web which had been preparing for more than a twelvemonth, to meet the probable chance of a catastrophe*. The amiable and profound D——, the beautiful and alluring R——, seconded your noble zeal. You also had your knights of secret mystery enrolled under the banners of the hidden graces and virtues. It must be confessed, in the midst of social decomposition, whether under the reign of terror, or during the two directorial and imperial tyrannies, whom did we remark so capable of a rare disinterestedness as to devote themselves for the common good? Some women—What do I say?—a large number of women retained the generosity of their ideas, uninfected by that contagion of venality and baseness which degrades human nature and bastardizes nations.

Alas! we were at that time approaching, after many vicissitudes, the boundaries of that fatal cycle in which we had every thing to deplore or fear as a nation; we were approaching that future which was the more appalling because it was near, and in which every thing was likely to be compromised and made doubtful again; our fortune, our honour, our repose: we had been indebted for them, it is true, to the great man him-

* Fouché, in this place, only lifts a corner of the veil; what follows will apprize the reader of all which the ex-minister at present conceals.—*Note by the French Editor.*

self; but that extraordinary personage persevered, in spite of the lessons of all ages, in attempting to exercise a power without counterpoise and without control. Devoured by the fever of domination and conquest, raised to the pinnacle of human authority, it was no longer in his power to stop in his career.

Thanks to my correspondence and secret informations, I followed him step by step in his public proceedings as well as his private actions. If I did not lose sight of him, the reason was, that the whole empire was in him; the reason was, that all our power, all our fortune, resided in his fortune and his power; an alarming incorporation, no doubt, because it placed, at the mercy of a single man, not only one nation, but a hundred different nations.

Arrived at the zenith of his power, Napoleon did not even stop a moment; it was during the two years which I passed far from affairs, that the germ of his decline, which was at first imperceptible, began to develop itself. On that account I thought, therefore, to advert, in this place, to the rapid effects of it, less for the sake of gratifying a vain curiosity, than of contributing to the utility of history. It will moreover be by means of this natural transition, that I shall be conducted, without leaving any gap, to my re-appearance on the stage of the world, and my re-direction of state affairs.

The year 1810, at first marked by the marriage

of Napoleon and Maria Louisa, and afterwards by my disgrace, was also rendered remarkable by the disgrace of Pauline Borghese, the emperor's sister, and by the abdication of his brother Louis, King of Holland. Let us investigate these two events, in order to be better enabled to explain what followed.

Of the three sisters of Napoleon, Eliza, Caroline, and Pauline, the latter, who was celebrated for her beauty, was the one whom he most loved, without, however, suffering himself to be led by her. Giddy, whimsical, and fond of pleasure, without talent, but not without some quickness and a smattering of things, she delighted in splendour, in dissipation, and all kinds of flattery. She never hated any one except Leclerc, her first husband, and, still more, the most amiable of men, Prince Camille Borghese, to whom Napoleon had united her by her second marriage. Her first marriage was what is called a garrison marriage. Being taken ill, and refusing to follow Leclerc in his expedition to St. Domingo, she was carried by Napoleon's orders in a litter on board the admiral's ship.

Consumed by the burning heat of that tropical climate, and banished, in consequence of the unfortunate result of that expedition, to the island *De la Tortue*, she, in order to divert her mind, plunged into every species of sensuality. On the death of Leclerc, she hastened to take ship, not

like an Artemisia, nor like the wife of Britannicus, dissolved in tears, and embracing the funeral urn of her husband, but free, triumphant, and eager again to revel in all the luxuries of the capital. There, for a long while eaten up by a complaint, the seat of which is an accusing witness against incontinence, Pauline had recourse to all the treasures of Esculapius, and recovered. Strange effect of her miraculous cure; far from impairing her beauty, it derived from it a greater degree of lustre and bloom, like some curious flowers which are brought to blossom by manure, and rendered more vivacious by the rottenness out of which they spring.

Desiring nothing but unrestrained and unlimited enjoyment, but dreading her brother and his rough severity, Pauline formed a project, in conjunction with one of her women, of subjecting Napoleon to the full dominion of her charms. She employed so much art, and so much refinement, for the purpose, that her triumph was complete. Such was the intoxication of the despot, that more than once his familiars heard him exclaiming, in the excess of his admiration, that his sister was the most beautiful of the beautiful, and, in short, the Venus of the age. Her beauty, however, was only of a masculine description. But let us lay aside these scenes, which are more worthy of the pencil of Suetonius and Aretin, than of the pen of history. Voluptuous *château de Neuilly!* magnificent palace of

the Faubourg St. Honoré! if your walls, like those of the palaces of the kings of Babylon, could reveal the truth, what licentious scenes would you not depict in large characters.

For more than a year, the infatuation of the brother for the sister maintained its power, although unaccompanied by passion; in fact, no other passion but that of dominion and conquest could master that haughty and warlike mind. When, after the battle of Wagram, and the peace of Vienna, Napoleon returned in triumph to Paris, preceded by the report of his approaching divorce with Josephine, he went that very day to his sister, who was in a state of agitation, and the most anxious anticipation of his return. Never had she displayed so much love and adoration for her brother. I heard her say on that very day, for she was aware that there was no veil for me, "Why do we not rule in Egypt? We might then act like the Ptolomies; I might divorce my husband, and marry my brother." I knew she was too ignorant to have made such an allusion herself; I saw in it an ejaculation of Napoleon.

The bitter and concentrated disappointment which Pauline felt may be conceived, when, some months after that time, she saw Maria Louisa, adorned with all her innocence and candour, make her appearance at the nuptial ceremony, and take her seat on the throne, by the side of Napoleon. The imperial court then underwent a thorough reform in

its habits, its morals, and its etiquette; the reform was complete and rigorous. From that moment, the licentious court of Pauline was deserted; and that woman, who united all the weaknesses to all the graces of her sex, considering Maria Louisa in the light of a fortunate rival, conceived a mortal jealousy against her, and nourished the most intense resentment in the recesses of her heart. Her health was impaired by it. By the advice of her physician, she had recourse to the waters of *Aix la Chapelle*, as well for the purpose of recovery, as for that of escaping the *ennui* to which she was a prey. Having undertaken her journey, she met, at Brussels, Napoleon and Maria Louisa, who were travelling towards the frontier of Holland. There, compelled to appear at the court of the new empress, and eagerly seizing an opportunity of insulting her as much as possible, she went so far as to make, behind her back, while she was passing through the *salon*, a sign with her two fingers, and that accompanied by an indecent tittering, which the common people apply, in their gross style of derision, to a credulous and deluded spouse. Napoleon, who witnessed and was shocked by this impertinence, which the reflection of the mirrors had even revealed to Maria Louisa, never forgave his sister; she received, on that very day, an order to withdraw from court. From that time, disdaining submission, she preferred to live in exile and disgrace, till the events

of 1814, when the misfortunes of her brother recalled her affections and devotedness,

The disgrace of Louis, King of Holland, was of a more dignified description.

Hitherto, the emperor had only persecuted and despoiled ancient dynasties, as if, by that means, he had really intended, according to his imprudent words, to make his own the most ancient in Europe. But now, as if nothing could restrain him, he went so far as to depose a king of his own race, whose brow he himself had bound with the royal diadem. It was asked whether in proclaiming his brother King of Holland, he only meant to make a prefect of him. Louis, who was of a mild disposition, and a friend to justice, beheld, with deep sorrow, the ruin of his kingdom, occasioned by the effect of that continental system, which destroyed all industry and commerce. He secretly favoured a maritime trade, notwithstanding the threats of his brother, who called him by the name of smuggler. Enraged by seeing himself thus disobeyed, Napoleon prepared for the invasion of Holland, forgetting that he had told his brother, in calling him to the throne, and in order to conquer his repugnance, that it was much better to die a king than live a prince. Louis, finding he could not prevent the occupation of his states by the soldiers and custom-house officers of his brother, abdicated the crown in favour of his son, announcing his resolution, by a message, to the legislative body of Holland, in these

terms: "My brother, although much exasperated against me, is not so against my children; he will certainly never destroy what he has erected for their sakes; he will not take away their inheritance, since he will never have occasion to complain of a child who cannot govern for himself. The queen, appointed to the regency, will do her utmost to conciliate the emperor, my brother. She will be more fortunate than I, whose endeavours have never been crowned with success; and who can tell?—perhaps I may be the only impediment to a reconciliation between France and Holland. If that were the case, I should find some comfort in passing the remainder of a wandering and suffering life, far from the dearest objects of my warmest affection." An abdication like this was not undignified. The message was hardly delivered, when Louis secretly quitted Holland, and retired to Gratz, in Styria, in the Austrian states, having nothing more to live upon than a trifling pension. His wife Hortense, less disinterested, appropriated to herself the income of two millions which Napoleon decreed in favour of his dethroned brother.

This first example of Napoleonian abdication struck me, and made me reflect. Shall I confess the truth? it gave me the idea of the possibility of one day saving the empire, by means of an abdication imposed upon him who might, by his extravagance, compromise its prosperity. It will be seen in what manner this idea, which was at first con-

fined to myself, was realized afterwards by other political heads.

It might be thought that the abdication of Louis would have disconcerted Napoleon. But was he not surrounded by men, incessantly occupied with the task of varnishing over his invasions and encroachments? Does any one want to know what was the rhetoric employed, upon this subject, by Champagny, Duc de Cadore, his minister for foreign affairs, successively promoted to the highest offices, and of whom Talleyrand had formed so accurate a judgment, when saying that he was a man fit for all places on the day previous to an appointment being made to them? This wise minister, then commenced by proving, in a jumble called a report, that as the abdication of the King of Holland could not be made without the consent of Napoleon, it was null, from that very circumstance, and of no effect. From this he deduced the marvellous inference, (and this grand effort of logic was anticipated,) that Holland ought to be considered as a conquest, and reunited to the French empire; an inference which an *imperial decree* decided without appeal.

This event had a characteristic scene for its last act. Napoleon sent for the son of Louis, still a child, and whom he had created Grand Duc de Berg; and addressed him in the following short harangue: "Come to me, my son; the conduct of your father afflicts my heart: his disorder alone can

explain it*; come to my arms; I will be your father; you shall lose nothing by the event; but never forget, in whatever situation my policy may place you, that your paramount duty is owing to me, and that all your duties towards the people committed to your care are subordinate." In this manner it was that Napoleon rent asunder the veil of so measureless an ambition, that he placed himself above the King of kings, and the sovereignty of all nations.

But let us now explain the true cause of the usurpation of Holland; I can do it here with the more propriety, as it is, in some degree, connected with my fall. When the marriage with an arch-duchess was resolved upon, Napoleon felt a wish for general pacification, which I endeavoured to change into a firm and determined purpose. I knew by my emissaries, that the cabinet of London insisted upon two decisive points; the independence of Holland, and of the Peninsula. With Louis, the maintenance of the separation of Holland might be depended upon. As to the Peninsula, Napoleon would consent to wave his pretensions to Portugal alone, because he met with nothing but obstacles in his endeavours to conquer it. I did not, however, despair of disgusting him with the occupation of

* This insinuation of Napoleon, against his brother, was calumnious. Louis was melancholy, and valetudinarian; but his sound and right-minded judgment was not affected by that circumstance.—*Note by the French Editor.*

Spain, which had already cost him so great an effusion of blood, and which was every thing but secure. By his authority, I concerted with his brother Louis, during his residence in Paris, in 1810, a plan of secret and special negotiation with London. Louis wrote to his minister for foreign affairs, that Napoleon was so enraged against him and the English, in consequence of their clandestine trade with his dominions, that it would be impossible to prevent the forcible re-union of Holland with France, unless a maritime peace instantly took place, or, at least, unless changes in the British system of blockade, and orders of council, were effected. He authorized his minister to confer with his colleagues, on this head, but as if acting of their own accord in his absence, and to despatch to London an agent, who, being invested with a certain degree of consideration, might make overtures of negotiation in their private names. This agent was to be instructed, in the first instance, to point out to the cabinet of St. James' the immense disadvantage which would result to the commerce, and safety in coming from England, should Holland, by means of its union with the empire of Napoleon, become an instrument of aggression, in the hands of the latter; for he would, doubtless, take measures to preclude it from all commercial connexion. The ministers of Louis chose for their agent, M. Labouchère, a banker of Amsterdam, who repaired to London, with instructions to set on foot, in conjunc-

tion with the Marquess Wellesley, a secret negotiation. He was more especially to insist on the necessity of making alterations in the execution of the orders of council of the month of November, 1807. But the Marquess Wellesley refused to enter into a detached negotiation on the subject of Holland, fully aware that its independence could only be ensured as long as it was Napoleon's pleasure, who, till then, had shewn himself little disposed to recognise the rights of any of the nations placed under his influence. However, with a view to sound the real intentions of Napoleon, he authorized, about the same epoch (April, 1810), the English commissioner Mackenzie, then carrying on the negotiations, at Morlaix, relative to the exchange of prisoners, to open a negotiation for a maritime peace, which was to be concealed by the ostensible negotiation going on with the French commissioner, appointed for the exchange*. The cabinet of St. James', through the organ of the commissioner Mackenzie, left to Napoleon his choice between three modes of treating, *viz.*, 1st. The state of possession before hostilities: 2nd. The state of present possession: 3rd. Reciprocal compensation. But Napoleon, intoxicated by his prosperity, refused to listen to any of these modes of negotiation,

* Le Marquis du Moutier, at this time ambassador from Charles X., in Switzerland.—*Note by the French Editor.*

rejecting every description of peace but that, the conditions of which he should prescribe.

From that moment the Marquess Wellesley refused to receive any overture from the banker Labouchère, and even from M. Fagan, whom I had commissioned to address him with the same view. The English ministry was too well persuaded of the efficacy of its system of blockade to accede to any modification in that respect. The negotiation, therefore, was irredeemably broken off; and Napoleon, perceiving that he could not compel England to yield to his will, resolved, in the spirit of vengeance, to invade the kingdom of his brother, hoping, by that means, to withdraw Holland for ever from the influence of English commerce. At the same time, he conceived that he could no longer defer the disgrace of his minister of police, who incessantly laboured to bring him back to a reasonable system of administration and policy. He was the more induced to sacrifice me, that his private correspondents repeated, in reference to myself, and with certain London pamphleteers; "that he trembled before his own work, without having the courage to destroy it." He had been waiting for the opportunity for several months past. It has been seen* how uneasy he was respecting my connexion

* In the first part of these Memoirs.—*Note by the French Editor.*

with Bernadotte; but, in this case, there appeared to him a more plausible motive for my disgrace. He pretended that, under pretext of negotiating on the subject of Holland, my agents at London had done nothing but abandon themselves to intrigues and fraudulent speculations; by that means seeking to make me responsible for the rupture of a negotiation, which had only failed through his insincerity and domineering spirit. Such were the true motives of the invasion of Holland, and of my disgrace, the accuracy of which I can guarantee.

This system of irreconciliation and violence was perpetuated by an imperial decree (19 October, 1810), the purport of which was, that all the English merchandises found in places subjected to the emperor's dominions, or conquered by his arms, should be publicly burnt. This was an appendix to the Berlin and Milan decrees, that is to say, that the same steps were to be taken at Amsterdam and Leghorn, as had already been taken at Berlin, Frankfort, Mayence, and Paris. If the observation could not here be made, that "*to burn was not to answer*," it could at least be said, that "*to burn was not to govern.*"

Such were the consequences of the continental system, which according to silly and dastardly councillors, was to conclude by putting England *hors de combat*, and delivering the whole world to Napoleon. And this incendiary idea, which became with him, in particular, a steadfast belief, was

nothing but a political tradition, inherited by him from the directorial government, which the reporters, clubs, and newspapers, had persuaded, that the only way to reduce England, was to exclude her from the ports of the continent.

But in order to do this, it was first necessary to subjugate continental Europe, of which Napoleon did not yet possess more than one-third; the rest languished under the government of the kings, his allies, friends, or tributaries. What was the tenor of the notes which the minister Champagny Cadore successively addressed to them, in order to persuade them to close their ports against all English vessels! "That there was no longer any neutral territory for the European states; that they should not carry on any commerce active or passive, on their own account, and that France alone, by means of licenses, negotiated at London, would provide them with such goods as it was indispensable for them to receive." Such was the famous continental system, which tended to abolish the commerce of the world, and which on that very account was impracticable. But they had soon found necessary to modify it, or, rather, to merge it in the system of licenses, invented by England.

Bonaparte himself was, therefore, observed, at the end of 1810, to impart a latitude to this system, by granting permission, for a given sum, to introduce into France a certain quantity of colonial produce; but on condition of exchanging it for

goods of French manufacture, which were most frequently thrown into the sea on account of the difficulties raised by the English custom-house officers.

And who derived the greatest profit from this unheard of monopoly? Undoubtedly not the subaltern speculators, nor the *rated* commissioners of the great speculator in chief, who were reduced to little more than a trifling commission. But the emperor's profit was clear and nett. Every day he observed, with an excess of joy, which he did not disguise, the accumulation of the enormous treasure stored in the cellars of the Pavilion Marsan; they were completely encumbered with it. These treasures already amounted to near five hundred millions in specie, (£20,000,000 *;) it was a residue of the two milliards introduced into France by the effect of conquest. The desire of gold might thus have superseded eventually the desire of conquest in the mind of Napoleon, if the inexorable Nemesis had suffered him to grow old.

To form an idea of the accumulation of wealth identified with the developement of this individual's power, we must add to the treasures concealed in the cellars of the Tuileries, forty millions in moveables, and four or five millions in plate, preserved

* The voluntary companions of the captive of St. Helena, have since confirmed this disclosure; but they only compute the especial treasure of their idol in the best times at four hundred millions.—*Note by the French Editor.*

in the imperial mansions; five hundred millions distributed under the name of *dotations* to the army; and, finally, the *domaine extraordinare*, amounting to more than seven hundred millions, and which was unlimited, since it was composed of property, "which the emperor, exercising the right of peace and war, acquired by conquests and treaties." With such an indefinite text, it was impossible for any thing to escape him. Already the funds of this *domaine extraordinaire* were composed of whole provinces, of states whose fate had not been decided, and of the produce of confiscations throughout the empire. He would have, doubtless, ended in absorbing all the public revenues and property which might chance to escape from the two other institutions of *imperial domains* and *private domains*. To divide the whole of France into fiefs, and to attach them to his domain, by annual service, was one of Napoleon's favourite ideas.

What a magnificent *regime* of military spoliation on the one hand, and of gifts and prodigality on the other. Whither was it likely to conduct us? To shed our blood in order to subject the whole world to a state of vassalage. And yet there was but little hope of satiating the voracity of the favourites and votaries of an insatiable conqueror.

Such calculations coming from my pen, and the reflections which accompany them, will occasion some readers, I doubt not, to smile or sneer. How, it will be said, was it, that this minister, so morti-

fied because he was disgraced, remained a stranger to the abuses of lucrative gratuities which he now, perhaps, exclaims against because their source is dried up? Was he not himself loaded with honours and riches?—And who denies it? What, because a man has shared individually in the advantages of an outrageous, pernicious, and insupportable system, should he abstain from telling the truth when he has pledged himself to reveal every thing? The time for reservation is past. It is, besides, necessary in this place, to state the causes of the fall of the greatest empire which ever adorned or desolated the universe.

It will be seen how Napoleon, in a very little space of time, voluntarily precipitated himself beyond all the bounds of moderation and prudence.

As a consequence of the usurpation of Holland, he declared, in a message addressed to the senate, (10 December, 1810,) that new guarantees had become indispensable to him, and those which had appeared most urgent, were the re-union of the mouth of the Scheldt, of the Maes, of the Rhine, the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe, and the establishment of a navigation in the Baltic. Thence a *senatus consultum*, (13 December, 1810,) decreeing that Holland, a considerable portion of the north of Germany, and the free towns of Hamburgh, Bremen, and Lubec, should, thenceforth, become an integral part of the French empire, and form ten new departments. It was thus that Napoleon, without

thinking of consolidating what he had acquired, was incessantly tormented with the thirst of new acquisitions.

This violent incorporation was effected without any motive of right, even ostensible; without any previous negotiation with any cabinet whatsoever; and under the futile pretext, that it was rendered indispensable by the war with England. Napoleon, by this act, annihilated even his own creations; the states of the confederation of the Rhine, the kingdom of Westphalia, and all other territories, were called upon to furnish their quota towards this new lion's share.

But he thus obtained for himself a new frontier line, which deprived the southern and central provinces of Germany of all communication with the northern sea; which passed the Elbe, separated Denmark from Germany, established itself on the Baltic, and, in its direction, seemed intended to join with the line of Prussian fortresses, on the Oder, which we occupied, in spite of treaties.

It is obvious enough that all the neighbouring powers must have been alarmed at an act which thus established, on the flanks of Germany, a new French dominion; and that by a mere decree, by a *senatus consultum*, exacted from a servile senate. I immediately concluded, that the treaty of Tilsit, the principal object of which was to prevent the two empires from bordering upon each other, was,

by that means, annulled; and that France and Russia, thus brought into contact, would not be long before they would fall to blows.

When I learnt, by means of my correspondents at Paris, the uneasiness which the junction of the Hanse-towns caused to Russia, Prussia, and even Austria, I was confirmed in the opinion, that there was, in that circumstance, not only the germ of a new universal war, but of a conflict which would finally decide whether we were to have an universal monarchy in the hands of Napoleon Bonaparte, or the restoration of every thing which the revolution had dispersed or destroyed.

Alas! with this great question was incorporated another; namely, the identical question of the interest of the revolution, and of the safety of the individuals who had founded and established it. What was to become of them? Could I remain cold, alien, and insensible to so alarming a future prospect?

Among the princes recently despoiled was the Duke of Oldenburg, of the house of Holstein Gottorp; that is to say, of the same house as the Emperor of Russia; and Napoleon thus took away the patrimony of a prince whom every reason ought to have induced him to spare. A negotiation was opened on this subject, between the court of St. Petersburgh and the cabinet of the Tuileries. Napoleon, by way of indemnity, offered the Duke of Oldenburg the city and territory of Erfurt. When

I learnt that this offer had just been haughtily rejected, that the Emperor Alexander had, by a formal protest, reserved the rights of his family from encroachment, and that his ministers had received orders to present that protest at the various courts, I no longer entertained a doubt that war was on the point of breaking out. But, reflecting on the circumspect and measured character of the Emperor Alexander, I concluded that the approach of the crisis would neither be abrupt nor precipitate.

Let us now pass to the year 1811, during which all the elements of a frightful tempest were maturing in the midst of a deceitful calm, the illusions and deceptions of which I detected. From day to day my Parisian bulletins and my private correspondences assumed a character of a deeper interest. In order to connect the chain of facts, I will give her a sketch of the most striking details and features, scarcely allowing myself to combine with them some short reflections, or some necessary elucidations. I have, moreover, already said, that anxious as I am to arrive at the period of my re-entrance into office, an abridged historical transition, which will bring us to the catastrophes of 1813, 1814, and 1815, will be most accordant with my design.

The first event, which offers itself to notice, is that of the birth of a child, proclaimed King of Rome (20th March 1811) at the first moment of its

existence; as if a son of Bonaparte could not be born any thing else than a king! This sudden revival of the kingdom of Tarquin the Proud, appeared to some persons in the light of a bad omen; it reminded too much of the recent spoliation of the holy see, and the oppression exercised upon the person of the sovereign pontiff. Ridiculous reports, respecting the birth of this infant king were propagated, and accredited, in Paris. If these reports, which originated both in the upper and lower classes, did not prove the hostile tendency of public opinion, at that epoch, against the perpetuity of the new dynasty, I would have dispensed with alluding to them, as unworthy of the dignity of history. Malignity made a show of an ingenious credulity. A pretended pregnancy was at first supposed; as if an arch-duchess, becoming barren, could ever belie the well-known Latin distich. The consequence of this supposition led to another fable, according to which, the King of Rome was identified with a child lately born from a connexion between Napoleon and the duchess de M—. Some newsmongers pretended that he was substituted in the place of a still-born child; others in the room of a female infant. Certes, the arch-chancellor, Cambacérès, could not have been mistaken. The calumnies of the malignant were inexhaustible. It is, however, true, that the labour of Maria Louisa was horribly protracted; that the *accoucheur* got bewildered; that the child was concluded to be

dead; and that he only recovered from his lethargy, by the effect of the repeated report of the hundred and one guns fired at his birth. As to the emperor's transport, it was very natural. Some flatterers inferred from it, in the first instance, that Napoleon, more fortunate than Cæsar, would have nothing to dread from the ides of March, since the 20th of March was distinguished as a day of good fortune, both for himself and the empire. Napoleon believed in horoscopes and predictions. Yet, what a disappointment he experienced in March 1814 and 1815!

He departed from Rambouillet, with Maria Louisa, towards the end of May, in order to visit Cherbourg. On their return to St. Cloud (4th June, 1811), they presided at the baptism of their son, whom Napoleon, lifting in his arms, himself exhibited to the numerous persons present. All things seemed to conspire in announcing the most brilliant destinies for this child; three years sufficed to overthrow the colossal power of his father, —and yet the court, the great officers, the ministers, and the whole empire, lived in the most profound security. There were scarcely to be discovered, even among thinking men, a sign or two of apprehension and vague disquietude.

Some few days afterwards (16th June, 1811), Napoleon, opening the session of the legislative body, announced that the birth of the King of Rome had accomplished his wishes, and fulfilled the prayers of

his people. He spoke of the incorporation of the Roman states, of Holland, of the Hanse towns, and of the Valais; and concluded by saying, that he flattered himself that the peace of the continent would not be broken. France easily understood the purport of these last words, which were not dropped without a design of preparing the public mind for war.

The *ukase*, intended by the Emperor Alexander to extricate his empire from the embarrassment in which the continental system had thrown it, was made known to me. Russia could no longer renounce her maritime commerce. I, moreover, knew that the faction of the old Russians began to predominate in the councils of Alexander. The *ukase* confined the importation of merchandise to certain specified ports; and among those which were subjected to tariff, no article of French manufacture was found. I saw in that a retort for the arbitrary seizure of the Hanse towns.

As to our commerce, compressed from day to day within our immediate limits, it only existed in land-carriage; we had no other vessels of burden than waggons and drays. The great reputation of our industry rested, at that time, upon the manufacture of sugar from beet-root. It was a lucky experiment for certain adventurers in the line of national industry, who thereby obtained from the government advance-money, premiums, and grants of land. The administration exhausted its funds in

these juggleries, the actors of which promised us beet-root sugar at a colonial price. According to my Parisian correspondents, the emperor had already, under a glass, on his mantle-piece, at St. Cloud, a loaf of refined beet-root sugar, which would bear comparison with the best colonial sugar that ever issued from the warehouses of the sugar-refiner of Orleans. It was so perfect a specimen, that his minister of the interior had presented it to him, with all the pomp which might correspond with a rarity worthy of figuring in a museum. Specimens of it were sent in presents to the prince primate, and to all the little potentates of the confederation of the Rhine. If it was above the public reach, in consequence of its high price, it had, by way of compensation, under its hand, syrup of raisins and indigenous coffee made of Chicoree at a reasonable price. In the midst of this penury of colonial produce, some new manufactures flourished in the interior, and some hundred manufacturers, who shared in the distribution of prizes and premiums, loudly cried up the activity of our internal commerce.

All other commerce languished; and, what was still more deplorable, the people began to suffer from dearth, occasioned by a bad harvest, and aggravated by the extent of those exportations on which the government obtained a profit. To say the truth, indeed, in order to render misery less importunate, *depôts* of mendicity were established

in different parts of the empire, where one portion of the population was successively penned up, and fed by means of economical soups. But the people who persevered in their *panivorous* propensities, accused the emperor of selling our corn to the English. It is certain that the corn-monopoly exercised by Napoleon partly contributed to produce the famine. The spirit which reigned in the *salons* was not more favourable to the emperor; it was even becoming hostile. Such was the manner in which public opinion was moulded since Savary directed it.

That individual, who was dazzled by the pomp of rank and the illusion of outward circumstances, imagined that he should arrive at a state of influence and power, if he possessed creatures, parasites, and literary men, enlisted at his table, and at his orders. He conceived that, in order to profit by my *traditions*, all that was necessary, was to ingratiate the *Faubourg Saint Germain*, without divesting his police of its odious and irritating character. In a word, he thought he could form the public spirit of the empire, as *Madame de Genlis* formed the manners of the new court. It was then that the famous *déjeuners à la fourchette* were established, at which Savary presided, and at which all the hired jurists, who corresponded with the emperor, and all the journalists who aspired to be made directors, or to receive money, were to be

found. It was there that Savary, excited by previously made up *bons mot*, and by the fumes of a plentiful breakfast, imparted commands, to each of his guests, as to the colour they should give to the literature of the week.

The direction of this moral portion of the police was confided to the poet Esmenard, a writer of real talent, but in so much discredit, that I thought it necessary to keep the bridle constantly in his mouth, whenever I set him to work. Soon, taking too great an advantage of the superiority of his talents and of his position, he led the new minister, in flattering his passions and follies. I had respected learning and letters. My successor, appearing to become the protector of the academies, treated them in a military manner, forcing his own creatures upon them as candidates; and seemed to have nothing more at heart than the desire of degrading, in a scandalous manner, the organs of knowledge and of public opinion. I had respected the proprietorship of the journals; Savary invaded its rights with audacity, and divided its shares among his familiars and agents. Thus he deprived himself, in consequence of the degradation of the journals, of one of the principal levers of public opinion. It was in the same way that Napoleon took a dislike to Madame de Staël; and in concert with the poet Esmenard, did all he could to injure her; an impolitic persecution, because he

thus made of the numerous coteries of that celebrated woman, a hot-bed of opposition to the imperial *regime,* and of animosity to the emperor.

In the upper police, there was the same system and the same violence; and there little Desmarets was to be found acting the part of an effective minister. What was to be expected from a man of such slender talents, and from the combinations of a minister of his description? Awkward inventions, repulsive acts, and a vexatious administration. Some idea may be formed of it by the following example. A certain *Baron de Kolly,* a Piedmontese, who was commissioned by the British government to attempt the liberation of Ferdinand of Spain from his captivity, disembarked about the beginning of March, 1810, in Quiberon Bay; thence he proceeded to Paris, where I ordered him to be arrested and conveyed to the *château de Vincennes.* What, forsooth, does my successor do? He imagines a plan of trying Ferdinand's inclinations, by means of a false Baron de Kolly, supplied with the papers and the letter of credit belonging to the real emissary. Ferdinand the Seventh was, however, upon his guard; he saw the snare, avoided it, and left Savary to put the best face he could on his defeat.

The Queen of Etruria, deprived of her states, lived at Nice, in exile, where she was shamefully treated; emissaries were sent to induce her to throw herself into the arms of the English. This

unhappy queen, driven to despair, embraced what appeared to her the only means of safety; she was arrested and threatened to be carried before a military commission, and two of her officers were shot. When there is no conspiracy, a sham one is easily imagined, or a real one excited. It was in this manner that some unfortunate inhabitants of Toulon, said to be implicated in an obscure plot against our arsenals, were dragged to punishment in a city yet bleeding with the memory of its past afflictions.

In the mean while, opinion remained silent. There was no more communication; no more open conversations; no more confidence among the citizens. It was only in the interior of the domestic circle, or in the bosom of friendship, that the public grief dared to express itself in stifled accents of affliction. In default of public opinion, the emperor wished to be supplied with that which emanated from the *salons* of Paris. A factitious opinion was manufactured expressly for his service, by the three hundred police spies, hired at large salaries. There were, in this manner, several statistical surveys of public feeling; the five or six polices supplied theirs. The least insignificant was, unquestionably, that of the director general of posts Lavalette. Already a correspondent and confidential emissary of Napoleon, when he was only a general, he was well acquainted with what was agreeable to him in this respect. The emperor,

who was soon enabled to appreciate what was wanting in these secret researches, the true spirit of which no one but myself had seized, demanded facts. These were furnished; but miserable facts they were; and he concluded, either by rejecting or not reading them, so tiresome and incoherent did he find them. In my retreat, some of these bulletins, got up by the pupils of the police system, were brought to me. At a later period, Savary himself wrote entirely the bulletin which issued from his own cabinet, believing that he should by that means impart more importance to his vague discoveries.

If, since my disgrace, the police had degenerated in its most essential functions, it was the same with another public office, which was also the asylum of mystery. I allude to the office of foreign relations, where, since the resignation of M. de Talleyrand, the spirit of conquest, of violence, and oppression, were no longer repressed by moderation or restraint. Napoleon had the imprudence (and the consequences will be seen presently) to disgust that personage, so independent in mind, so brilliant in talent, and so practised and refined in his taste; who, moreover, had by his diplomacy, done him at least as much service as I myself had been able to render him in the higher affairs of state, which concerned the security of his person. But Napoleon could never forgive Talleyrand, for having always spoken of the war in Spain with

a disapproving freedom of speech. In a short time the *salons* and the boudoirs of Paris became the theatre of a secret warfare between the adherents of Napoleon on the one side, and of Talleyrand and his friends on the other—a war in which epigrams and *bons mots* constituted the artillery, and in which the victor of Europe was almost always beaten. This species of satirical encounter assumed a more serious character, in proportion as the Spanish war grew more envenomed in its progress. On their side, M. and Madame de Talleyrand only took a warmer interest in the princes of the house of Spain, banished to their *château de Valency*, by a petty refinement of vengeance on the part of Napoleon. Daily more incensed with Talleyrand, he one day perceived him at his levee, in the midst of his courtiers; and, in the hope of humiliating him, by taking advantage of an affair of gallantry supposed to have passed at Valency, he put a question to him which, to a husband, is considered as one of the greatest of insults. Without exhibiting any emotion in his countenance, Talleyrand replied in a dignified manner, "It would be well both for the glory of your majesty and mine, if the princes of the house of Spain were never mentioned." Never did Napoleon display so much confusion, as after receiving this severe lesson, given in a manner which showed such a high sense of good-breeding. All things shortly announced a complete disgrace, and the

position of Talleyrand was gradually becoming more difficult. His mansion, his friends, and his servants, were subjected to a perpetual *espionnage*, which Savary himself even affected not to disguise. He boasted to his familiar partisans that he kept Talleyrand and Fouché in perpetual alarm. The public drew the inference, that the chief of the state, through his suspicious character, had deprived himself of the services of two men, whose advice would always have been beneficial; and that either in the police department, or in the foreign affairs, there were no longer sufficient moderation or ability, since they had retired. The police was nothing more than a fruitless and aggravating inquisition. In the department of foreign affairs, they had become accustomed to look upon treaties as mere truces, or expedients calculated to arrive at new wars. They even went so far as no longer to blush at making the most scandalous avowals. "We no longer want principles," said Champagny-Cadore, who succeeded Talleyrand; the same individual who had himself directed the violence exercised on the person of the pope and the princes of the house of Spain. And yet, this same minister, when out of the diplomatic sphere, or rather beyond the influence of Napoleon, was one of the mildest men in France in deportment, and one of the most moderate in opinion. Soon, we shall see him share in a disgrace which, it seems, none of Napoleons' ministers could escape.

As it was no longer possible to maintain one's self in place, except by flattering the passions of the individual who had the source of all power and favour, the *journeymen labourers* of the imperial politics again set themselves briskly to work, in order to accelerate the fall of England and the humiliation of Russia. Memorials and projects followed each other, under the protection of the secret police of Desmarets and Savary, whose function it was to make themselves responsible for those daily projectors. The emperor no longer received any reports, but those in which the truth of facts and their consequences were either distorted or disguised; he no longer imbibed any information but such as was derived from impassioned correspondences, replete with proposals and projects of intrigues, adventures, and acts of violence.

The idea was at length entertained of manœuvring (*travailler*) England at the same time as Russia. I had endeavoured without effect, while I held the reins of the high police, to bring the emperor to sounder ideas respecting England. The emperor esteemed the English, and had no especial dislike to England; but he feared the oligarchy of its government. It was his belief that England, under a system of this description, would never suffer him to enjoy a substantial peace, but only a truce of three years to the utmost, after which it would be necessary to begin again. I could never succeed in destroying the prejudices and misapprehensions

of the emperor on this head. Other persons, by the coarsest sophistries, inflamed his ruling passion against the nature of the British constitution, a passion which plunged him once more into an universal war. It was a revolution in earnest which Bonaparte wished to effect in England; he thirsted with a desire to strangle the liberty of the press, and the liberty of parliamentary discussion. Induced to wish for the moment when he could behold that island, in her turn, a prey to the horrors of a political revolution, he sent agents there, who deceived him as to its actual condition. I told him a hundred times that England was as powerful through her constitution as through her naval force; but he preferred believing the representations of interested spies. It was in the hope of causing internal dissensions to explode, that, during the year 1811, he chiefly gave his mind to the project of entirely excluding English commerce from the continent. His emissaries did not fail to attribute to the continental blockade, the distress of the manufactures in that kingdom, as well as the numerous bankruptcies, which, during the course of that same year, struck deadly blows at the stability of English credit. They announced the approach of serious tumults; and maintained that England could not much longer support a state of war, which cost her more than fifty millions sterling.

In fact, riots among the working people who had no occupation broke out in Nottinghamshire. The

mutineers assembled in numbers, burnt or destroyed the looms, and committed all kinds of excess. They described themselves as being under the orders of a Captain *Ludd*, an imaginary personage, whence they received the name of *Luddites*. The emperor considered this in the light of a national wound, which it was his policy to enlarge, like that of Ireland. In a short time, indeed, the system of insurrection extended its sphere of action, and involved the neighbouring counties of Derby and Leicester. It was affirmed in the cabinet of Napoleon, that persons of note were not strangers to the commotion, and were even its instigators, In case of a serious insurrection, supported by correspondent movements, prepared in London, the co-operation, more or less efficacious of our prisoners, who amounted to fifty thousand, was calculated upon. Such was one of the motives which influenced Napoleon in not consenting to their proposed exchange. As we had no more than 10,000 English prisoners in France, but near 53,000 Spanish and Portuguese, the emperor feigned to consent to an exchange, but only in the proportion of one Englishman and four Spaniards or Portuguese, against five Frenchmen or Italians. He was sure beforehand, that England would reject an exchange founded upon this principle. In fact, the mere proposal highly incensed the English ministry.

Napoleon, who became more rigid as to continental system, in proportion as he saw the distress

of England increasing, insisted upon the ports of Sweden being more completely closed, only leaving to that power the choice of a war with England or with France. This impolitical severity, exhibited towards an independent power, proceeded in some degree from his discontent with Bernadotte, who had been proclaimed, the year preceding, (21 Aug. 1810) by the unanimous vote of the Swedish states, prince royal, and hereditary successor of King Charles XIII. This sudden elevation had not pleased Napoleon, at the bottom of his heart, and his resentment against his old companion in arms had gone on increasing since the mission with which I had intrusted him, in 1809, for the defence of Antwerp. Napoleon was persuaded that there was a secret intelligence between Bernadotte and myself at that time, and that if he had then experienced any striking reverse in Germany, I should have caused Bernadotte to be proclaimed either first consul or emperor, in order to close the gates of France against him for ever. Thus, on the other hand, he saw him first depart for the North, without regret, considering himself too happy to be delivered from the presence of a man, whom Savary, and his familiars, represented to him in the light of an adversary, who might one day become formidable. Believing even, for some months, that he should be able to retain him compulsively, within the orbit of his own politics, he addressed note upon note, and injunction upon injunction, to the govern-

ment of Charles XIII., to induce it to keep its ports rigorously closed against English commerce. Exasperated that sufficient promptitude was not exhibited in accomplishing his views, he caused his privateers to seize such Swedish vessels as were loaded with colonial produce, and persevered in the occupation of Pomerania. Mutual complaints being thus engendered, Napoleon gave new disquietude to the government of which Bernadotte had become the hope and the arbiter. The whole of the year 1811 was spent in altercations between the two states.

The knowledge which I had of the character of Bernadotte gave me sufficient reason to foresee, that he would conclude by throwing himself into the arms of Russia, and of England; either to guarantee the independence of Sweden, or to secure his rights of inheritance to a crown of which Napoleon showed himself envious.

My former connexion with the Prince of Sweden gave the emperor (through the representation of Savary) the idea that I secretly excited Bernadotte to maintain himself in an attitude of opposition to the cabinet of St. Cloud. I soon learnt, beyond the possibility of doubt, that I was watched, and that my letters were opened. And here I beg to ask what would be thought of me, if I had not put myself in a condition to defeat the ridiculous investigations of a police, all the windings of which I was acquainted with? I was not, however igno-

rant of what was passing at Stockholm, nor even in all the North; I had Colonel V. C—— near the person of Bernadotte, who supplied me with all that it was necessary to know.

Let us conclude, by some reflections on the Peninsular war, our sketch of the political events of 1811, which will bring us to the fatal expedition into Russia. The resistance of the Spanish people had already assumed the character of a national war, and it was Napoleon himself who had opened this field of battle on the continent, for England's advantage.

Ever since the beginning of 1810, the war had become so complicated in Spain, it already offered so many chances to the ambition and the rivalries of the various generals, that when King Joseph came to Paris, to attend the nuptials of the emperor, he made an express demand that all the troops should be withdrawn, or that they should be placed under his immediate orders, or rather under the direction of his major-general. The emperor took good care not to grant him the recal of the troops; but he invested him with their command. Joseph then took with him, from Paris, Marshal Jourdan, who bore the title of major-general to the King of Spain. The generals-in-chief were supposed to be under his orders, and were to send their reports to King Joseph, and to the emperor at the same time. But these measures remedied nothing; there were always several armies, and the generals depending

at once on Paris and Madrid, took precautions to depend upon neither; their first and principal object was to remain masters of the provinces which they occupied, or for which they were contending with the enemy.

In the meanwhile, we had been twice driven from Portugal, where the English army found infinite resources, and a secure place of refuge. All things ought to have convinced Napoleon, that in order to subject the Peninsula, it was, in the first place, indispensable to effect the conquest of Lisbon, and compel the English to re-embark. To this he had, in some sort, pledged himself in the face of Europe. But his genius was in fault, in this instance, as in many other decisive circumstances, where the irritability and impetuosity of his character ought to have given way to profounder views, or at least to the most ordinary foresight. How could it have escaped his notice, that he was risking not only his Spanish conquest, but even his own fortune, in suffering a military and hostile reputation to establish itself in the Peninsula? Europe had a sufficient number of soldiers; all that she wanted was a general capable of guiding them, and of making a stand against the French army, no matter how. It is incredible how this view of the subject could have escaped the observation of Napoleon. It was only through too great a confidence in himself and in his good fortune. Thus, instead of marching in person at the head of a for-

midable army, to drive Wellington out of Portugal, (and this the state of the continent, at that time, permitted,) he sent Masséna there, the most skilful, doubtless, of his lieutenants, a man gifted with unusual courage and remarkable perseverance, whose talent grew with the increase of danger, and who, when vanquished, always appeared ready to recommence the struggle as if he had been the victor. But, Masséna, who was a daring depredator, was also the secret enemy of the emperor, who had compelled him to disgorge three millions of money (£120,000). Like Soult, he indulged himself in the belief that he also might be enabled to win a crown at the point of the sword; the examples of Napoleon, of Murat, and of Bernadotte, were besides so alluring, that Masséna's mind easily gave way to ambitious visions of reigning in his turn. Full of hope, he began his march at the head of 60,000 soldiers; but in the very middle of the first difficulties of the expedition, he received certain intelligence that the emperor was disposed to restore Portugal to the house of Braganza, provided England would consent to his retaining Spain; and that a secret negotiation was opened for that purpose. Masséna, piqued and discouraged, suffered the fire of his military genius to evaporate. Moreover, in an operation so decisive, no one could supply Napoleon's place; he alone could dare to sacrifice from 30 to 40,000 men to carry the formidable lines of Torres Vedras, which surrounded Lisbon

as a rampart of steel. And yet every thing was about to depend on the issue of this campaign of 1810, both with reference to Napoleon and to Europe. It showed a real deficiency of tact and genius, to have failed in perceiving this intimate co-relation.

What was the consequence? The campaign failed; Lord Wellington triumphed. Masséna, falling into disgrace, returned to dance attendance in the saloons of the Tuileries, only obtaining, after a month's solicitation, a private audience, in which he detailed the reverses of the campaign; and, in short, the Peninsular war, notwithstanding many great exploits, exhibited, upon the whole, an alarming aspect. Suchet alone, in the eastern provinces, transmitted titles of incontestible glory to the French name; he effected the conquest of the kingdom of Valencia, and was always equal to himself. While he was, as it were, making himself independent there, Soult, who had not been able to make himself King of Portugal, was playing the part of a sovereign in Andalusia; and Marmont, rallying the wrecks of the army of Portugal, acted separately, on the Douro and the Tormes; in a word, the lieutenants of Bonaparte established distinct military governments, and Joseph was no more than a fictitious king. He could no longer go out of Madrid without having an army for his escort; more than once he narrowly escaped being taken by the *guerillas;* his king-

dom was not his own; the provinces which we occupied were, in reality, no more than French provinces, ruined by our armies, or devastated by the *guerillas*, who harassed us without intermission. I lay it down as a fact, that all the subsequent reverses of the Peninsula are to be attributed to the errors of the campaign of 1810, so falsely conceived, and so heedlessly undertaken. Towards the end of 1811, Joseph despatched the Marquess of Almenara, invested with full powers to sign his formal abdication at Paris, or to obtain a recognition of the independence of Spain. But Napoleon, turning his whole attention towards Russia, postponed his decision regarding Spain, till after the issue of the great and distant enterprise in which he was about to engulf himself.

The Russian war was not a war undertaken for the sake of sugar and coffee, as the vulgar at first believed, but a war purely political. If the causes of it have not been accurately understood, it is because, covered with the mysterious veil of diplomacy, they could only be perceived by enlightened observers and statesmen. The seeds of the Russian war were enclosed even in the treaty of Tilsit. In order to prove this, it will be sufficient for me to adduce its immediate consequences. The foundation of the kingdom of Westphalia for the Napoleonian dynasty; the accession of the largest portion of the princes of the north of Germany to the confederation of the Rhine; the erection of the

duchy of Warsaw, a nucleus for the re-establishment of Poland, an ever-acting bugbear in the hands of its inventor, and which he might direct, at his will, either against Russia or against Austria; the re-establishment of the republic of Dantzic, of which the independence was guaranteed, but whose permanent subjection gave to Napoleon a port and a garrison town on the Baltic; finally, military roads secured to the French armies across the Prussian states, and which broke down every barrier interposed between France and the Russian frontiers; —such were the conditions to which the Russian cabinet subscribed in exchange for eventual acquisitions in Turkey, which soon turned out to be illusory. It is true, it was not so with regard to Finland. But, however that might be, we cannot deny that, if the Russian autocrat acknowledged an equal in Napoleon, he also recognised in him a conqueror, who, sooner or later, would avail himself of his advantages.

But, first, directing his ambitious views towards the south, Spain, Portugal, and Spanish America became the immediate objects of his cupidity. Hence resulted a respite in favour of the Russian empire, while Napoleon appeared to abide by a captious treaty. But it cost him very little, besides, to fascinate the eyes of those whom he caressed while he was concerting their ruin. At the time when I was near him, his views upon Russia had not escaped me; and, I confess, that seduced

myself by the grandeur of his plans, I had once indulged in the hope of seeing the re-establishment of Poland, founded upon its liberty; but Napoleon, repelling Kosciusko, or, at least, endeavouring to draw him into a snare, I perceived that his only object was to extend his dominion beyond the Vistula, and the example of his ravages in Spain soon corrected my judgment.

In fine, it was well understood that the Emperor Alexander, in order to preserve peace, was, in every thing, to please Napoleon, his cabinet, his ministers, and his ambassadors; and that he was not to deviate, in any respect, from the obligation of acknowledging his supremacy, and of obeying his will.

While proceeding to the conquest of Spain, Napoleon had put the finishing hand to his federal system, and thus prepared the way to universal monarchy. The last defeat of Austria followed; next the forced marriage of an archduchess,—and the change operated in the politics of the latter power. Then the European continent lost all hope of being able to shake off the yoke, as long as the Emperor Alexander remained faithful to his alliance with the chief of the federal empire, already named *the great empire.* But how was it possible to breathe in the neighbourhood of so oppressive an atmosphere of ambition? Russia already began to recognise that the infallible results of the continental system, for every nation which submitted to

it, was the ruin of commerce and of industry, the establishment of excessive imposts, the burden of immense armies nearly foreign to their princes, and princes incapable of protecting their trembling subjects from the gripe of the usurper of Europe.

The Emperor Alexander, after three years of an ambiguous and burdensome alliance, at length opened his eyes. He found it was necessary to gather all the strength of his empire, in order to secure his independence. Instructed by his emissaries that the anti-French party, or that of the old Russians, began to prevail in the cabinet of St. Petersburgh, Napoleon returned, with regard to Russia, to his plan of 1805 and 1806, which he had only at that time postponed, with the intention of preparing its execution with more efficacy.

This was his plan: to divide or abolish the Russian empire, or compel the Emperor Alexander to make a humiliating peace, followed by an alliance between Russia, France, and Austria, the basis and the price of which were to be the restoration of Poland, and the dissolution of the empire of the crescent. This was to be followed by the acceding of all Europe to the continental system, which, with Bonaparte, was only a mask for universal domination.

But, in the first instance, it was indispensable to gain Russia by intimidation, or otherwise to make a deadly war upon her, for the purpose of abrogating her power, or expelling her into Asia.

Exertions were made, long beforehand, to shake the fidelity of the Poles, by preparing their minds, by means of underhand negotiation.

When Napoleon had determined that all the springs of his diplomacy should be put in motion towards the north, he changed his minister of foreign affairs, the complication of so many intrigues and manœuvres becoming too much, not indeed for the zeal, but for the energy, of Champagny-Cadore.

Napoleon did not think himself secure in confiding the weight of affairs, so important, to any other person than Maret, the chief of his *secrétariat*, —that is to say, all foreign affairs were, from that moment, concentrated in his cabinet, and received no other impulse than from him. Under this point of view, Maret, who was a true official machine, was the very man whom the emperor wanted. Without being a bad man, he really admired his master, whose thoughts, secrets, and inclinations, he was acquainted with. He was, moreover, his confidential secretary, and the individual best acquainted with the art of connecting or transfusing into grammatical phraseology his effusions and political imaginations. It was also he who kept the secret book, in which the emperor made his notes of such individuals of all countries and parties, who might be useful to him, as well as of men who were pointed out to his notice, and whose intentions he suspected. He also kept the *tarif* of all

courts and pensioned personages from one end of Europe to the other; in short, it was Maret who, for a long time past, had directed the emissaries of the cabinet. Constantly devoted to the caprices of Napoleon, and opposing nothing but the calmness of unconquerable resignation to the violence of the emperor, it was with perfect sincerity, and under the impression that he was following the line of his duty, that Maret unscrupulously lent himself to proceedings which attacked the security of the states. Never did it enter his mind to oppose the will of Napoleon; hence, the increasing good graces of his master in his favour.

These mysteries of the cabinet, the unusual tone of some of the notes in 1811, the indication of great preparations secretly set on foot, and manœuvres and intrigues abroad, awakened the attention of Russia. The Czar had already found that the time was come to penetrate Napoleon's projects, and, desiring to obtain some better guarantee than that of his ambassador, Kourakin, who was too much cajoled at St. Cloud, and besides was a partisan of the continental system, he had despatched Count Czernitscheff to Paris, ever since the month of January, on a diplomatic mission. This young noblemen, who was the colonel of a regiment of cossacks, in the Russian imperial guard, attracted the notice of the court of Napoleon, on his first appearance, by his politeness and chivalrous deportment. He appeared in every circle, and at

every fête; and he obtained there, as well as among the highest society, so great a success, that he soon became the rage among all those ladies who contended for the empire of elegance and beauty. They all aspired to the homage of the amiable and brilliant envoy of the Russian emperor. For some time he appeared to be doubtful about his choice, but at length it was to the Duchess of R—— that the Paris of the Neva gave the apple. This intrigue made the more noise, inasmuch as it was the emperor, and not his minister of police, who first suspected that, under the mask of gallantry, under the exterior of amiable and showy accomplishments, the Russian envoy concealed a mission of political investigation. Suspicions increased when he was seen to return upon a new mission, a month after his departure. Vexed at having been anticipated and forewarned by his master, Savary, in order to please him, commissioned his factotum, Esmenard, to let fly some pointed, but indirect, squibs at the Czar's emissary. The very evening previous to his arrival, (11th of April, 1811,) the semi-official scribe inserted, in the *Journal de l'Empire*, an article, in which were related the travels of an officer, named Bower, in the employ of Russia, whom Prince Potemkin commissioned one while to hire a dancer at Paris; at another time to purchase *Botargo* in Albania, watermelons in Astracan, and grapes in the Crimea. The allusion was obvious. Czernitscheff felt him-

self insulted, and complained firmly, having previously consulted with his ambassador. The intention of Napoleon not being to hurry a rupture, he pretended to be exasperated at a satire of which he had himself supplied the idea; and, by way of satisfaction, pronounced the ostensible disgrace of Esmenard, who was temporarily banished to Naples; though loaded at the same time with gold and secret favours. These gifts were fatal to him; he was, two months after, (25th of June, 1811,) run away with by spirited horses, which dashed him down a precipice, on the road to Fondi, and the unfortunate man was killed by the fracture of his skull against a rock.

Meantime, Napoleon and his ministers were incessant in their complaints at St. Petersburgh, of the effects produced by the *ukase* of the 31st of December, which favoured the interest of England by permitting the introduction of her colonial goods. The Paris Journals even frequently announced that English vessels were admitted into Russian ports. From that time, all clear-sighted men felt convinced that a new rupture was inevitable. It was well understood that the apparent causes of irritation merely served as disguises for political complaints, which had become the subject of animated debates between the two empires. In the autumn of 1811, the war was considered, even in England, to be imminent, and the cabinet of London was persuaded that Napoleon could no longer send to his

armies in Spain the reinforcement which his brother Joseph solicited.

It was also from this epoch, an epoch still fresh on my memory, that, by the sole medium of rumours and conjectures spread through society, and repeated in all classes, public prepossession was created, accompanied by so great an expectation, which, during six or eight months, absorbing all the attention of the popular mind, concentrated it upon the immense enterprise which Napoleon was about to undertake. I was so absorbed in it, that I felt the greatest desire of drawing nearer to the capital. I hoped to be enabled to change my relative position there, and, by that means, find myself in a condition to present to the emperor, while time remained, some observations calculated to make him abandon his resolution, or induce him to modify his projects; for a secret presentiment seemed to warn me that he was in this case rushing on his destruction.

Great difficulties, however, obstructed this design. In the first instance, I could not dissemble from myself, that I had become an object of suspicion and disquietude to the emperor; I knew that an order to watch all my actions had been repeatedly given; but that the high police had found itself so much at fault, as to be obliged to allege that my great distance and mode of life rendered all watching abortive; that, in a word, I evaded all kind of investigations with infinite adroitness.

Upon this *datum* I founded my chance of success for the direct demand, which I addressed to the emperor, through the intervention of Duroc; and I caused it adroitly to be supported by the Count de Narbonne, who was at that time rising rapidly in favour.

I alleged, that the climate of the South was particularly prejudicial to my health; that such was the opinion of my physicians; that, moreover, a residence of some months, on my estate of Pont-Carré, was rendered indispensably necessary, by the interests of my family; that I should derive great comfort from being allowed to retire into seclusion, for which I had always entertained a decided predilection. I immediately received permission; but Duroc at the same time confidentially advised me to live at Ferrières, in the greatest possible privacy, in order to give no cause of umbrage, especially as I had the police and many prejudices against me. I consequently changed my residence, but without display, and, if I may so express myself, incognito. As soon as I arrived at Ferrières, I began to live in seclusion, receiving nobody, and apparently having no other occupation than that of benefiting my health, educating my children, and improving my estate. It was necessary to employ infinite caution, in order to receive, from Paris, in the vicinity of which I now was, that secret information, the want of which had now become an invincible habit. Considering the import-

ance of the conjuncture, I soon felt that nothing could replace those confidential conversations, which I possessed the art of drawing out, without ever having had to reproach myself with breach of confidence. But situated as I was, it was only by stealth, and at long intervals, that I was enabled to obtain a few clandestine interviews with trusty and devoted persons. When this happened, they were always admitted unknown to my people, through a small door, of which I alone had the key, and under cover of the shades of night. It was in a secret corner of my house that I received them, and where we ran no risk of being heard or surprised.

Of all the individuals, who were for the existing government, or composing a part of it, the estimable and worthy Malouet was the only one who had courage enough to visit me openly, and without disguise. It was then that I was enabled to appreciate all the merit of that valuable man. I was deeply affected in thus seeing him defy authority, to extend a friendly hand to his school-fellow and the companion of his youth*; and yet, we had held opposite opinions in politics, and were even then divided on important points. He had always been a prudent and moderate royalist; I had been an enthusiastic republican. On this account, Malouet, on his return to France, had brought back strong

* Fouché and M. Malouet had been fellow-students at the *Oratoire.—Note by the French Editor.*

and well-founded prejudices against me. Those prejudices were only dissipated when he was enabled to judge for himself, that I was now a different man, matured by experience and reflection, employing the vast power with which I was invested, for no other purpose than to disarm hostile passions, and heal the wounds of the revolution. He then did me justice, and concluded by the profession of an inviolable friendship. This flattering feeling, which he carried with him to the tomb, is, beyond a doubt, the most honourable pledge that I can offer either to my enemies or my friends.

How deep and exquisite were those moments of mutual confidence! Although divided by shades of opinion, we soon met on the same ground; viewing the errors of power with the same eyes, impressed with the same anxieties, and convinced that Europe was upon the eve of one of the most terrible social crises which had ever shaken the nations of the earth. The Russian war, now considered inevitable, and the extravagant ambition of the chief of the state, composed the text of our commentaries and reflections. I learnt from Malouet, that Napoleon had proposed to the emperor of Russia, that the latter should invest his ambassador, Kourakin, with powers to enter into negotiations, on the subject of the three points in dispute; namely: 1st, the *ukase* of the 31st of December, which, according to our cabinet, had annulled the treaty of Tilsit, and the conventions consequent

upon it; 2nd, the protest of the Emperor Alexander, against the delivering up to France the duchy of Oldenburg, Russia having no right, according to our cabinet, to meddle with any thing that concerned a prince of the confederation of the Rhine; 3rd, the order which Alexander had given his Moldavian army, to direct its march towards the frontiers of the duchy of Warsaw. But Alexander, whose eyes were already open to the consequences of his alliance with Napoleon, eluded the proposition; at the same time promising to send to Paris Count Nesselrode, who had superseded Count Romanzoff in his confidence.

On a full examination of the matter, we considered the points in dispute to be nothing but pretexts, mutually put forward, in order to conceal the real question of state; that question consisted in the power and rivalry of two empires, which had latterly become too proximate not to be induced to contend for the continental supremacy. Although he considered as useless and abortive the representations which I proposed to make to Napoleon, on the subject of the danger of this new war, Malouet did not endeavour to dissuade me from the attempt; on the contrary, he told me that it was a kind of protest which I owed to my country, to myself, and to the importance of the office I had filled; and which it was proper to make for the exoneration of my conscience. I showed him the draught I had made of it, which he approved, ob-

serving, however, that I ought not to show too much anxiety, since, as nothing official or ostensible had appeared, to occasion my solicitude, it would seem as if I had penetrated the state secret; that it depended on myself alone, to seize the opportune occasion, for which, according to all probability, I should not have long to wait. We took leave of each other, and I resumed my task.

The emperor, with a view to ingratiate himself with his new subjects in Holland, departed in September, on a journey along the coast. On his return, his attention was, without loss of time, directed towards his immense preparations for the Russian war. For the mere sake of form, privy councils were held, at which none but the most servile instruments of power attended. Never had Napoleon exerted that power, materially or morally, in a more despotic manner;—keeping his ministers and council of state in a condition of dependence upon him, by means of *senatus consulta*, which emanated from his cabinet; dispensing with the legislative body, by means of the senate, and with both by means of the council of state, which was entirely under his thumb. He, besides, never took the least heed of the advice of his ministers, and governed less by means of decrees submitted on their part to his approbation, than of acts secretly suggested to him by his correspondents, his private agents, and more frequently by his own impulses or impatience. It has been seen to what

a degree flattery had obtained possession of his court, of his officers, of his ministers, and council. Panegyric had become so outrageous, that adoration was a matter of command, and, from that moment, it became shameful.

The rumours of the Russian war daily increasing in consistency, became, in consequence of the general fever of the public mind, the subject of every conversation. At length, the very acts of the government began to lift a corner of the veil. A *senatus consultum* of the 20th of December placed 120,000 men, of the conscription of 1812, at the disposal of the emperor. The harangue of the government orator, and the report of the committee of the senate were not made public, and this furnished additional motives for ascribing every thing to the approaching rupture.

I had arranged all my ideas on the dangers of engaging in that distant war, which would admit of no comparison with any other; I had nothing more to do, therefore, than to make a fair copy of my memorial, which it was now time to present. It was divided into three sections. In the first, I treated of the unseasonable period selected for the Russian war, and I drew my principal inferences from the dangers which would result from undertaking it, at the very moment when the flames of war in Spain, instead of being extinguished, were daily more and more increasing. I proved, by examples, that it was a combination entirely contrary

to the rules of politics established even by conquering nations. In the second section, I treated of the difficulties inherent in the war itself; difficulties which were, I might say, intrinsic, and I deduced my arguments from the nature of the country, and from the character of the inhabitants, considered under the double point of view of nobility and people. I did not omit to notice even the character of the emperor, which I thought myself warranted in considering as being wrongly judged, or not understood. Finally, in the third and last section, I treated of the probable consequences of the war, looking at them under the two hypotheses of a complete success, or a complete reverse. In the first case, I laid down, that to think of arriving at an universal monarchy, through the conquest of Russia, bordering upon China, was a brilliant chimera; that from Moscow, the conqueror would inevitably be drawn on to fall, at first, upon Constantinople, and thence to proceed to the Ganges, by the effect of the same irresistible impulse, which had formerly impelled, beyond all the bounds of true state reasons, Alexander, the Macedonian; and, subsequently, another still more profound and cooler genius, namely, Julius Cesar, who, on the eve of undertaking his war against the Parthians, (the Russians of that period,) indulged the frantic hope of making the tour of the world with his victorious legions. It may be easily perceived, that with this matter for my text, I could not sink beneath my

subject, with respect to general considerations. "Sire," said I to Napoleon, "you are now in possession of the finest monarchy upon earth; is it your wish incessantly to enlarge its boundaries, in order to leave the inheritance of an interminable war to a weaker arm than your own? The lessons of history repel the idea of an universal monarchy. Take care lest too much confidence in your military genius should induce you to exceed all the bounds of nature, and shock all the precepts of wisdom.

"It is full time to pause. You have, Sire, reached that point of your career, in which all that you have acquired is more valuable than all which additional efforts could add to your acquisitions. All new increase of your dominion, which already exceeds all proportion, is associated with obvious danger, not only for France, already overwhelmed, perhaps, under the weight of your conquests, but also for the well-understood interest of your own glory and security. All that your power can gain in superficial extent will be lost in substantial value. Pause, it is time; enjoy, in short, the advantages of a destiny, which is, beyond a doubt, the most brilliant of all those which, in our modern times, the state of civilization could permit a bold mind either to desire or possess.

"And what is the empire which you seek to subject? The Russian empire, resting upon the Pole, and backed by eternal ice; which is only assailable during one quarter of the year; which

offers to its assailants nothing but hardships, sufferings, and the privations of a barren soil, and of a region universally benumbed and dead? It is the Antæus of fable. You cannot conquer it unless you stifle it in your arms. What! Sire, will you penetrate into the depths of the modern Scythia, heedless either of the rigour and inclemency of the climate, of the barrenness of the country which you will have to pass, of the roads, lakes, and forests, which alone are sufficient to arrest your march, of the dreadful fatigue, and innumerable dangers, which will exhaust your army, however formidable it may be! True; no force in the world can prevent you passing the Niemen, and plunging into the deserts and forests of Lithuania; but you will find the Dwina a much more difficult obstacle to surmount than the Niemen, and, even there, you will still be a hundred leagues distant from St. Petersburgh. There, you will have to choose between St. Petersburg and Moscow. What a balance of chances, just Heaven, will that be, which will decide you to march towards either of those two capitals! In one or the other will be found the destiny of the universe

"Whatever may be your success, the Russians will dispute with you, inch by inch, those desert countries, in which you will find none of the necessaries of war. You must draw every thing from a distance of two hundred leagues. Whilst you will have to fight, perhaps, thirty battles, the

half of your army will be employed in defending your lines of communication, weakened by their extension, and menaced and broken by clouds of cossacks. Take care, lest all your genius be unable to save your army, a prey to fatigue, hunger, want of clothing, and the severity of the climate; take care, lest you be afterwards compelled to fight between the Elbe and the Rhine. Sire, I conjure you in the name of France, for the sake of your own glory, and of ours, replace your sword in its scabbard—think of Charles XII. It is true, that prince could not, like you, command two-thirds of continental Europe, together with an army of six hundred thousand men; but, on the other hand, the czar had but four hundred thousand men, and fifty thousand cossacks. Perhaps you will say, his heart was of iron, while nature has bestowed the mildest disposition upon the Emperor Alexander; but, do not deceive yourself, mildness is not incompatible with firmness, especially when such vital interests are at stake. Besides, will you not have as opponents, his senate, the majority of the nobles, the imperial family, a fanatical people, hardy and warlike troops, and the intrigues of the cabinet of St. James's? Even now, if Sweden escape you, it is by the sole influence of British gold. Fear, lest that irreconcilable island should shake the fidelity of your allies; take care, Sire, lest your people should reproach you with an inconsiderate ambition, and anticipate too much the

possibility of some great misfortune. Your power and glory have laid asleep many hostile passions; but one unexpected reverse may shake all the foundations of your empire."

This memorial being finished, I requested an audience of the emperor. I was introduced into his cabinet, at the Tuileries. He had scarcely perceived me, when assuming an easy manner; "Here you are, Duke; I know what brings you." "What, Sire?" "Yes, I know you have a memorial to lay before me." "It is not possible." "Never mind; I know it, give me the paper, I will read it; I am not, however, ignorant that the Russian war is no more to your taste than the Spanish." "Sire, I do not think that the present war is successful enough for us to fight without risk, and at the same time beyond the Pyrenees and the Niemen; the desire and the want of seeing your majesty's power for ever secured, have emboldened me to submit to your majesty some observations upon the present crisis." "There is no crisis; the present is a war purely political; you cannot judge of my position, nor of the general aspect of Europe. Since my marriage, the lion has been thought to sleep; we shall see whether he does or not. Spain will fall as soon as I have annihilated the English influence at St. Petersburgh; I wanted eight hundred thousand men, and I have them. All Europe follows in my train, and Europe is no more now than an old rotten

w——, with whom I may do what I please, with my eight hundred thousand men. Did you not formerly tell me that you thought genius consisted in finding nothing impossible? Well, in six or eight months, you shall see what things upon a vast scale can effect, when united to a power that can execute them. I am guided by the opinion of the army and the people rather than by yours, gentlemen who are too rich, and who only tremble for me because you apprehend a fall. Make yourselves easy; regard the Russian war as dictated by good sense, and by a just view of the interests, the repose, and the tranquillity of all. Besides, how can I help it, if an excess of power leads me to assume the dictatorship of the world? Have not you contributed to it, you and so many others, who blame me now, and would make a king *debonnaire* of me. My destiny is not accomplished; I must finish that which is but as yet sketched. We must have an European code, an European court of appeal, the same coins, the same weights and measures, the same laws; I must amalgamate all the people of Europe into one, and Paris must be the capital of the world. Such, my Lord Duke, is the only termination which suits my ideas. At present, you would not serve me well, because you imagine that every thing is again to be placed in doubt; but, before twelve months are over, you will serve me with the same zeal and ardour as after the victories of Marengo and Austerlitz. You will see something superior to all that; and it

is I who tell you so. Farewell, my Lord Duke; do not affect the interesting part of a man in disgrace, nor that of a censor, and place a little more confidence in me."

I withdrew quite thunderstruck, after having made a profound bow to the emperor, who turned his back upon me. Having recovered from the astonishment I felt at this singular conversation, I began to conjecture by what means the emperor could have been so exactly informed of the object of my proceedings. Not being able to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, I hastened to Malouet, supposing that, perhaps, some involuntary indiscretion, on his part, had put the high police, or one of the emperor's confidants, upon the scent. I explained myself; but soon convinced by the protestations of the most upright man in the empire, that nothing had escaped him, I found the circumstance still more extraordinary, as I could not fix my suspicions upon a third person. How then could the emperor have learnt that it was my intention to present a memorial to him? Was I then spied in my own house; suddenly a thought struck me; I recollected that one day a man had abruptly entered my room without giving my valet time to announce him, and had availed himself of some specious pretext to keep me in conversation. After having weighed all the circumstances, I inferred that he was an emissary; and upon a review of all that had taken place, my suspicions became still stronger. I made inquiries, and learnt that this

man, whose name was B——, was a returned emigrant, who had purchased, near my seat, a small estate, for which he had not yet paid; that he was mayor of his commune; but was, to all appearance, an intriguer and an impostor. I procured some of his hand-writing, and recognised it for that of an agent, formerly commissioned at London to be a spy upon the Bourbons, the emigrants of rank, and the Chouans. I had the number of correspondence; and this enabled me to find out from among the papers deposited in the *bureaux* of the police, the reports of that worthy gentleman. One of my former confidential agents undertook to come at the fact, and succeeded. The affair was as follows:—

Savary, having been ordered by the emperor to inform him how the ex-minister Fouché employed his time at his seat at Ferrières, presented a first report, in which he said he was looking out for an agent sufficiently qualified to fulfil the intentions of his majesty. He, at the same time, observed to the emperor that the investigation was of a very delicate nature, the ex-minister being invisible to all strangers, nobody, not even the country people, having access into his house. After some research, Savary cast his eyes upon the Sieur B——. Having sent for this man, who is tall, well made, of pleasing manners, and an insinuating character, cunning, adroit, possessing great volubility, and an imperturbable assurance, he said to him, "Sir, you are

mayor of your commune; you know the Duke of Otranto, or, at least, you have been in correspondence with him, and you must be able to form some idea of his character and habits; you must give me an account of what he is doing at Ferrières; this information is absolutely indispensable, for the emperor requires it." "My Lord," answered B——, "you have given me a commission extremely difficult to execute; I consider it as almost impossible. You know the man; he is mistrustful, suspicious, and constantly on his guard; besides, he is inaccessible; by what means or under what pretext can I gain an entrance into his house? Indeed, I cannot,"—"It does not signify," answered the minister, "this commission, to which the emperor attaches great importance, must be executed; I expect you will procure me this intelligence, as a proof of your devotion to the person of the emperor. Go, and do not return without having accomplished your object; I allow you a fortnight."

B——, in the greatest embarrassment gave himself a great deal of trouble, made inquiries, and found, through an indirect channel, that one of my farmers was prosecuted by my steward for large arrears of rent. He called upon that man, and pretending to be extremely concerned for him, obtained from him the documents relative to the affair. Furnished with these papers, he took a cabriolet, and having dressed himself neatly, presented him-

self at the lodge of my château, announcing himself as the mayor of a neighbouring commune, who had taken a great interest in an unfortunate family, unjustly prosecuted. Being first stopped at the gate, he easily talked over my porter, who suffered him to reach the house. There my *valet* refused to let him enter my apartment. Without, however, being disheartened, B—— begged, solicited, and entreated so earnestly, that at last he obtained to be announced; but, at the moment when the valet was opening the door of my closet, he pushed him on one side and entered; I was at my writing-desk, with my pen in my hand.

The sudden entrance of a stranger surprised me; I asked him what was his pleasure: "My Lord," said B——, "I am come to solicit from you a favour, an act of justice and humanity the most urgent; I am come to entreat you to save an unhappy father of a family from total ruin;" and here he employed all his rhetoric to interest me in favour of his client, and explained the whole affair to me in the clearest manner possible. After a moment's hesitation, I rose and proceeded to search in a box for the papers relative to my farms. Whilst, my back being turned, I was searching for the documents, B——, still speaking on, succeeded in deciphering backwards a few lines of my writing; and what particularly struck him were the initials, *V. M. I. et R.;* which, being in capital letters, were more striking; he immediately inferred that I was

preparing a memorial to be presented to his majesty. Upon returning to my desk, after two or three minutes' search, and won by the fine speeches of the man, I settled the affair with him in favour of his client, with the utmost simplicity; and dismissed him, expressing my thanks to him for having given me an opportunity of performing a praiseworthy action. B—— left me, and immediately proceeded to Savary, to whom he related the success of his undertaking, and Savary instantly hastened to make his report to the emperor. I confess that, when made acquainted with the details of this piece of mystification, I was extremely vexed at it. I could scarcely forgive myself for having been duped by a scoundrel, who for a long time had sent me secret intelligence from London, and in whose favour I ordered the annual payment of a sum of twenty thousand francs. It will be seen later (in 1815), that I did not allow myself to be actuated by too great resentment.

Although this was a wretched intrigue, I yet derived from it an advantageous position which gave me more security and confidence, by making me persevere in my system of circumspection and reserve. It was evident that a great part of Napoleon's suspicions respecting me was dissipated, and that I had no longer any reason to apprehend, at the moment that he was about to penetrate into Russia, being made the object of any inquisitorial and vexatious measure. I knew, that in a cabinet

council, to which the emperor had only summoned Berthier, Cambacérès, and Duroc, the question had been discussed whether it would be advantageous to make sure, either by arrest or severe banishment, of M. de Talleyrand and me; and that upon mature consideration, the idea of this *coup d'état* had been rejected as impolitic and useless; impolitic, inasmuch as it would have shaken public confidence too much, and aroused apprehensions, for the future, in the minds of the high officers and dignitaries of the state; useless, because no act or deed could be laid to our charge as a motive for such a measure. Engaged, moreover, in the preparations for the expedition into Russia, the government experienced, from another cause, uneasiness more real, and disappointments more distressing. France was daily suffering more and more from a scarcity of corn. Riots had taken place in several places; these had been repressed by force, and military commissions had condemned to be shot many unfortunate wretches who had been urged on by despair. It was not without feelings of horror that the public ascertained that, among the victims of these bloody executions, a woman in the town of Caen had been included.

It became, however, necessary to withdraw a part of the veil, which concealed the mystery of the vast hostile preparations, of which all the north of Germany was already the theatre. An extraordinary sitting of the senate was ordered, for the

purpose of receiving the communication of two reports which were supposed to have been presented to the emperor; the one by the minister for foreign affairs, the other by the minister at war. The sole object of this farce, at once warlike and diplomatic, was to obtain a levy of such men as had escaped the conscription, and the formation of cohorts of the first ban, according to a new organization of the national guard, which divided into three bands or three classes the immense majority of our male population.

There was no exaggeration this time in considering France as one vast camp, whence our phalanxes marched, from all parts, upon Europe as upon a prey. In order to colour this levy of those classes which had been free from the conscription, fresh motives and new pretexts were necessary, since it was not desirable, for the moment, to reveal the true cause of such extraordinary measures. Maret spoke to the senate of the necessity of compelling England to acknowledge the maritime rights established by the stipulations of the treaty of Utrecht—stipulations which France had abandoned at Amiens. But the levy of the first ban of the national guards was granted by a *senatus-consultum*, and a hundred cohorts were placed at the disposal of the government; we members of the senate evinced admirable docility and subserviency. At the same time, two treaties of alliance and reciprocal assistance were signed with Prussia and

Austria. All doubt was now removed. Napoleon was about to attack Russia, not only with his own forces, but also with those of Germany, and of all the petty sovereigns who could no longer move out of the orbit of his power.

War was fully decided upon, when the emperor caused his confidential minister to open fresh negotiations with London; but these proposals not only came late, but were made without any ability. Some persons, who were in the secret of every intrigue, assured me, at that time, that the cabinet employed this clumsy expedient, in concert with the principal Russians of the French party; seeing themselves on the eve of being expelled from the councils of St. Petersburgh, they had imagined that the Emperor Alexander, alarmed at the idea of the possibility of an arrangement between France and England, would re-enter the continental system to prevent his being isolated, and that he would once more submit to Napoleon's will. But however this may be, Maret wrote to Lord Castlereagh a letter containing the following proposals:—To renounce all extension of territory on the side of the Pyrenees; to declare the *actual dynasty* of Spain independent, and to guarantee the independence of that monarchy; to guarantee to the house of Braganza the independence and integrity of Portugal, as well as the kingdom of Naples to Joachim, and the kingdom of Sicily to Ferdinand IV. As to the other objects of discussion, our cabinet proposed

to negotiate them upon this basis; that each power should keep what the other could not wrest from it by the war. Lord Castlereagh replied that if, by the *actual dynasty* of Spain, the brother of the chief of the French government was meant, he was commanded by his sovereign to declare candidly, that he could not receive any proposals of peace founded upon that basis. Here the matter dropt. Ashamed of its overtures, our cabinet, whose only object was to have drawn Russia into some act of weakness, perceived too late that it had impressed upon our diplomacy a character of fickleness, bad faith, and ignorance.

As all was transacted in the utmost secrecy, what most puzzled the politicians was, that in France, and even in Russia, the exterior forms of amity were kept, although making immense preparations. The emperor Alexander's ambassador was still at Paris, while Napoleon had his at St. Petersburgh: nor was this all; Alexander had his confidential diplomatist, Count Czernitscheff, resident in the French capital. This amiable Russian, in the midst of the dissipations of a brilliant court, and the mysteries of many amorous intrigues purposely ill-managed, did not neglect a more secret commission, of the highest importance to his master. Seconded by women, some of whom were stimulated by love, and others by a spirit of intrigue, he managed his plans so as to discover Napoleon's real intentions of invading Russia. Sus-

picion having been raised as to the secret object of his mission, he was watched and spied, but all to no purpose. At length, Savary sent to him a person attached to the police, who gave him some false information, and drew from him, in return, some fresh indications which increased the suspicions already existing. But, favoured by his love affairs, Czernitscheff was warned in time; he avoided the snare, ill-used the spy, and went to Maret to complain of having been subjected to such revolting proceedings. That very day, the emperor having been informed of the subject of his complaint, determined upon communicating to him the secret accounts which inculpated him. Czernitscheff came out triumphant from this ordeal, by giving an explanation of his conduct, and of the cause of his complaints. The police received formal orders to take off the *surveillance*. Being thus at liberty to continue his investigations, he succeeded in executing the object of his mission. He was particularly anxious to procure the lists of the intended movements of the French army; these he obtained through the medium of a clerk belonging to the *Bureau des Mouvemens*, named Michel. An imprudence of this person, who thus betrayed the secret of the emperor's operations, having awakened some suspicions, he was arrested. Czernitscheff was immediately informed of it, and left Paris with the greatest precipitation, carrying off with him the most important documents. In vain was a tele-

graphic order given to seize his person; he had got the start by five or six hours, and this advantage was sufficient to enable him to cross the Rhine. He had just passed the bridge of Kehl, when the telegraphic order for his arrest reached Strasburgh.

His precipitate flight from Paris prevented him from burning his secret correspondence, which it was his custom to conceal under the carpet of his room; and as the latter was necessarily the object of minute search, the police agents discovered the papers of Czernitscheff. The first thing found in them was the proof that a great intimacy had been kept up between this Russian nobleman and several ladies of Napoleon's court; amongst others, the Duchess of R——. She, however, it is said, exculpated herself by alledging that she had acted in concert with her husband, to endeavour to ascertain the secret object of Czernitscheff's mission. Among the papers discovered, was also a letter in Michel's hand-writing; so convincing a proof of his guilt sealed his fate,—he expiated his treason with his life. This affair brought to light a very singular fact, *viz.*, that the Russian cabinet had foreseen, even from the epoch of the interview at Erfurt, the possibility of a rupture with France. It was then that Romanzoff said, in order to justify his indulgent politics, and in speaking of Napoleon: *We must wear him out.* (*Il faut l'user.*)

The circumstances of Czernitscheff's flight, which

was soon known in the saloons, made considerable noise, and accelerated the rupture. The emperor, whose departure was determined upon, anxious to obtain some popularity, visited the different parts of Paris, examining the public works, and acting little preconcerted scenes, either with the prefect of Paris, or the prefect of police, Pasquier. He also went frequently hunting, affecting to appear more occupied with his pleasures than with the vast enterprise he had engaged in. I saw him at St. Cloud, whither I went to pay my respects to him, without any intention of soliciting or obtaining an audience. The mournful aspect of that court, and the anxious looks of the courtiers, appeared to me to form a strong contrast with the confidence of the emperor. He had never enjoyed such perfect health; never had I seen his features, formed after the antique, lighted up with a greater glow of mental vigour, of greater confidence in himself, founded on a deep conviction of his prodigious power. I experienced a feeling of involuntary melancholy, which I should have been unable to define, had not the most gloomy presentiments taken possession of my mind.

In the mean time the cabinet of St. Petersburgh, whether its real intention was to employ every possible means of reconciliation, compatible with the independence of the Russian empire, or whether it had only the intention of obtaining some certain in-

formation, respecting the true intentions of Napoleon, ordered prince Kourakin to make known to the French government the bases of an arrangement, which his sovereign was willing to accede to. These were the deliverance of Prussia, a reduction of the garrison of Dantzic, and the evacuation of Swedish Pomerania; upon these conditions, the Czar engaged to make no alterations whatever in the measures prohibiting a direct trade with England, and to concert, with France, a system of licences to be established in Russia.

Kourakin's note remained unanswered for a fortnight. At length, on the 9th of May, the day of the Emperor's departure for Germany, Maret asked Kourakin if he had full powers for treating; Kourakin replied, that the character of ambassador, with which he was invested, should be considered as sufficient. Being only able to obtain evasive and dilatory answers, he demanded his passports, which were refused him under various pretences. It was not till the 20th of June they were sent him from Thorn, an artifice, the object of which was to allow Napoleon time to cross the Niemen with all his forces, in order to surprise his august adversary at Wilna, before he could receive the least intelligence from his ambassador.

The die was cast; the Niemen was crossed by six hundred thousand men, by the finest and most formidable army ever assembled by any conqueror

of the earth. We will now leave Napoleon,—we will leave this illustrious madman to rush on to his ruin: it is not his military history I am relating.

Let us ascertain the state of public opinion, at the moment, when traversing Germany, and stopping at Dresden, he rivetted upon himself the anxious regards of twenty nations. Let us first see what was thought of him in the *salons* of Paris, those very *salons* for whose good opinion he was so anxious; wishes were there expressed for his humiliation, and even for his fall, so much did his aggression appear the effect of a mad ambition. In the middling and lower classes, the public disposition was not more favourable to him. The discontent, however, had nothing of hostility in it. The general wish was only to save Napoleon from his own follies, and to restrain him within the bounds of moderation and justice.

Some persons thought that combined resistance, on the part of his marshals and the army, would succeed in ruling his will, and, eventually, in obtaining the mastery over him. But such persons could understand but little the fascinations of a military life, and the manners of a camp. I had had the means of being convinced that the least political idea, calculated to guarantee us from the abuses of victory, or from the dangers of a reverse, never proceeded from the brains of a discontented general.

There was, moreover, at the bottom of all this

spirit of disapprobation, a feeling superior to it; that of an anxious expectation and intense curiosity respecting the issue of the vast expedition of the extraordinary man whose ambition devoured whole ages. It was generally admitted that he would remain the conqueror and master of the field.

As to politicians, by taking into consideration the destruction of Poland, on the one hand, and the encroachments of the revolution, on the other, they saw Germany destroyed by two vast irruptions; that of the French from the west, and the Russians from the east. It was these latter that Napoleon wished to drive back upon the polar ices, or into the Steppes of Asia. That man, whom nothing could stop, who drew after him one half of the military population of Europe, and whose orders were implicitly executed, on a space which embraced nineteen degrees of latitude, and thirty degrees of longitude,—that man, who had now set foot on Russian ground, was about to risk his own fate, and the existence of France.

Upon advancing beyond the Niemen, and proclaiming war, he exclaimed, with an affectation of prophetic inspiration—"The Russians are urged on by fate—let the destinies be accomplished!" His adversary, who dared not to wait for him at Wilna, more calm, recommended to his people to defend their *country and their liberty*. What a contrast between the two nations, between these two adversaries and their language.

At first, the forced retreat of the Russians, who, everywhere the weakest and least inured to war, endeavoured to avoid the rencontre; and the devastation of the country, which they systematically effected, were considered as two grand measures, the result of a plan preconcerted for the purpose of drawing Napoleon into the heart of the empire.

But the imagination soon took the alarm when, after a furious combat, Napoleon, against the advice of the majority of his marshals, and in contempt of a kind of engagement he had entered into at Paris with his council, left in his rear Smolensko, the only bulwark of Russia on the frontiers of Poland. The anxiety was still further increased, when he was seen advancing, without the least hesitation, on the line of Moscow, braving all the chances of war, and equally regardless of the character of his enemies, the disposition of Europe impatient of her yoke, the season, the distance, and the severity of the climate.

Inflated with gaining the most sanguinary battle of modern times, a battle in which a hundred thousand soldiers were victims to the ambition of one man*, and not in the least affected by the miserable and wretched appearance of his bivouacs, Napoleon imagined that he could, at length, effect the destruc-

* The battle of the Moskowa, or Borodino, fought on the 7th of September, at twenty-five leagues in advance of Moscow. —*Editor's Note.*

tion of a vast and powerful empire, as he formerly accomplished, as it were extempore, the fall of the republics of Geneva, Venice, and Lucca.

The Russians had retreated, armed with torches; they had burnt Smolensko, Dorigobni, Viazma, Ghjat, and Mojaisk, and yet he imagined they would reserve Moscow for him. The conflagration of this fine capital, while it undeceived Napoleon too late, enlightened France with its ill-omened flames; the sensation was deep. It was then, alas! that I saw all my presentiments realized; I perceived its object; that of depriving the victor of a pledge, and the vanquished of a motive, for concluding peace.

How did Napoleon act upon witnessing this grand national sacrifice? He encamped for forty days on the ashes of Moscow, contemplating his vain conquest, not doubting his ability to conclude the campaign by negotiations, and never even suspecting that two Russian armies, the one from the Livonian Gulf, the other from Moldavia, had been ordered to effect a junction at Borisow, a place one hundred leagues in his rear. He was ignorant, perhaps, that Russia, without a single ally at the commencement of the campaign, had just signed, one after the other, three defensive treaties—with Sweden, England, and the Regency of Cadiz.

In the interval, the interview at Abo, between the Emperor Alexander and Bernadotte, in presence of Lord Cathcart, took place—an interview, where

the first appeal was made to Moreau, whom they wished to oppose to his persecutor, to him who was now designated the oppressor of Europe. The ruins of Moscow had been abandoned to Napoleon, who could not at all comprehend a system of warfare so different from his own strategy. For twenty-two days he awaited a suppliant message from the Russian emperor, whose cabinet kept in play his prolocutors and negotiators. Napoleon was as blind at Moscow as in Spain. Prudent measures smacked too much of methodical arrangement, which he utterly detested.

At length, he commenced his retreat, but not till the fatal hour had struck; for on the very day of his tardy evacuation of Moscow, the 13th of October, the Malet conspiracy, so humiliating for the emperor, for his adherents, and his police, burst out; a conspiracy which had nearly cost him his empire, from the wish of gratifying his vanity in dating a few decrees from Moscow. The Malet conspiracy has never been well understood;—Malet was not a mad, but abold, man.

Little known as a general, he was at first involved, in 1802, in the Senate conspiracy, as it was called, of which Bernadotte was the soul, Madame de Staël the focus, and himself the principal agent; a conspiracy in which I was myself denounced as an accomplice, by Dubois, the prefect of police. It became necessary to throw the whole culpability on Malet. He was put in prison. Upon

being restored to liberty, by the amnesty granted on the occasion of the coronation, he was employed, in 1805, in the army of Italy; and, upon his return, was engaged in fresh plots against the emperor, involving at one time Brune, at another Masséna; at length, in 1808, he was imprisoned in the castle of Vincennes. It was in the gloom of this prison that he hatched his double conspiracy, which was to rally the disaffected of every party against the emperor's government. The whole of this plot, however, was not the offspring of Malet's brain *. Its conception belonged to the royalists, its execution to the republicans. In fact, success was impossible without an understanding between the two opposite opinions, cemented by a common hatred, and a mutual want of overthrowing the oppressor in order to restore public liberty. All was favourable to the conspirators engaged in the boldest of enterprises. From the instant that the mode of execution depended only upon one man, and that man was determined, full of resolution and courage, there was every reason to calculate upon the probability of success. The rest was left to chance. Let us demonstrate it; and, first, let us consider into what hands the power was delegated in the emperor's absence. It is certain that the arch-chancellor, Cambacérès, was the depositary of it; a cowardly and disgraced man, and a true sycophant. Among the ministers, one alone prided

* This deserves attention.—*Editor's Note.*

himself, because he was at the head of the police, which for him remained mute as to any discoveries; but this man, a severe officer of *gendarmerie*, was a mere cypher in politics and state affairs. Next on the list, was Pasquier, prefect of police, an excellent magistrate in all that regarded mud and lanterns, in regulating the police of the markets, gambling-houses, and prostitutes, but without intelligence, extremely verbose, and entirely devoid of tact and power of investigation. So much for the civil power.

We will now proceed to the military: the strength of the sword was intrusted to Hullin, commander of Paris, a dull, heavy soldier, but firm, although equally stupid and awkward in politics as the others. Let it be observed, that the exercise of authority having become, for the principal functionaries, a kind of mechanism, they saw nothing but passive obedience; that the Empress Maria-Louisa resided at St. Cloud; that, at this time, in the garrison of Paris, there were none of those old fanatical troops, who, in the name of the emperor, would have carried fire and sword everywhere: that they had been replaced by cohorts recently organized, the greater part of which were commanded by old patriotic officers; and, lastly, that the anxiety, respecting the event of the Muscovite expedition, began to make the high functionaries apprehensive for their security. It is evident, therefore, that Paris, in this state of things would, by an

ably directed and vigorous *coup de main*, remain in possession of the first that seized it. The immense distance of the emperor, the irregularity and frequent interruption of the couriers, by increasing the anxiety and preparing the public mind, threw all the chances in favour of the person who should be daring enough to take advantage of a momentary stupor and alarm. The *emperor is dead;* the abolishment of the imperial government by a senatorial decree, and the establishment of a provisionary one, were the pivot of the conspiracy, of which the mover and the head was Malet. He had himself drawn up the *senatus consultum*, decreeing the abolition of the imperial government.

But it may be said, you see there was no decree of the senate, there was no provisionary government, the emperor was full of life and vigour, and the conspiracy was only founded in a fiction. Now, how could Malet have accomplished it, supposing even that he had remained master of Paris?

It is true, there was no decree of the senate; but it is equally certain, that there was not in the senate a nucleus of opposition, which might have been made to act *according to circumstances*. I lay it down as a fact, that, out of one hundred and thirty senators, nearly sixty *, who were generally

* The same, no doubt, who eighteen months after, on the 2d of April, 1814, had the *courage*, protected by two hundred thousand bayonets, to declare Napoleon *fallen from the throne.* —*Note of the Editor.*

led by M. de Talleyrand, M. de Semonville and me, would have seconded any resolution which should have a salutary object, upon the mere manifestation of an understanding between these three influential men. Now such a coalition was neither improbable, nor impracticable.

This possibility explains the creation of an eventual provisional government composed of Messrs. Mathiew de Montmorency, Alexis de Noailles, General Moreau, Count Frochot, prefect of the Seine, and a fifth not named. This fifth person was M. de Talleyrand, and I myself was to fill the place of Moreau during his absence, whose name had been introduced either to satisfy, or divide the army.

As to Malet, a mere instrument, he would voluntarily have resigned the command of Paris to Masséna, who, as well as myself, lived at that time in retirement and disgrace.

But answer, it may be said, this last and strongest objection—the emperor was living!—True, but it should be recollected how the imperial revolution which overthrew Nero was effected, (although I do not mean to establish a parallel between the two characters.) It was operated with the assistance of false rumours and alarms, by a servile, but suddenly unshackled, senate. Where was Napoleon at the moment when Malet made his *coup de main?* He was evacuating Moscow; he was commencing his disastrous retreat, which had only

been foreseen, but which once ascertained for a fact, would have decided the general defection, if fifteen or twenty people of note had replaced, in the name of *the safety of France*, the first movers of the conspiracy. Let it be recollected, that the couriers and bulletins were already intercepted; that the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh bulletins, announcing the evacuation and the retreat, and dated the 23d of October, were only followed by the twenty-eighth, dated the 11th of November; being an interval of twenty days, which would have amply sufficed to ensure the success of a plot, the ramifications of which will, for a long time, remain unknown. For a month, nothing was heard of but a continual succession of disasters, the knowledge of which alone might have closed the gates of France against the emperor for ever. At first believed to be dead, he would only have been resuscitated, to be again struck down by the decree of his forfeiture. Never did a more favourable opportunity present itself for the overthrow of his military dictatorship; never would it have been more easy to have established the basis of a government which would have reconciled us with ourselves and with Europe. This supposition being admitted, how many fresh calamities would France have been spared?

Now let us examine, what were the causes of Malet's failure, in the midst even of his triumph. Shall I say it? it was for having regulated his

means of execution, upon a basis too widely philanthropic. We will explain. Malet, a republican, belonging, as well as Guidal and Lahorie, his accomplices, to the secret society of the Philadelphians, was justly apprehensive lest he should revive the alarm of the return of those sanguinary and mournful days which France remembered with horror. This moral conviction overcame every more decisive consideration, and instead of immediately putting to death Savary, Hullin, and the two adjutants, Doucet and Laborde, the leaders of the staff, Malet thought it would be sufficient to arrest them, without effusion of blood. He at first succeeded, with respect to the police, which was disorganized the moment that Savary and Pasquier permitted themselves to be surprised, and ignominiously dragged to prison. But when Hullin's resistance had forced Malet to discharge his pistols, his hesitation lost him, not being able to fire at the same time upon Hullin and Laborde. The latter, being at liberty, had time to rally a few men round him, and rushing upon Malet, disarmed an rested him. The conspiracy failed. Malet died with great *sang froid*, carrying with him the secret of one of the boldest *coups de main* which the grand epocha of our revolution bequeaths to history.

The facility with which this surprise of power was effected, seemed to indicate that it was not unexpected. All was prepared at the *Hôtel de*

Ville, for the installation of the provisionary government. Pale and trembling, the arch-chancellor remained, till ten o'clock in the morning, a prey to the most dreadful alarms, at one moment imagining he was about to be killed, at another, that he should at least share the dungeon with Savary. As to the people, it is true, they did nothing for the success of an enterprise, at first enveloped in the shades of night; but they indirectly seconded it by that *vis inertiæ* which is always opposed to bad governments. In short, although it had failed, this conspiracy was a home-thrust to Napoleon's dynasty, by revealing a secret, fatal to its founder, his family, and his adherents; *viz.*, that his political establishment would end with his life.

It was at Smolensko, on the 14th or 16th of November, that the emperor, amid the horrors of his retreat, received the first information of the conspiracy, and the prompt punishment of its authors. He was much troubled at it. "What an impression," said he, "that will make in France!" Savary and Cambacérès urged him to keep a strict eye upon the army, in which plots were formed against his life. Extraordinary precautions were immediately taken; a sacred band of officers most devoted to him was formed, the command of which was intrusted to Grouchy; but this chosen body was soon involved in the general wreck. Jealous, in the extreme, of all that could menace his throne, Napoleon felt far more anxiety to pre-

serve that, than to save the wrecks of his army, the retreat of which he hurried on at any cost. Thanks to the unskilful pursuit of Kutusow, he gained three days' march upon the Russians, arrived at the Berezina, eluded the generals of the Moldavian army, and, under protection of a most horrible disaster, gained the opposite bank. The whole army in the mean time was completely disbanded; the only remains which could here and there be perceived of it were wandering spectres, sinking under the severity of cold, fatigue, and wretchedness. Napoleon, having made up his mind to end, as a fugitive, an expedition which was going to deprive him of his laurels as a general, and tear him from his reputation as a statesman, betook himself to flight in a sledge, and intrusted himself solely to Caulaincourt's devotedness; disguised, and with the utmost haste, he made for Paris, where every thing conspired to make him tremble for the loss of his crown. At Warsaw, he himself revealed to his ambassador his situation, and the state of his mind, by those well-known words: "From the sublime to the ridiculous there is but a step." Ever agitated with the fear of never reaching France, he strove to surmount danger by the rapidity of his flight, traversing the whole of Germany in an impenetrable incognito. In Silesia, he was very nearly taken by the Prussians; and at Dresden, he only escaped a plot for his seizure,

because Lord Walpole, who was at Vienna, dared not give the signal.

And as if fortune had wished to pursue him to extremities, he re-entered the palace of the Tuileries, on the 18th of December, the day after the publication of his twenty-ninth bulletin, which carried mourning into so many families. But this was, on his part, a new snare, held out to the devotedness and credulity of a generous nation; who, struck with consternation, thought that their chief, chastened by misfortune, was ready to seize the first favourable opportunity of bringing back peace, and of, at length, consolidating the foundation of general happiness.

This was the reason why France willingly made the greatest sacrifices to support a man, whose only success had been to tread the ashes of Moscow, and carry desolation into a vast extent of country, which he had left covered with the corpses of a hundred and fifty thousand of his own subjects, and those of his allies, after abandoning a still greater number of prisoners, and the whole of his artillery and magazines. Of four hundred thousand men in arms, who had crossed the Niemen, scarcely thirty thousand repassed that river five months afterwards, and, of those, two-thirds had not seen the Kremlin.

Napoleon, however, appeared at first far less concerned on account of the loss of his army, than

about the conspiracy which had revealed so fatal a secret as the fragility of the foundation of his empire. Tormented by the idea of his death having been anticipated, his care-worn brow appeared bending beneath clouds of gloom; the conspiracy was the object of his first words, his first inquiries. He closetted himself with Cambacérès, and sifted him narrowly in a long and secret conversation. Savary was next sent for, whom he overwhelmed with questions and reproaches; he afterwards gave audience to several members of his council, and appeared still wholly occupied with the conspiracy, while his ministers and agents were in the utmost alarm. But his police, being interested in representing the plot as an isolated one, affirmed that the whole of it originated in Malet; such was also the opinion of Cambacérès, of the minister at war, and of the confidential advisers, who confirmed Napoleon in the idea that the greatest danger he had to fear, and against which he should be on his guard, was in the reminiscences of the republic. Enraged with the prefect of the Seine, a pupil of Mirabeau's, and whom we have seen bending before the conspirators, he issued a Philippic against *pusillanimous magistrates*, who, said he, "are the destruction of the empire, of the laws, and of the throne. Our fathers had for their rallying cry, *The king is dead: long live the king!* A few words," added Napoleon, "containing the principal advantages of monarchy." All the bodies of the state

immediately came to assure him of their present and future fidelity. Lacépède, the speaker of the senate, designating the body to which he belonged as *the first council of the emperor*, added with great rapidity, "whose authority exists only when the monarch requires it, and gives it movement." This allusion to the spring of which Malet had availed himself, struck the senators very forcibly. In his answer to the council of state, Napoleon, attributing all the misfortunes which *beautiful France had undergone* to *ideology*, (gloomy metaphysics,) took occasion to cast reflections upon philosophy and liberty. He did not perceive that by ceasing to keep up the revolution and its principles, he ceased to command its aid and support; and that by preaching up the maxims of monarchical legitimacy, he was opening to the Bourbons the ways which the revolution had closed against them. And yet, in great crises, the Bourbons were ever uppermost in his thoughts. Besides what I have myself seen and heard of him in this respect, I was at this time made acquainted with the following fact. Ney, when relating to me the disasters of the retreat, and putting the firmness of his own military conduct in opposition to the want of foresight and the stupor of Napoleon, added, that he observed in him a kind of mental aberration. "I thought him mad," said Ney to me: "when, struck with the greatness of his misfortune, at the moment of his departure he said to us, like a man who saw him-

self utterly deprived of all resource; '*The Bourbons would get out of this:*'"—an observation, the sense of which escaped Ney, who was incapable of combining two political ideas.

Napoleon's object, therefore, now was, to establish the superiority of the *fourth dynasty* over the *third*, and to surmount the crisis. All the different bodies of the state were now seen engaged in resolving a new question of public right, in consequence of the impulse they had received from the cabinet, and of the first words which fell from their master's lips. "I will," said he to them, "reflect upon the different epochas of *our* history." Every one immediately began thinking of the means of securing the hereditary possession. The different speakers hastened to develope and explain the new doctrine; nothing was now heard of but succession, legitimate rights; these were the theme of all public speeches. "The king of Rome," said they, "must be crowned upon the express request of the senate, and a solemn oath must, in anticipation, unite the empire to the successor to the throne."

Such was the measure upon which the man relied, who, indebted to the revolution for a vast power, the magic of which he had just destroyed, renounced that very revolution, and separated himself from it. He, however, felt all the instability of a throne, the sole support of which is the sword.

Whilst he was thus exclaiming against the men and the principles of the revolution, he recollected

me, me against whom he had indulged so much suspicious jealousy. Besides, could he ever pardon me the warnings I had given him, and my importunate foresight? I was informed that he had instituted a secret inquiry respecting my conduct connected with Malet's affair; but that all the reports had agreed as to my circumspection and non-participation in it. Unable to reach me, he wounded me in the person of my friend, M. Malouet, whom he never pardoned for having openly visited me during my disgrace, this undisguised friendship between a revolutionary and a royalist patriot making him more uneasy; besides, he was irritated against him, on account of the spirit of opposition which Malouet evinced in the discussion at the council-board, against so many extravagant and vexatious measures. Being removed from the council of state, Malouet was exiled to Tours, where he led the life of a philosopher, less affected by his own disgrace, than by the evils which afflicted his country. His disgrace was to me an additional motive to persist in the same reserve towards a government, which in its despair, in its vengeance, might be restrained by no consideration. Its power already began to totter, and experienced eyes could perceive the elements of its destruction. But seconded by his intimate councillors, Napoleon employed every artifice calculated to palliate our disasters, and conceal from us their inevitable consequences. He assembled the whole phalanx of his

flatterers, now become the organs of his will; he tutored them, and all, with one voice, attributed the loss of our army, and the fatal issue of the campaign, solely to the rigour of the elements. By the aid of deception of every kind, they succeeded in making it be believed, that all might be repaired if the nation did but shew itself great and generous; that fresh sacrifices could not cost her any thing when weighed against the preservation of its independence and glory. The public spirit was stimulated by addresses, begged of the chiefs of cohorts of the first bans of the national guards, who requested to march against the enemy, out of France, and also by offers from the departments and communes to furnish cavalry, offers commanded by the government itself. Napoleon endeavoured, at the same time, to gain over new creatures to his interest, and to secure vacillating affections; he distributed secret bribes drawn from his own treasures, which he had already diminished by nearly a hundred millions, for his expenses in the Russian war. This time he distributed his riches with a lavish hand, for the double purpose of creating a new army, and of keeping in pay the ministers of certain cabinets, in order to maintain them in his interests. It was in his treasures that he found an army of reserve.

In the mean time he held privy councils, which were attended by Cambacérès, Lebrun, Talleyrand, Champagny, Maret, and Caulaincourt. Maret, who had arrived from Berlin, affirmed that he had

received from the Prussian ministers, and from the king himself, the strongest protestations that they would persevere in our alliance; he added, that every circumstance ought to set the emperor's mind at ease, respecting the affairs of the north. Whether Maret really spoke sincerely, or whether all was concerted for the purpose of spurring on the council, which leaned towards negotiations, Napoleon, affecting greater confidence, said, that he could rely upon Austria, and, according to all appearance, upon Prussia; that consequently there was nothing alarming in his situation; that besides he found his brother Joseph again at Madrid, and the English driven back into Portugal; in addition to which, he had already under arms one hundred cohorts, and the anticipated levy of the conscripts of 1813. He decided that the Spanish war and that of the north should be carried on together.

On the other hand, the contents of Otto's * correspondence got wind; it was known that Lord Walpole had made Austria the most brilliant offers; that he had represented all Germany as ready to rise, and France on the eve of a revolution. Otto added that the defection of Austria might be expected. But this cabinet, being soon informed that Napoleon had again seized the reins of power, that he was making fresh levies, and that, in the interior, there was no appearance of a crisis, hastened

* Napoleon's ambassador at Vienna.

to despatch to Paris Count Bubna. Otto also changed his tone, and his letters were in perfect unison with the assertions of Austria, whom he represented as only desirous of interfering, as mediator, for a general pacification.

Full of confidence, Napoleon gave the word to his official organ, the *Moniteur;* according to its representations, "Austria and France are inseparable, no continental power will detach her from him; besides, forty millions of Frenchmen have nothing to fear . . . If it be desired to know," adds he, "the conditions to which I would subscribe for a general peace, reference must be made to the letter written by the Duke of Bassano to Lord Castlereagh, previous to the campaign of Russia;" which was equivalent to saying that he consented, as if he had experienced no reverse at Moscow, to leave Sicily to Ferdinand IV., and Portugal to the house of Braganza, but that no other sacrifice was to be required of him.

The news of the defection of a Prussian corps, commanded by Yorck, having arrived, "What sufficed yesterday," cried Napoleon, "is not sufficient to-day;" and all his councillors perceived that very instant what use was to be made of such an event. Maret drew up a report, stuffed, according to custom, with invectives against the British government, and concluding by proposing a levy of three hundred and fifty thousand men. Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely hastened to the senate, and, in the

name of the emperor, required the service of the young Frenchmen forming the hundred cohorts, and who had been assured that they should only be required to attend military games and martial exercises in the interior; a *senatus consultum* placed them at the disposal of the emperor.

The legislative body was assembled, in order to vote the supplies. "Peace," said Napoleon, in his opening speech, "is necessary to the world; but I will never make but one honourable and consonant to the *greatness* of my empire." Nothing could be more pompous than the *exposé* of his situation presented by Montalivet, the minister of the interior; every thing, population, agriculture, manufactures, commerce, public instruction, and even the navy, was in the most flourishing and prosperous condition. Then came the presentation of the budget by Count Molé, councillor of state; and here the worthy pupil of Fontanes, astonished at so much prosperity, exclaimed, in concluding his speech, "To produce so many wonders, twelve years' war and one single man sufficed!" And immediately eleven hundred and fifty millions were, without discussion, placed at the disposal of this one man.

He had reckoned, among the urgent affairs, the accommodation of his differences with the pope, who, since the month of June, had been confined to the palace of Fontainbleau. Under pretence of a hunting party, Napoleon hastened to extort from him

a new *concordat*, despoiling him of his temporalities, but which the holy father retracted almost immediately afterwards. Religious matters became in consequence more and more embroiled.

The open defection of Prussia no longer left any doubts upon the progress of the coalition. Frederick William, suddenly quitting Berlin, had fled to Breslaw, protected by the goodnature of our ambassador, Saint Marsan, and in some degree under the ægis of Augereau, who had suffered himself to be *humanized*. Nothing could exceed the *benignity* of our generals and our ambassadors, since our reverses. Upon receiving the news that the King of Prussia had escaped him, Napoleon regretted he had not treated him as he had done Ferdinand VII. and the pope. "This is not the first instance," said he, "that in politics, generosity is a bad counsellor." He generous towards Prussia!!!

In the mean time, the reflux of the war, rushing from the ruins of Moscow, proceeded rapidly towards the Oder and the Elbe. Eugène, who had rallied a few thousand men, had successively retired upon the Walthe, the Oder, the Sprée, the Elbe, and the Saale. The German insurrection, excited by the secret societies, spread itself from town to town, and from village to village, and the number of Napoleon's enemies daily increased. How could we depend upon our allies? From the defection of Prussia, we had reason to anticipate that of many others. Determined to face every

thing, Napoleon, like a spendthrift, demanding, in advance, his revenue of men, ordered the conscription of 1814 to be put at his disposal. He and his favourites flattered themselves with raising an army of a thousand battalions, presenting an effective force of eight hundred thousand men, and four hundred squadrons, or one hundred thousand horse; in all, a million of soldiers to feed and pay. He lulled himself with this flattering chimera, and his ministers already demanded an additional sum of three hundred millions.

On the other hand, one hundred and sixty thousand conscripts were wandering about the country, deserting from their standards, and protected by the disaffected spirit of the provinces. Napoleon dreaded this silent rebellion to military law, to which nothing but leaders were wanting, but who would be found ready when the opportunity required presented itself: what did he do? By the most artful of plans, he collected together, in a guard of honour, ten thousand young men, selected from the richest and most illustrious families; these were as so many hostages of their parents' loyalty.

The mediation of Austria being unsuccessful, Napoleon again endeavoured to open a direct communication with the English ministry; for this purpose, he despatched the banker, Labouchère, who, however, did not meet with a more favourable reception than he did in my time. On her side, Prussia, who had just entered into alliance with

Russia, proposed an armistice, upon condition that Napoleon would content himself with the line of the Elbe, and would cede all the places on the Oder and the Vistula. In our cabinet, a party persisted in affirming that peace was still possible; M. de Talleyrand said, that we still had it in our power not to fight; Lebrun and Caulaincourt were likewise of opinion that the offer of Prussia should be accepted, and that negotiations should be entered upon. But how could Napoleon be persuaded to give up the fortresses? He could not make up his mind to cede any thing by negotiation. "Let them take what they can from me," said he, "but I will not give up any thing."

He made his journals say, "Spain belongs to the French dynasty; no human effort can hinder it." Being informed, on the 31st of March that the Russians had begun to cross the Elbe, he, himself, declared, through the medium of these same journals, "that the enemy's batteries, placed upon the heights of Montmartre, could never make him yield an inch of territory."

And yet he received, from every quarter, pacific counsels and useful advice.

I was hurt to see M. de Talleyrand, if not restored to favour, at least recalled to the council-board, whilst I remained inactive and in disgrace. I perceived the reason of it to be the impression which the Malet plot, to which a republican and liberal colour had affectedly been given, had left; it

might also be imputed to my remonstrances against the war with Russia. Certain, however, that sooner or later my advice would be required, I thought it expedient to hasten the period. I was not ignorant that an address from Louis XVIII. to the French people, dated from Hartwell, 1st of February, was being clandestinely circulated, in which the senate was invited to become the *instrument of a great service.* I knew that the emperor was aware of this document, the authenticity of which, however, might be questioned, as it had not given rise in England to any public observation or discussion. I procured a copy of it, which I addressed to him, assuring him, at the same time, of its genuineness.

I represented to him, in my letter, that his triumphs had lulled the Faubourg St. Germain, but that his reverses had again aroused it; that these reverses had produced a vast change in the opinion of Europe; that, even in France, the public mind had already undergone a change; that the partisans of the Bourbon family were on the alert; that they would secretly re-organize themselves themselves the instant that the power of the head of the empire should lose its fascination; that weariness of war was the most general and the deepest feeling; that nothing short of the national honour was required to enforce the necessity of conquering peace by a new campaign, in which the whole population were to be in arms, in order to support

negotiations so anxiously expected; that, for our safety and his own, he must either make peace, or convert the war into a national one; that too implicit a confidence on the alliance of Austria would inevitably be his destruction; that great sacrifices must be made to Austria, and that what could not be withheld from her should be returned with the utmost promptitude; that I did not consider M. Otto as a person adequate to the discussion of such complicated political interests, especially when opposed to M. de Metternich; and I pointed out M. de Narbonne, as alone able to penetrate the real intentions of Austria, whose conduct was so very equivocal.

It was not till after the lapse of a fortnight or three weeks, that I had a proof that my letter (though unanswered) had produced its effect, by the mission of M. de Narbonne to Vienna; I neither wished for, nor expected more; the rest was to follow sooner or later. I could rely upon the influence and credit of M. de Narbonne, whose mission was of the highest importance.

However, it must not excite astonishment, if, at the moment when Prussia obtained the levy *en masse* of the people of Germany, in the rear of the armies of the northern confederacy; if, at the moment, when she held out to the German nation, its deliverance as the object of the war, that Napoleon voluntarily rejected the first defence he could have, —that of a national war. He was well aware he

could only obtain a burst of patriotic enthusiasm, by regaining the public opinion—by making to us concessions, easy to another, but which would have cost him his heart's blood, as they would have inflicted a wound upon his pride, and have been a curb upon his power. I was, therefore, convinced that he would no more acquiesce in such a measure, than in ceding to Prussia the places upon the Vistula and the Oder, and, to Austria, the Tyrol and Illyria. Napoleon thought he could meet all difficulties by the formation of a new army of three hundred thousand men, and by organizing a regency, in case even of his death.

By conferring it upon Maria Louisa, with the right of assisting at the different councils of state, his object was twofold; to flatter Austria, and, at the same time, to prevent any plot in favour of a provisionary government. But, as the empress regent could not authorize, by her signature, the presentation of any *senatus consultum*, nor the promulgation of any law, the part she had to act was limited to her appearance at the council-board. Besides, she was herself under the tutorship of Cambacérès, who was himself directed by Savary. The ex-minister, Champagny, made also part of the regency, under the name of secretary; whose duty it was to enter into a new register, ridiculously called the *state-book*, the *definitive* intention of the absent emperor. In fact, after the regency was set in motion, the *soul* of the govern-

ment did not the less travel post with Napoleon, who did not fail of issuing forth numerous decrees from all his moveable head-quarters.

The allies, after several battles, were preparing to cross the Elbe, when the emperor, after having displayed extraordinary activity, during three months, in his preparations, quitted Paris, on the 15th of April, and proceeded to place himself at the head of his troops.

At first, he astonished Europe by the creation and sudden appearance, in the very heart of Germany, of a new army of two hundred thousand men, which enabled him to act on the offensive. By gaining two battles successively, the one at Bautzen, in Saxony, the other at Wurtchen, beyond the Sprée, he recovered the reputation of his military talents. The first consequence of these victories was to bring back to us the King of Saxony, who again threw himself headlong into our alliance.

The Prusso-Russians, whom Napoleon had defeated,—that is to say, the troops of Frederick William and the Emperor Alexander, continued their retreat towards the Oder, and he permitted himself to be drawn on in pursuit. But in proportion as he advanced, he separated himself from his reinforcements, whilst the allies, on the contrary, fell back upon theirs.

Suddenly, the news of an armistice was noised about Paris. Napoleon acceded to it, as he stood in need of reinforcements of every kind, and be-

cause he feared, under the cloak of mediation, the armed interference of Austria.

The question was now, to decide where the line of demarcation between the two armies should stop. The two points which they warmly disputed were Hamburgh and Breslaw. The Prussians insisted, with the greatest obstinacy, upon being left in possession of Silesia. Napoleon was apprehensive that the enemy's object, in the armistice, was rather to strengthen themselves for war than to use it as a preliminary to peace; he determined however to acquiesce, the general wish around him being for a suspension of arms. He, therefore, gave up Breslaw, abandoned the line of the Oder, and consented to withdraw his army upon Leignitz. The armistice was concluded on the 4th of June at Plessevig; and Napoleon again fixed his head-quarters at Dresden.

Such were the events which occupied the first two months of a campaign which was about to decide the fate of Europe. They had, both on this and the other side of the Rhine, wound up public attention to the highest possible pitch of excitement and anxiety.

The armistice was as a respite; the nations now flattered themselves with the hope of an approaching peace—the object universally desired. Was it not thus, besides, that Napoleon, after all his victories, had succeeded in pacifying Europe? But, to an observer, how much times were altered! At that

time, for want of information that could be depended upon, we had in Paris but very imperfect ideas upon events, the secret springs of which we were equally ignorant of.

I was expecting news from head-quarters, by an indirect channel, when I received from the arch-chancellor an invitation to confer with him upon a subject of importance. He informed me that he was commanded by the emperor to make a communication to me. The emperor, who had determined upon again accepting my services, desired that, at the same time he wrote to the King of Naples, requesting him to repair to Dresden, I should avail myself of the intimacy I enjoyed with that prince to determine him not to defer acquiescing in the emperor's wish; I was to represent to him that it became absolutely necessary that we should make in Saxony the greatest display possible of our forces, and of our resources, both military and political, in order to induce the enemy to conclude a peace which should be honourable for us. The arch-chancellor gave me the emperor's letter to read, to which he joined his own entreaties, adding that he had not the least doubt but I should be immediately called to fill a mission which would not be inferior either to my talents or rank. I replied that I was ready to fulfil the emperor's wishes; that I would, that moment, write to the King of Naples, and would communicate the contents of my letter to

him, in order that he might report them to his majesty.

Although, from preceding circumstances, I expected that I should soon be recalled into activity, I could not doubt as to what I should direct my views. I was mistrustful of Italy, which, in case of the resumption of hostilities, would only be for me an honourable exile, dictated by suspicion. However, I wrote my letter to Murat, who was himself in no ordinary position.

Joachim Murat, a brave and noble-minded general, but a king without any firmness or decision in his resolves, had created for himself, at Naples, a species of popularity and military power; he was so much dazzled with this, as to wish to shake off the yoke of Napoleon, who only considered him as an obedient vassal. It was not without difficulty that he had obeyed Napoleon's orders, in forming part of the Russian expedition with his contingent, formed of twelve thousand Neapolitans and a part of his guard. It was to him that Napoleon, when he fled, confided the command of the wretched remains of his army. Joachim, foreseeing the changes which were about to take place in the political system of Europe, resolved to return to his kingdom, and endeavour to preserve himself from the consequences of such a disaster. He quitted the army of Posen, and ten days after (27th January, 1813,) the *Moniteur* announced his

departure in these terms; "The King of Naples, being indisposed, has been obliged to retire from the command of the army, which he has resigned into the hands of the prince viceroy. The latter is more accustomed to the direction of large masses, and possesses the entire confidence of the emperor."

This official sally was the more galling to Murat, from the emperor having, during the two preceding years, made him feel that he was but a vassal of the grand empire. Murat, perceiving that he must expect the fate of his brother-in-law, Louis, if the emperor, surmounting his disasters, should recover his ascendency, sought the alliance of Austria, which was not as yet detached from Napoleon. His first communications with the court of Vienna were managed by Count Miër, the Austrian minister at Naples. Some negotiations also took place with Lord Bentinck, commander of the English forces in Sicily. Joachim and Lord Bentinck had even a secret interview in the island of Ponza; but Murat was watched by Bonaparte.

When it was known at Naples that the emperor, after gaining the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, was assembling a numerous army in Saxony, Queen Caroline wrote to her brother, requesting he would be more considerate towards her husband, and used all her influence with the king to induce him to break off his rash connexions with Austria and England. Napoleon wrote to Murat, who, at first, refused to proceed to Saxony. He

then caused a very affectionate letter to be written to him, in which Berthier, in the name of the emperor, entreated him to repair to head-quarters, assuring him, that in all probability the campaign would not be opened; that negotiations for peace were about to be commenced, and that his own interests imperatively demanded his presence. My letter was nearly in the same terms; and I flattered him by adding that glory was to be won there, and that his honour required that he should join his brothers in arms. Murat no longer hesitated. Before even he could have received my despatch, a courier from Dresden brought me an order from the emperor, requiring my presence at head-quarters. I immediately concluded, that being as much apprehensive of my presence at Paris, as of that of Murat at Naples, we might consider ourselves as two hostages whom he was anxious to have in his power. I made some hasty preparations, and set off for Dresden *via* Mayence.

The defence of Mayence, our principal key to the Rhine, was confided to Augereau, with whom I was anxious to have an interview, and who was also ordered to form a corps of observation on the Maine. I found him very incredulous as to the peace, finding much fault with Napoleon, and expressing much pity for the poor inhabitants of Mayence, who were in the utmost alarm at the idea of a siege and the ruin of the beautiful environs of their city. Finding that he was com-

pletely master of all that had occurred, I set him a babbling. " Adieu, now," said he, " to our days of glory! Alas! how little do these two victories, with which Napoleon makes all Paris re-echo, resemble those of our famous campaigns in Italy, where Bonaparte was my pupil in a science which he now only abuses. How great is the difficulty now to make even a few marches in advance. At Lutzen, our centre had given way; several battalions even had disbanded themselves; in vain did our two wings, by extending themselves, threaten to surround the forces accumulated by the enemy at the centre; we should have been lost, but for sixteen battalions of the young guard and forty-eight pieces of cannon. I tell you," continued he, " we can only calculate upon the superiority of our artillery; we have taught them to beat us. After Bautzen, he forced the passage of the Elbe, and made himself an opening into the north; but he was obliged to stop before Wurtzen, on the other side of the Sprée, and there we only carried the position and the entrenched camp by immense loss of blood. I have letters from head-quarters, and from these this horrible butchery has produced no advantages; no cannon taken, nor prisoners. In a hilly country like this, the enemy are everywhere found entrenched, and disputing the ground with invariable success. The battle of Reichenbach was disadvantageous to us. Observe also, that in this short opening of the campaign, a cannon-ball

carried off Bessières, on this side the Elbe, while another killed Duroc at Reichenbach; Duroc, the only friend he had left! The same day, Bruyères and Kirgemer fell also under random bullets. What a war!" cried Augereau, continuing his disheartening reflections, "what a war is this! it will be the end of us all! What is he now about at Dresden? He will not make peace; he will get himself surrounded by five hundred thousand men; for rely upon it, Austria will be as little faithful to him as Prussia. Yes, if he persist, and be not killed, which he will not be, good bye to us all."

These observations sufficiently convinced me of the truth of what I had already heard, that an impatience for peace and for returning to Paris, formed the anxious desire of almost every general whose fortune was made. Dresden presented to me, at the same time, the idea of a vast entrenched camp, and a capital city. The forests in the vicinity were being felled by the axes of the pioneers. Upon my arrival, I everywhere found the earth dug up, trees felled, ditches, and palisadoes being made. The emperor was continually on horseback, overlooking the works, and surveying the surrounding country, accompanied by Bertheir, Soult, and the geographical engineer Bacler d'Alby; he was almost continually, with the map in his hand, examining all the openings which led into the plain of Dresden. The construction of bridges, the tracing of roads, the erection of re-

doubts and the formation of camps, formed also the principal objects in his excursions and rides.

All these fortifications and lines might be considered as the advanced works of Dresden, the central point of a strong position on the higher bank of the Elbe; the works on the right bank round the city were nearly finished; peasants, put in requisition from all parts of Saxony, were labouring at their completion. The emperor had completely surrounded the city by ditches and palisadoes, supplying the intervals left by the walls; the approaches were also defended by a line of advanced redoubts, the cross-fires of which commanded the country to a considerable distance. Not confining himself to fortify the environs of Dresden, he had established along the whole line of the Elbe, upon the banks of that river, his cavalry; the advance of which was at Dresden, while its rear reached to Hamburgh. The towns of Kœnigstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, and Magdeburg, were his principal fortified points upon the Elbe, and secured to him the possession of that large and beautiful valley. All these works, begun and prosecuted with the utmost ardour, sufficiently revealed that Napoleon's plan was to concentrate a great part of his forces in the environs of Dresden, there to await the course of events. Thus I found him much occupied with negotiations, after having chosen the environs of Dresden for his field of battle, and the line of the Elbe for his rallying

point. The majority of his generals considered Dresden as possessing all the advantages of a central position proper to serve as a pivot for the emperor's intended operations. There were, however, some who owned to me that, if Austria declared itself, we should find ourselves in an awkward predicament, being exposed to an attack between the Elbe and the Rhine. They considered the division of the enemies' forces, though separate, as forming three grand masses. Towards the north, on the Berlin road, the army of Bernadotte, Prince of Sweden; towards the east, on the road to Silesia, the army of Blucher; and behind the mountains of Bohemia, the Austrian army of observation, under Schwartzenberg; for, at head-quarters, the Austrians were already looked upon as on the point of declaring against us.

Being informed that the emperor had returned to the palace of Marcolini, in Friederichstadt, I hastened to present myself at his audience. He called me into his cabinet; I found him there very serious. "You have come late, my Lord Duke," said he to me. "Sire, I have used the utmost diligence in obeying your majesty's commands." "Why were you not here before my grand discussion with Metternich? you would have fathomed him." "Sire, it was not my fault." "Those people wish to dictate laws to me without a sword being drawn; and do you know who most annoy me at this moment? Your two friends, Bernadotte

and Metternich; the one makes an open, the other an underhand, war against me." "But, sire!" . . . ., "Call upon Berthier; he will communicate to you every thing respecting our present situation, and will put you *au fait* to all; you must then give me your ideas upon this infernal Austrian negotiation, which is slipping through my fingers; all your ability is required to preserve it. However, I will no way compromise my power or my glory! Those scoundrels are so hard; they want, without fighting, the money and the provinces which I only obtained at the sword's point. I have arranged matters well, as to the chief point: Narbonne has undeceived us; you will see what his opinion is. Speak with Berthier as soon as possible, give the matter mature consideration, and let me see you in two days."

Upon withdrawing, I found it was impossible for me that day to converse with Berthier, who, having become, since Duroc's death, his confidant, both in politics and military affairs, was continually with the emperor, and was even a constant guest at his table. He put off the interview till the day following. In the mean time, a member of the cabinet made me acquainted with two circumstances which had just over-shadowed our political horizon, and rendered the hopes of peace still more uncertain. I mean the political dispute of Count Metternich with the emperor (of which I shall soon speak,) and the intelligence, which arrived that

very day, of the complete defeat of our army in Spain, at Vittoria; a defeat which left the Peninsula at the mercy of Wellington, and brought the war to the foot of the Pyrenees. Such an event, known at Prague, could not fail producing a baleful influence upon the pending negotiations. The emperor, confounded at this new reverse, which he imputed to the inability of Joseph and Jourdan, looked around for a general, capable of repairing so many errors. This choice fell upon Marshal Soult, at that time near his person, in his guard. He enjoined him to go and rally his forces, and to defend, inch by inch, the passage of the Pyrenees. Soult would not have hesitated, had not his wife, recently arrived at Dresden, with a splendid equipage, shown some repugnance, and refused to return to Spain, "where," said she, "nothing is to be got but blows." As she possessed considerable influence over her husband, Soult, being much annoyed, had recourse to the emperor, who immediately sent for the duchess. She made her appearance with an air of vast importance, and assuming an imperious tone, declared that her husband should not return to Spain; that he had served there too long, and stood in need of repose. "Madam," cried Napoleon, enraged, "I did not send for you to hear this insolence; I am not your husband; and if I were, you would conduct yourself differently. Recollect that woman's province is to obey; return to your husband, and let him be

quiet." She was obliged to submit; to sell horses, carriages, *&c. &c.*, and in dudgeon, take the road to the western Pyrenees. This scene, with a haughty duchess, furnished much amusement at head-quarters, and acted as a diversion to the malicious chit-chat, of which one of our most beautiful actresses, Mademoiselle de Bourgoin, had recently been the object. Having been sent for to Dresden, with the *élite* of the *Comédie Française*, and being invited one day to breakfast with the emperor, in company with Berthier and Caulaincourt, she had, it is said, after laying aside the character of Melpomene, successively assumed that of Hebe, Terpsichore, and Thais.

But let us pass on to more serious circumstances. I, at length, obtained an interview with Berthier, who had a small apartment in the Brühl* palace. It would be tiresome to relate *verbatim*, our long conversation upon the military and political position of the emperor at this time. I shall only give here the portion really historical, introducing some ideas, drawn from my own recollections. We will commence by the Austrian negotiation. Narbonne, writing from Vienna towards the end of April, was the first to inform us that Austria could be but little depended upon, he hav-

* We suppose it to be the same thing with the palace of Marcolini, which was occupied by Napoleon, and formerly belonged to the Count de Brühl, a minister of Augustus III., the Elector of Saxony, and King of Poland.—*Note by the French Editor.*

ing forced from M. de Metternich the avowal, that the treaty of alliance of the 14th of March, 1812, no longer appeared applicable to existing circumstances; he called for a serious attention to the demands and armaments of Austria. The emperor immediately conceived the idea of, at least, neutralizing the cabinet of Vienna, by means of two negotiations: the one official, the other secret; he flattered himself with destroying the influence of the northern coalition, and to do this he relied upon the emperor, his father-in-law, and M. de Metternich.

The emperor had formed an erroneous opinion of this statesman, who had resided for three years at Paris as ambassador, and who had negotiated, in quality of prime minister, the treaty of Vienna and of alliance. Of all European statesmen, he was indisputably the one who best understood the government and court of Naploeon. In this he had succeeded, through his high office, by successively paying his interested devoirs to Hortensia and Pauline, and principally from predilection, to Murat's wife, afterwards the Queen of Naples.

The emperor formed a superficial judgment of a diplomatist, who under the exterior of a man of the world, agreeable, gallant, and devoted to pleasure, masked one of the strongest thinkers of Germany, and concealed a mind essentially European and monarchical. Still deceiving himself, even after his reverses, the emperor imagined that in-

trigue at Vienna would be superior to considerations of state; such was the source of his errors. Imagining that he had cut the Gordian knot of policy, in the fields of Lutzen and Wurtzen, he thought he had fully succeeded in regaining Austria to his interests. M. de Bubna was despatched to him; this minister did not dissemble, in the midst of his flatteries, that his court would demand in Italy, the Illyrian provinces, on the side of Bavaria and Poland, an increase of frontiers; and, lastly, in Germany, the dissolution of the confederation of the Rhine. Napoleon, considering it weakness to purchase a mere neutrality with such sacrifices, in answer to the autograph letter of his father-in-law, replied, that he would die fighting, rather than submit to such conditions. The uncertainty respecting the alliance being prolonged, after the armistice, Bubna was seen going to and fro between Vienna and Dresden, Dresden and Prague, and at length he announced that Russia and Prussia adhered to the mediation of his court. A congress at Prague now was proposed. Narbonne followed the court of Austria thither; and scarcely was he in the neighbourhood of Dresden, than he repaired thither to receive fresh instructions. "Well," said the emperor to him, "what do they say of Lutzen?" "Ah! Sire," replied the witty courtier, "some say you are a god, others, that you are a devil; but every one allows you are more than a man." Narbonne, a deep observer of mankind, was not, how-

ever, mistaken respecting the supernatural power of him whose head he compared to a volcano.

The secret negotiation turned upon two conditions, the withdrawing from the Illyrian provinces, and the payment of a provisional subsidy of fifteen millions, as a small compensation for what Austria affirmed she had refused, *viz.*, ten millions sterling, offered her by the Cabinet of London, in order to induce her to declare against us. She had already received ten millions in two equal payments.

After having conferred with Narbonne, Napoleon decided that the negotiations should be opened direct with M. de Metternich, and that I should repair to Dresden, as I had for a long time been in possession of the clue to the labyrinth of diplomacy.

Whilst a courier was despatched for me, M. de Metternich arrived, bringing with him the answer of his cabinet to the pressing notes of the minister of foreign affairs. The alliance considered as incompatible with the mediation was first to be broken off. The Austrian minister, also, no longer dissembled the intentions of his court to place itself between the belligerent powers, to prevent their communicating with each other, but through the chancery of Vienna. Here fresh difficulties arose, as Napoleon would not understand this unusual mode of negotiation. Prince Metternich, being the bearer of a private letter from his master, came to deliver it to the emperor, who granted

him a private audience. Here the altercation began. First, Napoleon complained that a month had already been lost, that the mediation of Austria had the character of hostility, and that she would no longer guarantee the integrity of the French empire; he complained that she had interfered to arrest his victorious progress, in speaking of armistice and mediation. "You talk of peace and alliance," said he to M. de Metternich, "and the political horizon becomes more and more clouded. The ties of the coalition are drawn still closer by the treaties cemented with English gold. Now that your two hundred thousand men are ready, you come to dictate laws to me; your cabinet is eager to take advantage of my embarrassment, to recover all or part of what it has lost, and to propose our ransom before we have fought. Well! I will consent to treat; but, let us have a candid explanation. What are your demands?" "Austria," replied Metternich, "is only desirous of establishing an order of things which, by a wise distribution of the European power, may place the guarantee of peace under the ægis of a confederacy of independent states." "Be more explicit, I have offered you Illyria; I have consented to a subsidy to induce you to remain neuter; my army is quite sufficient to make the Russians and Prussians listen to reason." M. de Metternich then made the avowal, that things were at such a pass, that Austria could not remain neuter; that she was forced to

declare for or against France. Thus pressed, Napoleon, without flinching, seized a map of Europe, and desired Metternich to explain himself. Finding that Austria insisted, not only upon Illyria, but the half of Italy, the return of the pope to Rome, the re-establishment of Prussia, the ceding of Warsaw, of Spain, Holland, and the confederation of the Rhine; he could no longer contain himself. "Your object then," cried he, "in going from camp to camp, is a division; you want the dismemberment of the French empire! With a single dash of the pen, you pretend to throw down the ramparts of the fortresses of Europe, the keys of which I could only obtain by dint of victory! And it is without striking a blow, that Austria thinks to make me subscribe to such conditions! And it is my father-in-law who makes an offer, in itself an insult! He deceives himself, if he thinks, that a mutilated throne can be an asylum for his daughter or his grand-son. Ah! Metternich, how much has England paid you, to induce you to act this part against me?"

At these words, the statesman, offended, replied only by a proud silence. Napoleon, confused, became more calm, and declared that he did not yet despair of peace; he insisted that the congress might be opened. Upon dismissing M. de Metternich, he told him that the cession of Illyria was not his *ne plus ultra*. The Austrian minister did not quit Dresden (30th of June) till after he had caused

the mediation of his court to be accepted, and prolonged the armistice till the 10th of August. When Napoleon was asked, if the five last millions of the subsidy must be paid: "No," said he, "these people would soon demand all France of us." Such was the state of affairs on my arrival at Dresden.

I did not conceal from Berthier, whose judgment was sound, and opinions just, that I had not the least doubt but that Austria would join the coalition, unless the emperor abandoned, at least, Germany and Illyria. I added, that, if hostilities were resumed, I foresaw the greatest disasters; as there had never existed, since the revolution, so firm a principle of coalition against our power.

Berthier coincided with me in opinion. "But," said he, "you cannot imagine how much circumspection is necessary with the emperor; an open contradiction would irritate him beyond my power to pacify him. I am obliged to use the most indirect means, unless he demands my opinion. For example, since Austria has appeared desirous of dictating to us, we are often discussing plans of campaign upon the supposition of a rupture; that is my ground. Well, would you believe it? I did not dare to urge him to abandon the line of the Elbe for the purpose of approaching methodically that of the Rhine, which would cover the whole of all the forces we can dispose of. How did I act? In an indirect manner, I seconded the plan of a very intel-

ligent officer*, a plan which consisted by calling in all the troops we had on the other side of the Elbe, in reuniting all the detached corps, and in retiring *en masse* upon the Saale, and from thence upon the Rhine. One very serious consideration pleaded in favour of this plan. Allowing that Austria declared herself, she would immediately open the gates of Bohemia, permit the allies to turn our position, and in a word, cut us off from France. Nothing could make an impression upon the emperor. 'Good God!' cried he, 'why ten defeats could scarcely reduce me to the position in which you place me all at once. You are apprehensive of my situation in the heart of Germany being a very precarious one. Was I not in a much more hazardous situation at Marengo, Austerlitz, and Wagram? Well! I conquered at Wagram, Austerlitz, and Marengo. What! do you think me in a precarious situation, who am protected by all the fortresses of the Elbe, and by Erfurt? Dresden is the pivot upon which I shall manœuvre to make head against every attack. From Berlin to Prague the enemy develop themselves upon a circumference of which I occupy the centre. Do you imagine that so many different nations will long keep up a connected system of operations for such an extent of line? I shall sooner or later surprise

* We have reason to believe that the person here alluded to is Lieutenant-General Rogniat, commander of the engineer department in the campaign of Saxony.—*Editor's Note.*

them in false movements. The fate of Germany must be decided in the plains of Saxony. I repeat it: the position I have chosen gives me such chances, that the enemy, if they even gained ten battles, could scarcely drive me back upon the Rhine,—while I, if once victorious, would take possession of the hostile capitals, disengage my garrisons upon the Oder and the Vistula, and force the allies to make a peace which would leave my glory untouched. At any rate, I have calculated upon every thing; fate must do the rest. As to your plan of retrograde defence, it cannot suit me: besides, I do not ask you to furnish plans of campaign; do not make them; be satisfied with entering into my ideas, in order to execute the commands I may give you.'" "But," said I to Berthier, "if every general and staff-officer of the army thought as you do, which, I have no doubt, is really the case, do you not conceive that this combination of a moral opposition would force the emperor not to compromise every thing by his obstinacy?" "Do not deceive yourself," replied Berthier; "opinions are much divided at headquarters. Because we have been a long time victorious, they imagine we shall be so still, and do not perceive how much times are altered. Besides, see how the emperor is surrounded: Maret is completely drawn into his system; nothing, therefore, can be expected from him. If Caulaincourt, who enjoys his confidence in a still greater degree,

sometimes speaks his mind, and forces the truth upon him, he is not less obsequious. The emperor never consults his two bravest generals, Murat and Ney, except on the field of battle,—and he is in the right. Those usually about his person encourage to war; all but Narbonne, Flahault, Drouet, Durosnel, and Colonel Bernard, who are distinguished exceptions, and whose opinions might easily be formed into a reasonable system. As to his other favourites, especially Bacler d'Abby, who, with his maps, is constantly at his side, they, like their master, indulge the hope that the allies will commit faults which may be turned to their destruction; they speak of them with contempt, as acting without any plan; they will not see that all has undergone a change since our unfortunate Russian campaign,—that we have taught them how to beat us,—and that, if they cannot attain the velocity and the precision of our manœuvres, and the superiority of our artillery, other advantages, especially that of numbers, will ensure their eventual triumph; for, as in the days of Marshal Saxe, it is still *les gros bataillons* who gain the victory." "Do not forget," I answered, "the co-operation of the people, who are now stirred up in insurrection against us, not only by secret societies, but even by their governments." "No doubt," rejoined Berthier: "add to which we are also in want of spies and a good cavalry." "Enough," said I, taking leave of him; "I will commit to writing your ideas, to which I

will add my own; and thus provided, I will see the emperor, and tell him the truth, as I have done upon every occasion."

My intention was not to enter into a military discussion, nor even into a profound political disquisition: for I was perfectly aware that either the abruptness of his dialogue, of his questions, or of his dogmatizing tone, would not allow me the time. I had been able to judge, at my first audience, that two men were uppermost in his thoughts, Bernadotte and Metternich. As to the latter I knew well what to think; the former was a more difficult subject to speak of: it was, however, necessary. I had been assured that, at the Abo interview (September, 1812), the Emperor of Russia had said to him, "If Bonaparte be unsuccessful in his invasion of my empire, and if, in consequence of that, the throne of France should become vacant, I know no one better qualified to ascend it than yourself." Were not these words, which were a sufficient explanation of Bernadotte's conduct, rather employed as a stimulus, than as an index of the real sentiments of the august personage who uttered them?—The interior of France was, at this time, no way prepared for such an event: how many chances were wanting to render it even probable? After the disasters of Moscow, the European cabinets could no longer think of replacing the military chief of France by another soldier of fortune. They began to recollect that there was

a dynasty of Bourbons. Many doubts were removed by the expected arrival of Moreau on the continent, in the suite of Bernadotte. The first operations of Charles John, who, previous to the armistice, had landed at Stralsund with the Swedish corps, was to retake Pomerania from us. What could his politics be? He was reported to be always accompanied and almost watched by the English General Stewart, the Austrian Baron de Vincent, the Russian General Pozzo-di-Borgo, and the Prussian General Krusemarck. Amid such mistrust, some glimmerings of hope shone around him; for almost all parties had their representatives at his head-quarters, even the faction of the malcontents, of which Madame de Staël was the life and soul.

Napoleon had just learnt, that, availing himself of the armistice, Charles John had recently visited the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, at their head-quarters of Reichenbach, in order to confirm them in their resolution not to sign peace so long as a single French soldier should be left on the right bank of the Rhine. The temper in which I was about to find him may easily be conjectured. I prepared myself for the interview, and presented myself at the gardens of Palace Marcolini. Being almost immediately introduced, I found the emperor surrounded with maps and plans. He had scarcely perceived me, when, rising, he addressed me thus: "Well, my Lord Duke, are you now acquainted with our situation?" — "Yes, Sire."—

Shall we be between two fires; between the howitzers of your dear Bernadotte and the bombs of my most excellent friend Schwartzenberg!"—"In my opinion, there cannot be the least doubt; unless you satisfy Austria."—"I will not do so; I will not tamely submit to be stripped without fighting. I know full well that the ambition of all, and the bad passions of many, have been set in action against me. Your Bernadotte, for example, may do us much harm, by giving up the key to our policy and the tactics of our army to the enemy."—"But, sire, has not your cabinet endeavoured to induce him back into a less hostile system?"—"By what means? he is bought over by England; I have, however, written to him, and have about him a man I can depend upon; but his head has been turned with seeing himself courted and flattered by the legitimates."—"Sire, all this has appeared to me in so serious a light, that I also have taken up the pen to endeavour to open the Prince of Sweden's eyes, who is at perfect liberty to come and show off in Germany; but who ought not, in any case whatever, to make war upon France."—"Pshaw! France! France! I am France."—"Will your majesty condescend to inform me if you approve of my letter; I prove in it to the Prince of Sweden that he is making himself the instrument of Russia and England to overthrow your power, and for the resuscitation of the cause of the Bourbons." (I then delivered my letter to the emperor, who read it

attentively.) "Very well; but how shall you get it conveyed to him?"—"I think your majesty might avail yourself of the medium of Marshal Ney, so long the friend and companion in arms of the Prince of Sweden, and who might add his own personal solicitations, your majesty authorizing him to choose for his emissary Colonel T****."—"No, that officer was formerly a jacobin.—"Sire, Lieutenant L****, of the *gendarmerie*, might be employed; his devotion and intelligence is well known to your majesty."—"Well, let it be so; instructions shall be given him, and he shall wait upon Ney." After two minutes' silence, the emperor suddenly resumed: "Have you considered the means of prosecuting the secret negotiation with Austria?" "Yes, Sire."—"Have you drawn up a note for me?"—"Yes, Sire, here it is." (The emperor, after having read it;) "What! does all appear to you unavailing? Do you see in my plans nothing but palliatives and half measures; do you agree with the opinions of those, who would wish to see me disarmed, and reduced to an equality with a village mayor? Rely upon it, my Lord Duke, you will never find a more secure ægis than mine."—"Sire, of this I am so well persuaded, that it is precisely one of the motives which make me so ardently desire to see your majesty's throne no longer exposed to the chances of war. But it is my duty not to conceal from your majesty that the re-action of Europe, for a long time arrested by your glorious victories, can

no longer be so except by other triumphs more difficult to obtain. The same ministers, who were always ready to negotiate with your cabinet, and whom it was formerly so easy for you to divide and intimidate, now boast that their voices shall no longer be stifled in the councils of kings by a narrow and short-sighted policy; they pretend that they have at stake the salvation of Europe?"—"Well; I have at stake the salvation of the empire, and certainly I shall not undertake a part which they have rejected."—"But a solution is necessary; if you do not disarm Austria, or if she do not embrace your cause, you will have all Europe against you, now firmly united. The best thing to be done would be peace; it is practicable by abandoning Germany to preserve Italy, or by ceding Italy in order to keep a footing in Germany. I am beset, Sire, with melancholy presentiments; in the name of Heaven, for the glory and consolidation of that magnificent empire I have assisted you in organizing, avoid, I entreat, a rupture, and avert, while it is yet time, a general crusade against your power. Think, that this time, upon the least reverse of fortune, the face of every thing will be changed, and that you will lose the rest of your allies, who are even now wavering; that by rejecting a national defence, the only safe-guard against disaster, your enemies will turn to their advantage the *vis inertiæ*, so fatal to the power which isolates itself; it is then that old dormant hopes will be

revived, and that England, ever on the watch, will pour into Bordeaux, La Vendée, Normandy, and Morbihan, its agents, commissioned on the first favourable opportunity to revive the cause of the Bourbons. I conjure you, Sire, for the sake of our safety, and your own glory, not to stake your crown and power on the chances of a throw. What will be the event? That five hundred thousand soldiers, backed by a second line, consisting of a whole population in arms, will compel you to abandon Germany, without giving you time to renew the negotiations." At these words the emperor, raising his head, and assuming a warlike attitude, "I can yet," said he, "fight ten battles with them, and one is sufficient to disorganize and crush them. It is a pity, my Lord Duke, that a fatal tendency to discouragement and despair should have thus pervaded the best inclined minds; the question is no longer the ceding this or that province; our political supremacy is at stake; and upon that depends our existence. If my physical power be great, my moral power is infinitely more so; it is magic; do not let us break the enchantment. What occasion for all this alarm? Let events develope themselves. As to Austria, she should deceive no one; she wishes to profit by my situation in order to wrest great concessions from me; I have almost made up my mind to it; but I can never be persuaded that she consents to ruin me utterly, and thus place herself at the mercy of Russia. This is my line of policy,

and I expect you will serve me to the utmost of your ability. I have appointed you governor-general of Illyria; and, to all appearance, you will have to cede it to Austria. Go, make your way through Prague, there make your dispositions for the secret negotiations; and from thence proceed to Gratz and Laybach, after which you will act according to circumstances; use all despatch, for poor Junot, whom you replace, is certainly stark mad; and Illyria has need of an able and firm hand." "I am quite ready, Sire, to answer the confidence with which you honour me; but, if I dared, I would beg you to observe, that one of the principal springs in the secret negotiation would doubtless be, independently of the withdrawing from the provinces, the perspective of the regency, such as it has been organized by your majesty in its greatest latitude." "I understand you well: say all you please upon the subject; I give you *carte blanche.*"

My sole object was now, supposing that a rupture should take place, to turn my new situation to the advantage of the state. Besides, the secret negotiation with Austria appeared to be without an object, the moment that the emperor refused to make to that power the concessions by which alone he could retain it in his interests. My mission was therefore, with respect to Austria, nothing but a blind; and towards myself, nought else but a pretext to remove me, during the crisis, from the centre of affairs. The emperor had also two other objects.

First, to keep, as long as possible, the court of Austria in suspense; and to keep up a party there ready to second him, if, in case of a rupture, he should succeed, by some grand defeat, in disuniting the northern coalition. Secondly, he earnestly wished to make me traverse the Austrian monarchy from one end to the other, on my way to my government, being persuaded that I should not make my observations upon it in vain. Berthier owned to me that such was the emperor's intention; that he even desired I would stop at Prague as long as possible, in order to concert matters with Narbonne, and to penetrate the ulterior views of Austria. He did not fail to expatiate much upon the high powers with which I was invested in the Illyrian provinces, powers which, being at the same time both civil and military, conferred upon me a kind of dictatorship; but I knew perfectly well what I had to expect from this Illyria, whether war broke out again, or whether this province were ceded to Austria. As to my stay and my observations at Prague, I was convinced that it became me less than any other person to prolong the one, or extend the others beyond the limits of propriety.

I was, however, desirous of adopting some plan, founded equally upon reason and utility; for I know nothing worse than to act at random. Having no command on the existing political state of affairs, I arranged my ideas upon the probabilities of the future. "The emperor," said I, "must succumb under

a general confederacy; he may perish in the field, or may be attainted by a decree of forfeiture, after a series of fresh reverses, which would entirely dissipate the fascination of his power. Spite of the egotism, the blindness, and even the baseness which predominate among the chief functionaries of the state, it is certain that ideas as to the general preservation must take root among some of the strongest thinkers of Paris; this may bring about one of those revolutions, determined by the weight of circumstances and the exigencies of public opinion. Such a revolution may have important consequences, for if England, the soul of this new coalition, should assume the political direction of it, the chances would be found to be on the side of the Bourbons." I have no need to say that my former proceedings did not permit me to turn my thoughts to that quarter, even supposing the overthrow of the empire; and perhaps I shall be considered as being too candid in confessing that, during the last six months of 1813, the Bourbons would have found, among the high officers of state, but few leading men upon whom they could reasonably depend. In fact, all the revolutionary interests, which were detaching themselves from the emperor, those even of the royalists, who had become incorporated with the imperial government, must first necessarily endeavour to rally under the power of the regency, of which Napoleon himself had laid the basis, if a few men of ability were enabled to prepare this transi-

tion in case of a reverse. But it was in that case that it would have been imprudent to wait till all was lost. Austria was much interested in seeing a regency established under the ægis of an archduchess, and in maintaining a system which, by allying her to France, reconciled to Europe, and reduced within its natural limits, the Alps and the Rhine, would enable her immediately to counterbalance the too great preponderance about to be acquired by Russia. It was upon this basis that I arranged my ideas, and explained them in a memoir, in which I established the hypothesis of an effective regency, the eventual existence of which might be pointed out to statesmen. According to my plan, all interests were to be represented in the council of regency. I naturally was to be a member of it, as well as Messrs. Talleyrand, Narbonne, Macdonald, Montmorency, and two other persons, whose names I shall not mention. As to the ambition of the marshals, it would have been gratified by the erection of large military governments, which were to be shared among them, and which would have increased their influence in the state; in a word, according to my ideas, the regency would have conciliated all interests and opinions. The government, instead of being the oppressor, would have become the protector, of its subjects,—while its form would have been that of a tempered monarchy, with a mixture of a moderate aristocracy, *(aristocratie raisonnable,)* and of a representative

democracy, This was undoubtedly the plan best suited to the serious character of circumstances, as it would preserve France from the twofold danger of invasion and dismemberment. I had the greatest reason for believing that it would be favourably received by the statesman at that time at the head of the Austrian policy, whose solidity of character and depth of views were well known to me; I mean M. de Metternich. His kindness for me took its rise from the declaration of war against Austria, in 1809. At that time I received orders from the emperor to have him seized (contrary to the usual forms dictated by propriety in diplomatic affairs) by a brigade of *gendarmerie*, to be conducted under this escort to the confines of Austria, subjecting him at the same time to every severity which could increase the insult offered to him. Much hurt at such unheard-of treatment, I took upon me to soften down the execution of it. I immediately ordered my carriage, and repaired to the ambassador's; I explained to him the object of my visit, and expressed the deep regret it caused me. A mutual explanation followed, sufficient, at least, for us to understand each other. Having requested Marshal Moncey to appoint a captain of *gendarmerie*, whose amiable and polite manners might qualify, in some degree, the insulting nature of his commission, I ordered him to take his seat in the travelling-carriage of the ambassador, to whom I allowed the requisite time for preparation. Upon

taking leave, he expressed to me his deep sense of obligation for the attentions and delicacy I had observed upon this occasion.

My ideas, therefore, being thus settled, and being urged by the emperor and Berthier, I began my journey, attended by M. de Chassenon, an auditor attached to the commissariat-general of the grand army, and took the road to Prague,—not, however, without having, previous to my departure from Dresden, paid my respects to the venerable monarch of Saxony, who had devoted himself with so much perseverance to the French cause. I had an opportunity of remarking how much the Saxons regretted seeing their king thus identified with the interests of Napoleon, and how clearly they foresaw the misfortunes which might accrue from it.

I arrived at Prague at the moment of the expected opening of the congress, upon which, however, I founded not the slightest hopes, as, in my eyes, it was nothing more than one of those diplomatic scenes played off to justify the employment of force. M. de Metternich and the plenipotentiaries of Russia and Prussia had just arrived, and the whole Austrian chancery had already taken up its quarters. Of the two French plenipotentiaries, I only found Narbonne; he was expecting Caulaincourt, and was ordered not to act without his colleagues. Some difficulties had already preceded the meeting of the congress; Napoleon had just

protested against the nomination of M. d'Anstett, the Russian plenipotentiary, a Frenchman by birth, born in Alsace, and whom he designated in his *Moniteur* as a most active agent of war. Besides these altercations, it was expected that questions relating to form and ceremony would arrest the progress of affairs at their very outset. Napoleon had entered into the same explanation with Narbonne as with me. "The peace that I will not make," he had said to him, "is that which my enemies wish to impose upon me. Be assured, he who has always dictated peace cannot, in his turn, tamely submit to it. If I abandon Germany, Austria will fight with still more ardour till she obtain Italy; if I cede Italy, she will, in order to secure her possession of it, hasten to expel me from Germany." The only positive instruction Narbonne had yet received, was to endeavour not to place Austria in a hostile position. I communicated to him the emperor's intention relative to a secret negotiation, and he augured as unfavourably from it as I did myself.

I found myself at Prague in a sphere entirely new to me, and on a ground with which I was equally unacquainted. It was known that I had arrived there merely on my way forward. Much delicacy was required in getting an interview with the head of the Austrian chancery. I everywhere found the same mistrust with respect to Napoleon, and complaints, more or less well founded. I was

assured, for example, that, since the month of December, 1812, he had offered to abandon to Austria, Italy, the Illyrian provinces, the supremacy of Germany, and, in short, to re-establish the ancient splendour of the court of Vienna; but that he no sooner saw himself enabled to open a new campaign, than he had evaded all his promises, confining himself to cede nothing but a few trifling advantages, which could bear no proportion whatever to what Austria naturally expected, in order to resume her rank and preponderance in Europe.

The cabinet of Vienna evidently wished to profit by the diminution of our power, to recover what it had lost by the peace of Presburg and that of Schœnbrunn. It attached but little value to the regaining of Illyria, which could not fail, on the first shot, returning under its vast dominion.

I learnt at Prague that the northern coalition had just declared against the confederation of the Rhine, at the opening even of the campaign; and that, on the 25th of March, Marshal Kutusoff had announced, by a proclamation published at Kalisch, that the confederation of the Rhine was dissolved. This was a species of sanction offered beforehand to the defection of the German troops employed in our armies. I likewise learnt, that the conference of Reichenbach had been just resumed at Trachenberg; that the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, and the Prince Royal of Sweden, were present at them, as well as M. de Stadion on the

part of Austria, and the Earl of Aberdeen for England, as well as the generals-in-chief of the combined army. There the forces which the coalesced powers were about to devote to the most determined war ever undertaken against Napoleon were decided upon; there their movements of attack and their offensive operations were planned; in short, the rendezvous of the three grand armies was appointed to be *in the very camp* of the enemy. It was impossible not to perceive an understanding between all the contracting parties, about to be cemented by treaties of partition and subsidy.

It was, however, decided to open the congress, but to enclose Napoleon in it, in the circle of Popilius. Although not openly admitted to the conferences, England was undoubtedly the soul of them; it was she who was about to direct the negotiations. Thus there was no longer any doubt but that Austria was on the eve of joining the northern confederation, and strengthening it by two hundred thousand troops of the line. To all that we could confidentially urge, in order to dissuade her, she replied, that it was scarcely possible to find in Napoleon any guarantee that she should not be exposed to fresh spoliations, while the present state of affairs promised her more.

All my efforts to renew the secret negotiation were unavailing. As to my private views, as their object was the future guarantee of our political establishment, I was informed that the plan of a regency, in the interests of Austria, might influence

the determinations of its policy, but not till suppositions should be converted into realities. I could not succeed in getting any provisionary engagement entered into, on the basis of contingent events; I merely obtained the assurance that they would only commence with the destruction of the power of Napoleon abroad, and that Austria would refuse to be a party to any plan for the subversion of our home affairs. I ought not to forget to mention that, among the complaints made to me by the Austrian chancery, I remarked its reproaches against Napoleon on account of the diatribes of his *Moniteur*, as well as of certain articles inserted in other journals.

I quitted Prague certainly with more information, but without having found there the least shadow of a guarantee for the future; on the contrary, I carried with me the melancholy conviction that a million of soldiers were about to decide the fate of Europe; and that, in this vast conflict, it would be difficult to stipulate in time for the interests which I had combined, and which no diplomacy would as yet make an object of primary importance.

In traversing the Austrian monarchy, in my way to Illyria, my journey, although a very rapid one, afforded me much instruction. I first was convinced that this compact monarchy, although composed of so many different states, was better governed and administered than is generally supposed; that it was also inhabited and defended by a loyal and patient people; that there was, in its

policy, a kind of longanimity, well calculated to triumph over reverses, for which it had always palliatives in reserve. By its perseverance in its maxims of state, it triumphed, sooner or later, over the shifting policy of circumstance and contingency; in short, it was evident that Austria, by the entire developement of its power, was about to throw a decisive weight into the balance of Europe.

I proceeded, by the way of Gratz, the capital of Stiria, and by the Stirian Alps towards Laybach, the ancient capital of the duchy of Carniola, at that time considered the chief place of our Illyrian provinces. I arrived there towards the end of July, and immediately installed myself in quality of governor-general. These provinces, ceded by the treaty of peace of Schœnbrunn, in 1809, were composed of Austrian Frioul, of the government of the town and port of Trieste, of Carniola, which includes the rich mine of Idria, of the circle of Willach, and of a part of Croatia and Dalmatia, —that is to say, all the country situated to the right of the Save, reckoning from the point where that river quits Carniola, and takes its course as far as the frontier of Bosnia. This last country includes Provincial Croatia, the six districts of Military Croatia, Fiume, and the Hungarian shore; Austrian Istria, and all the districts upon the right bank of the Save, to which the Thalweg served as a boundary between the kingdom of Italy and the Austrian territory. From this description, it

will be perceived that they were an assemblage of heterogeneous parts, each repelling the other; but which, had they been longer united to the French empire, might have formed one whole, and acquired, from their position, considerable importance,—the more so as Dalmatia and a part of Albania were comprised in them. The sensation caused by my arrival in these provinces was the greater, because my name, as former minister of the general police, was known there, and I replaced in the civil and military government an aid-de-camp of the emperor, one of his favourites, Junot, Duke of Abrantes, who had just given an evident proof of madness. The circumstances relative to poor Junot are these: the corrosive effect of the severe climate of Russia upon the wound which had disfigured him in Portugal, domestic cares, and resentment at not having obtained a marshal's staff, had so affected his senses, that six weeks before my arrival, the aberration of his mind had been evinced in public. One day, making his aid-de-camp get into his barouche, to which six horses were harnessed, and which was preceded by a piquet of cavalry, he himself, covered with his decorations, and having a whip in his hand, mounted the coach-box. Thus exposed, he rode for several hours, from one end of the town of Goritz to the other, in the midst of the crowd of astonished inhabitants. The next day he dictated the most absurd orders and letters,

which he ended with this formula: "I, therefore, sir, pray that *Saint Cunegunda* will take you into her gracious favour and protection." Actions still more deplorable followed this; and the unfortunate Junot was sent back to France, where he died a fortnight after in consequence of a paroxysm, in which he threw himself out of a window, at his father's seat. Such was the man whom I had come to replace in the government of provinces, which, as least harmonizing with what was called the French empire, were still governed upon the principles of conquest. It is true, I was to be seconded by Lieutenant-General Baron Fresia, appointed commander-in-chief, under my immediate orders. This general officer, one among the Piedmontese who had most distinguished himself in the French armies, possessed much penetration and ability, and commanded a division of cavalry in the grand army at Dresden, when the emperor sent him into the Illyrian provinces.

We were here under a pure and mild climate; the country around us offered the greatest variety, and, though sometimes wild, was always picturesque; while among its inhabitants might at times be perceived the traces of advanced civilization, at others the manners of the primeval ages.

Upon quitting Dresden, when taking leave of the emperor, he told me that, in his hands, Illyria was an advanced guard upon Austria, calculated to be a check upon her; a sentinel at the gates of

Vienna, to force obedience; that, notwithstanding, it had never been his intention to retain it; that he had only taken it as a pledge, it having been at first his intention to exchange it for Gallicia, and now, of offering it to his father-in-law to retain his alliance. I, however, had perceived from his vacillation, that he formed various projects upon this said Illyria. He told me besides, that, at all events, he intended sending to the prince viceroy, Eugene Beauharnois, orders to be in readiness upon the Italian frontier, to make a vital attack upon the hereditary states, should the court of Vienna declare against us; he added that, at the same time, he would give directions to the Bavarian army, to Augereau's corps of observation, and the corps and cavalry under General Milhaud, to second the enterprise of the viceroy, whom he had ordered to penetrate even as far as Vienna. But could Napoleon deceive himself on these his gigantic views, and might he not propose them merely with the view of intimidating Austria?

I had scarcely arrived at my government, when I was convinced that the season for bold projects was passed, and that all idea of forming powerful diversions in the very heart of the hereditary states must be abandoned. In Illyria we had nothing but feeble attachments, and since the disasters of the campaign of Moscow, the military power of Italy was almost annihilated. Three corps of observation had been successively drawn from it

since 1812, which had completely exhausted all the French and Italian battalions; the garrisons were completely drained of troops, and the reports preserved nothing but the numbers of the regiments; the viceroy, however, had just received a positive order to raise a new army with the utmost expedition. For this purpose, the conscriptions of the departments bordering upon the kingdom of Italy were allotted to him. The recruiting was rapid, but the skeleton regiments were with difficulty being completed; and this army, which was to consist of fifty thousand men, was still unorganized and without *materiel*, when Narbonne informed me, by a letter from Prague, of the rupture of the congress. It was there that the intentions of Austria had at length been declared on the 7th of August; she had demanded the dissolution of the duchy of Warsaw, and its being divided between herself, Russia, and Prussia; the re-establishment of the Hanseatic towns in their independence; the re-integration of Prussia with a frontier on the Elbe; and the cession, to Austria, of all the Illyrian provinces, including Trieste. The question of the independence of Holland and Spain was referred to a general peace. Napoleon employed the whole of the 9th in deliberating. He at length decided upon giving a first answer, in which, accepting one part of the conditions, he rejected the others. The 11th was passed in awaiting the effect; but he soon learnt that, in the morning,

the congress was broken up. That same day Austria abandoned our alliance for that of our enemies, and the Russian troops penetrated into Bohemia. Napoleon accepted too late, in their full extent, the conditions prescribed by M. de Metternich; but these concessions, which would have ensured a peace on the 10th, were of no avail on the 12th. Austria declared war, and adjourned, *sine die*, the question of the re-assembly of the congress. Upon receiving this letter, I had not the least doubt but that the attack would commence by Illyria.

When traversing the hereditary estates, the continual movement of the Austrian troops did not escape my notice. I learnt that field-marshal lieutenant Hiller was expected at Agram; that he had been preceded there by generals Frimont, Fenner, and Morshal; that the strength of the army, of which he was about to take the command, would amount to forty thousand men, and that the troops in Austrian Croatia had been already placed upon a war footing. Upon my arrival, I had immediately despatched intelligence of this to the prince viceroy. Every report I received announced that among the inhabitants of French Croatia, there were secret practices and silent machinations being carried on by Austrian agents, sent for that purpose on the other side of the Save; they were organizing an insurrectional movement which might assist the invasion. In fact, on the 17th of August, the day after the expiration of the German armis-

tice, two Austrian columns, without any previous declaration of war, crossed the Save at Sissek and at Agram, directing their march upon Carlstadt and Fiume. General Jeanin, in command at Carlstadt, the chief town of French Croatia, made at first some show of defence, but, abandoned by the Croatian soldiers under his orders, and attacked by the insurgent inhabitants, he effected his retreat almost alone to Fiume. Less fortunate, the governor of Croatia, M. de Contades, being arrested during his flight, was in danger of losing his life. Having almost by a miracle escaped the fury of the inhabitants, who were infuriated against all persons employed in the French administration, he was detained a prisoner by General Nugent, who would not consent to restore him his liberty, without being authorized so to do by the court of Vienna.

The behaviour of the Croatians, upon this occasion, gave me no surprise. I was aware of their attachment to the Austrian government. Almost all the other parts of the Illyrian provinces followed the example of Croatia. The towns even of Zara, Ragusa, and Cattaro, defended by Generals Roise, Montrichard, and Gauthier, with weak garrisons of Italians, and a few French officers, were soon besieged by the Austrian troops, seconded by bands of Dalmatians. Upon the first intelligence of these movements, I had caused the fortresses of Laybach and Trieste to be put into a state of defence. Having gained intelligence

that the Austrian general, Hiller, commander-in-chief of the enemies' forces, was uniting at Clagenfurt the greatest part of his corps, with the view of forcing Willach and Tarvis, and of afterwards penetrating into the Tyrol, by the valley of La Drave, I immediately sent information of it to the prince viceroy. He had already set his army in march upon Illyria. The arrival of the Italian division of General Pino at Laybach, enabled me to make head against hostilities.

I, however, did not deceive myself: Hiller was manœuvring with forty thousand men; besides which, all the population was in his favour. The viceroy reduced, either by the numerical weakness of his army, or the inexperience of his troops, to a defensive war, with the mere hope of gaining time, could not think of reoccupying the line of the Save, which the enemy had already left behind. As the greatest part of the Austrian force was in march upon Clagenfurt, it was really to be feared that the enemy might succeed in forcing the positions of Travis and Willach. This movement would have exposed the left of the viceroy's army, and opened to the Austrians an access into the Tyrol, through the valley of La Drave. The prince took up the position of Adelberg, his left being at the sources of the Save, and his right inclined towards Trieste. Upon his extreme left, he had ordered the passes of the Tyrol to be guarded by a detached corps.

The enemy, however, continued to be on the

offensive. Fiume and Trieste, which they had taken without much effort, were retaken by General Pino with like facility. Willach, which was successively lost and recovered, suffered more from the battle than the combatants themselves. The only operation of vigour was the carrying the camp of Felnitz, by Lieutenant-General Grenier.

Thus passed all the month of September. As the emperor had observed, the fate of Italy was to be decided in Germany. At Dresden the rupture had been followed by military events of far greater importance.

But the battle of Dresden, while it diffused joy among the emperor's adherents, proved but a transient gleam of hope for them; they found themselves again plunged in doubt and alarm. The intelligence of the reverses of Katsbach, Gross-Beeren, and Culm, began to transpire at Paris and Milan. I learnt from my correspondents, that eighteen days had elapsed without the arrival of any couriers at Paris. Rumours began to spread a gloom over France; the emperor was loosing the confidence of his people. I was informed that royalist intrigues were again afloat in La Vendée, and at Bordeaux; and that people whispered to each other, in the parties and the saloons of the metropolis, "*This is the beginning of the end.*"

The same might be said of our beautiful Italy. Since the last news from Germany, the Austrian generals opposed to us showed themselves more

and more confident; while on our side, the Italian troops no longer manifested the same ardour. One of their chiefs, General Pino, who had at first manœuvred under my direction, for the defence of Illyria, revealing the secret dismay which pervaded the ranks, suddenly quitted the army, and retired to Milan, where he awaited the result of the campaign.

I went to confer upon the state of affairs with the prince viceroy, whom I found extremely uneasy, but firmly devoted to the emperor. He was much hurt at the rupture, and had no longer any confidence in the fortune of Napoleon: "It had been better," said he to me, "if he had lost, without too great a disadvantage, the two first battles in the commencement of the campaign; he would have retreated in time behind the Rhine." I did not conceal from him that I had given him that advice, at Dresden, but that nothing could make an impression upon him. "It is," said I to him, "the more unfortunate, because at the first battle he looses in person, the political reorganization will be settled without him." Eugene was struck with this reflection, and for the first time, perhaps, he was awake to the instability of his political existence. I did not open myself further upon this occasion, having but little confidence in those about him. He at length owned to me, what I had foreseen, that he had strong reasons for believing that Bavaria was, at this moment, about to detach

itself from our alliance; that the Bavarian army upon the frontiers of Austria had made no movement to arrest those of the Austrians, who were advancing in great force, although slowly, through the valley of La Drave, towards the Tyrol; that himself being no longer able to govern Italy, he was about to retreat behind the Isonzo, in order to interpose the defiles between him and the enemy. "If, contrary to all expectation," said I to him, "you cannot make a stand there, endeavour, for I have more confidence in your talents than in your troops, at least to dispute for some time the country between the Piave and the Adige, in order to allow time for events to develope themselves. It will be doing a great deal, if, during the approaching winter, you can cover Mantua, Verona, Milan, and the mouths of the Po."

He immediately made his arrangements for retreating, and I, on my side, evacuated Laybach, after having left in the castle the shadow of a garrison, chiefly composed of convalescents, whom I placed under the command of Colonel Léger. I followed the army, which came to occupy the line of the Isonzo. The same day, the Austrians having appeared in form upon Trieste, Lieutenant-General Fresia finally evacuated that place by my orders, leaving in the castle a very small garrison only, commanded by Colonel Rabié, who, after a very gallant defence, capitulated about a month afterwards.

From the head-quarters of Gradisca, I addressed my report to the emperor. I represented to him, that the viceroy, thinking it his duty to listen only to prudential motives, had just ordered the retreat upon Isonzo; that, in consequence of this movement, the Illyrian provinces were henceforth lost; but that the objects, to which the army of Italy would confine its efforts, possessed also their advantages; that they left nothing to chance, and might for some time yet ensure the tranquillity of Italy. I added that as my mission was now nearly at an end, I begged him to give me some other appointment, and that I awaited his orders.

While awaiting either the events, or Napoleon's decision with respect to me, I was induced to go and visit that dear and magnificent Lombardy, to the liberty of which I had devoted myself, when I entered the career of high official duties. Alas! that also was suffering under imperial oppression, and its political destiny depended but too much upon that of Napoleon.

In conquering Italy, we had introduced into it our activity, industry, and a taste for the arts and for luxury. Milan was the city which derived the greatest advantages from the French revolution, which we had transplanted there. Milan received a still greater lustre when it became the capital of a kingdom; a court, a council of state, a senate, a diplomatic corps, ministers, civil and military appointments, and tribunals of justice, added nearly

twenty thousand inhabitants to its population, which exceeded one hundred thousand souls. Milan was considerably improved and embellished; but its brilliant period was of short duration, like that of all the kingdoms, which the ambition of the ruler soon exhausted both of men and money, in his vain intention of conquering the world. The Viceroy Eugene was soon nothing more in the eyes of the Lombards than the obedient executor of all his wishes. After the affair of Moscow, in Italy as in France, all the springs of government had lost their elasticity. The conviction of Napoleon's power was destroyed, at the moment the illusion of his military fortune became eclipsed. Latterly, Eugene seemed to fear becoming popular, lest he should excite his jealousy. Eugene, although a brave soldier and of approved loyalty, was parsimonious, rather light, too docile to the advice of those who flattered his taste, but little acquainted with the character of the people whom he governed, and placing too much confidence in a few ambitious Frenchmen; he needed an equal degree of political knowledge to that which he possessed of military affairs. During these latter days of difficulty, this prince completed the people's discontent by conscriptions and forced requisitions; in short, the viceroy yielded too much both to the example and the impulse of the sovereign ruler. His position became the more difficult, as he had soon against him both the partisans of Italian independence and

those of the ancient order of things. The first becoming daily more uneasy looked round for assistance. Like his adoptive father, Eugene found no other, for the maintenance of authority, but in his army, which he lost no time in organizing and disciplining.

All was suspense in Italy. It was known that three large armies, in Germany, surrounded, so to speak, the emperor's, with the intention of manœuvring upon the basis of his line of operations at Dresden, and, if the events of war should prove favourable to them, of uniting in the rear of this line, between the Elbe and the Saal. It was likewise known, that to oppose these three grand allied armies, Napoleon had scarcely two hundred thousand men, divided into eleven bodies of infantry, four of cavalry, and his guard, which presented a formidable reserve. We had just learnt that he had resolved, in order to avoid being completely surrounded, to abandon his central position at Dresden, to manœuvre at Magdeburg and on the Saal. Suddenly, towards the end of October, I received from the Viceroy's head-quarters a note, conceived in these terms: "For refusing to give up anything, he has lost all." My anxiety and impatience to know the extent of what had taken place may easily be imagined. The next day gloomy reports were propagated respecting the fatal battles of Leipsic, which might have the effect of forcing Napoleon back upon the Rhine, followed by all

Europe in arms. Now were realized all my presentiments, all I had foreseen. But what would become of us? What fate was reserved for the tottering empire? It was easy to foresee that the emperor's enormous power, if not entirely destroyed, would at least be diminished. On the one hand, I was not blind to the species of opposition he might meet with in the interior of the empire; all the constituent elements of public power were known to me; I could appreciate the persons possessing more or less influence, and form an opinion of their courage and energy. A bold man was now necessary, and there were none but cowards. The only man who, by his talents and ability, might have directed events, and saved the revolution, had no political nerve, and was fearful of losing his head. As to myself, who certainly would not have been wanting in resolution, I was far removed from the centre, whether by fortuitous chances, or by preconcerted arrangements. I was burning with impatience; and, having resolved to brave everything, in order to re-enter the capital, there to resume the secret clues of a plot which would have conducted us to a happy issue, was already on my way, when a letter from the emperor, dated Mayence, ordered me, in answer to my last despatch, to proceed to take the government of Rome, which, till then, I had only nominally enjoyed. I perceived the blow, but there were no means of parrying it; the man who was thus losing the empire, found himself still secure

amid the wrecks of his military power. I lingered on my journey, in order to observe the course of events, and in expectation of receiving from my confidential friends in Paris positive information as to the sensation which would be produced by the sudden return of the emperor, after these fresh disasters. But how well I knew the ground, and how correctly had I judged of the men who occupied it! There were not twenty senators who did not consider the empire out of danger, because the emperor was safe! Not one great functionary, who suspected that the armies of Europe were capable of crossing the Rhine. In spite of the stupor which universally prevailed, a wilful blindness still created illusions in favour of power. I must, however, except that able man, whom I have sufficiently designated; with deep craftiness and disguised irony, he seemed to espy the moment of a fall, which appeared to him not to be as yet matured.

Italy, in the mean time, was on the point of undergoing great changes; abandoning successively the Isonzo, the Tagliamento, the Piave, and the Brenta, the viceroy had recently repassed the Adige, and fixed his head-quarters at Verona. The Austrian army, continually advancing and receiving reinforcements, established itself at Vicenza, at Bassano, and Montebello, already forming the blockades of Venice, Palma, Nuova, and Osopo. In the secret negotiations with which I had been intrusted, the cession of the Venetian states, as far

as the Adige, had been consented to, as one of the preliminaries of peace with Austria. But where would the pretensions of that power now stop? The two armies remained thus in presence of each other, as in winter-quarters. It was upon the South of Italy that all eyes were fixed, and whence were expected the military and political events, which would impart activity to the two armies in observation of each other, on the Brenta and the Adige. Murat, conceiving the fortunes of Napoleon entirely lost, after the affair of Leipsic, had returned, in all haste, to Naples, to resume the plan which he supposed would maintain him on the throne, even after the ruin of him who had placed him on it. In an interview with Count de Mier, at the head-quarters of Ohlendorf in Thuringia, on the 23d of October, he had prepared, as it were, his accession to the coalition, and his treaty with the Austrian court. I had not, at that time, any certain data respecting Murat's intentions, but I foresaw his change of politics. I have learnt that upon arriving at Lodi, on his way from Leipsic and Milan, whilst he was changing horses, several Italians of distinction were surrounding his coach; and upon one of them asking if he would soon come and assist the viceroy, "Certainly," replied he, in his Gascon manner, "before a month is over, I shall come to assist you with fifty thousand good fellows," and he set off with the rapidity of lightning. I inferred from this that he had said just

the contrary to what he intended. In fact, it thus formed part of Murat's plans to enter into alliance with Austria, at the same time that he represented himself to the Italians as the supporter of their independence; I also learnt, that, while traversing Northern Italy, he had received very graciously several Italian noblemen and general officers, who were also labouring for the liberation of their country, promising them to embrace their cause, and lead an army on the Po.

Upon my arrival at Rome, I found General Miollis, and the administrator Janet, labouring under mistrust and suspicions respecting Murat's conduct; who they told me was openly joining the coalition, and was organizing a new army, partly composed of Neapolitans, Italian deserters, Corsicans, and Frenchmen. Every information from Naples announced, that he had just abolished the continental system from his dominions, granting, at the same time, the entry of his ports to vessels of every nation; it was asserted that he was not only negotiating with the court of Vienna, but also with Lord William Bentinck, hoping to conclude a separate peace with Great Britain. The fears of the military commandant of Rome were shared by the viceroy, who despatched his aide-de-camp, Gifflenga, to Naples, in order to ascertain the king's intentions. This young officer, but little acquainted with the arts of that court, was cajoled by a few fair promises of peace and friendship.

Murat, declaring himself for the independence of Italy, found a party within the Roman states, among the *Carbonari* and the *Crivellari*, a species of political illuminati, who were raised among the nobles, the jurisconsults, and the Roman prelates. A priest of the name of Battaglia had just roused to insurrection the country about Viterbo; he had placed himself at the head of a band of insurgents, seizing the public treasuries, and levying contributions upon persons attached to the French interest. At the same time, incendiary writings and proclamations were profusely spread throughout the pontifical domains. Miollis having set in motion the armed force, soon dispersed the bands of insurgents; Battaglia having been arrested and conducted to Rome, his depositions sufficiently proved that he was the agent of the Neapolitan consul Zuccari, who was employed by his court to excite insurrection against the French dominion. It appeared to me that great circumspection and prudence were requisite in opposing the practices of the Neapolitans, and that nothing should be undertaken unadvisedly.

Murat, however, had set his troops in motion towards Upper Italy. Early in December, a division of Neapolitan infantry and a brigade of cavalry, with sixteen pieces of artillery, entered Rome; these troops were commanded by General Carascosa. Although the emperor had given orders that the King of Naples should be treated as an ally,

who was ready to shew his good intentions; and notwithstanding the movement of this body had been concerted with the viceroy, General Miollis received the Neapolitans with much suspicion, ordering Civita Vecchia and the castle of St. Angelo to be put into a posture of defence; the money-chests, and other precious articles, were all removed to the latter fortress. Three or four Neapolitan divisions succeeded each other, taking the road, through the Abruzzo, upon Ancona, and through Rome, either upon Tuscany, Pesaro, Rimini, or Bologna. It was to this last city that Murat had just sent Prince Pignatelli Strongoli, less to trace the route of his army, the object of whose appearance upon the Po seemed to be that of checking the Austrians, than to dispose all the friends of the independent cause to assist him in his enterprises. Pignatelli was commissioned to gain him partisans.

In the mean time, I received from the emperor an order to repair to Naples, to endeavour to dissuade Murat from declaring against him. I was instructed to conciliate him, and to employ the utmost address in this negotiation, and even to flatter him with the prospect that the marches of Pesaro and Ancona, the spoils of the Roman state, and the objects of his ambition, should be ceded to him. My arrival at Naples was preceded by three letters from the emperor addressed to Joachim, one of them announcing my mission. I made my entry at the court of Naples about the

middle of December. Joachim's court was certainly a singular one, and his Vesuvian royalty (*royauté de Vésuve*) most precarious. Murat possessed great courage, but little mind; no great personage of his time carried farther than himself whatever was ridiculous in ornament and the affectation of display; it was he whom the soldiers called the *King Franconi*. Napoleon, however, who did not mistake his brother-in-law's character, erroneously supposed that Queen Caroline, his sister, an ambitious and haughty woman, would govern her husband, and that without her Murat could not be a king. But, from the commencement of his reign, suspecting the authority to which they wished to subject him as a husband, he endeavoured to free himself from it; and the political circumstances in which he then found himself the more effectually opposed the queen's ascendency, as he was wholly surrounded by advisers who urged him to declare against Napoleon, representing this political change of system as a political necessity.

In a court where politics were nothing but cunning, gallantry dissoluteness, and external magnificence theatrical pomp, I found myself nearly, if the comparison be not considered too flattering to myself, as Plato did at the court of Dionysius. Upon my arrival, I was beset by the intriguers of both nations, among whom, under the mask of a kind of ingenuousness, I recognised some emissa-

ries from Paris. There were also some of these in the king's council; and I was particularly on my guard against a certain Marquess de G . . . ., who, of the two acceptations which his name has in Latin, had all the vigilance of the one, and none of the candour of the other. In my first conferences in the presence of Murat, I was obliged to maintain a great reserve; I affected to be without instructions, and begged the king would explain his political situation to me. He confessed that it was critical and embarrassing; that, on the one hand, he was placed between his people and his army, who detested all idea of persevering in an alliance with France; on the other, between the emperor Napoleon, who had left him without the least guide, and was continually giving him fresh cause for disgust—and the allied sovereigns, who insisted upon his immediately declaring his entire accession to the coalition. Again, that the Italian chiefs required him to concur in declaring the independence of their country, while the viceroy was decidedly opposed to all measures favourable to the independents, either by the emperor's orders, or to forward his own views. Lastly, added the king, I have to contend against the manœuvres of Lord Bentinck, who, from his head-quarters in Sicily, is endeavouring to effect an insurrection in Calabria, and who assists with money and promises the *Carbonari* throughout the whole extent of my kingdom. I told the king that it was not for

me to offer him any advice; that, as to himself, a decided resolution was all that was necessary; that to induce him to take one, and when taken firmly to adhere to it, was all my duty required of me.

The king, upon the breaking up of the conference, owned to me that having, a month before, communicated to the emperor his fears that an Austrian detachment would march towards the mouths of the Po, he had entreated him, upon this occasion, freely to renounce the direct possession of Italy, and by declaring its independence, thus to complete the benefits he had already bestowed upon that country. I replied to the king, that it was difficult to imagine the emperor would make a virtue of necessity; but that, supposing he did, I should claim the priority for France—I, who had so often, and so vainly, entreated Napoleon to render the war a national one.

My other conferences were all equally useless. Murat had committed himself: his council impelled him more and more into the interests of the coalition—a political situation, incompatible with his project of calling Italy to independence. I pointed this out to him, but in vain; I then confined myself to advise him, in a secret conference, to increase his army, to have good troops, and, at any cost, to attach to his cause the sect of the *Carbonari*, whom he had, with much imprudence,

persecuted, and who seemed to me to acquire greater consistence, in proportion as events became more serious. I concluded by advising the king not to rely too much upon his princely crowd of Neapolitan nobles, but rather to surround himself by people whose *excellence* did not alone consist in their title, and to whose firmness and devotion he could intrust himself.

My mission to Naples was not without its charms. I breathed, in the midst of winter, the air of the finest climate in Europe; I found myself well received and respected by a brilliant court; but all my thoughts and looks were continually turned towards France. She was threatened with invasion; foreigners were at her gates; what would the emperor do? what would become of him? I was convinced that he would not have greatness of mind enough to induce him to identify himself with the nation. Isolated, his ruin was certain: but the effects of his gradual fall might yet, for a long time, prove fatal to the country.

Receiving no certain information, and having but vague notions upon the state of affairs in Paris, I hastened to resume my journey towards Rome, to which city my private correspondence was addressed. I considered it the more imperative upon me to quit Murat's court, as I knew for certain that the arrival of Count Neyperg, the Austrian plenipotentiary, empowered to conclude the King of Naples' accession to the coalition, was hourly ex-

pected, and I should then have found myself compromised at Naples. Having once more entered the ancient capital of the world, I flew to open my despatches from Paris. They contained the intelligence I had every moment expected, of the violation of the neutrality of Switzerland by the allies, and the invasion of our territory by the eastern frontier. By them I also learnt that the emperor could scarcely assemble, between Strasburg and Mayence, some sixty thousand men in the space of of a month, so great had been the ravages inflicted upon his armies by epidemic disorders and disorganization; but that he still obstinately rejected the *fundamental bases* (bases sommaires) which the allies had just sent him from Frankfort, notwithstanding that Talleyrand, in the council, strongly urged him to make peace, assuring him, in the most positive terms, that he deceived himself as to the energies of the nation, and that it would not second his efforts, and that he would ultimately find himself abandoned. Deaf to these prudent counsels, what did Napoleon meditate, at this important crisis? A *coup d'état:* that of proclaiming himself dictator. Indebted for his rise to the factions and storms of a revolution in which *words* did much, he persuaded himself, (from a confusion of ideas respecting ancient history,) that the title of dictator alone would produce a great effect. He, however, gave this up, upon the representations of Talleyrand and Cambacérès. They observed to him that

he must exercise the power without assuming the name; that he could even lock up the senate-house without arrogating any fresh title. He acted upon their suggestions; the senate-house was, from this moment, placed under a guard.

Such was the sum total of my correspondence; and, yielding to the impressions such intelligence produced, I wrote to the emperor the following letter:—

"I have taken leave of the King of Naples; I ought not to conceal from your majesty any of the causes which have paralyzed the natural activity of that prince.

"1st. It is the uncertainty in which you have left him, with respect to the command of the armies of Italy. The king, in these two last campaigns has given you so many proofs of his devotion and his military abilities, that he expected from you this mark of confidence. He complains of a two-fold humiliation, that of being the object of your suspicions, and of being reduced to an equality with your generals.

"2d. Such is the language continually held to the king: 'If, in order to preserve Italy to the emperor, you deprive your kingdom of its troops, the English will effect a landing there, and will excite insurrections, the more dangerous as the Neapolitans loudly complain of the French influence. Besides, it is added, what is the situation of this empire? That of being without an army, and of

being discouraged by the events of a campaign, which the enemy do not consider as the termination of its misfortunes, since the Rhine is no longer a barrier, and since the emperor, far from being able to preserve Italy, can scarcely prevent the invasion of his German, Swiss, and Spanish frontiers.' 'Take care of yourself, rely only upon your own resources,' is the advice he is continually receiving from Paris. 'The emperor can no longer do any thing for France; how then can he secure your dominions? If, at the period of his greatest power, he could think of incorporating Naples with the empire, what sacrifice can he be expected to make for you now? He would, at this moment, abandon you for a fortress.'

"3d. On the other hand, your enemies have contrasted this picture of the situation of France with that of the immense advantages which are likely to accrue to the king by joining the coalition: 'This prince,' say they, 'by so doing, consolidates his throne, and aggrandizes his power: instead of making to the emperor an useless sacrifice of his glory and his crown, he will diffuse over both the most brilliant lustre, by proclaiming himself the defender of Italy, and the guarantee of her independence. But if, on the contrary, he declare himself for your majesty, his army will abandon him, and his people rise in insurrection. If he abandon your cause, all Italy crowds beneath his banners.' Such is the language addressed to the

king by men who are closely attached to your government. Perhaps, by doing so, they only deceive themselves as to the means of being serviceable to your majesty. Peace is necessary to the world; and to persuade the king to place himself at the head of Italy, is, in their opinion, the surest method of forcing you to make peace.

"I arrived at Rome on the 18th; here, as throughout all Italy, the word *independence* has acquired a magical virtue. It cannot be denied, that under this banner are ranged opposing interests; but each country demands a local government; and each complains of being obliged to repair to Paris, upon subjects even of the least importance. The French government, at so great a distance from the capital, only causes them heavy charges without any equivalent.

"'All,' say the Romans, 'that we know of the government of France is, conscriptions, taxes, vexations, privations, and sacrifices. Add to which, we have no commerce, either at home or abroad; we have no means of disposing of our produce, and for the trifling articles we obtain from foreign countries we pay most extravagantly.'

"Sire, when your majesty was at the acme of glory and power, I had the courage to tell you the truth, for it was the only thing of which you then stood in need. Now I owe it to you equally, but with greater delicacy, since you are unfortunate. Your speech to the legislative body would have made a

deep impression upon Europe, and would have touched all hearts, if your majesty had added, to the wish you expressed for peace, a magnanimous renunciation of your former plan of universal monarchy. So long as you are not explicit upon this point, the allied powers will believe. or will say, that this system is only deferred, and that you will avail yourself of events to recommence it. The French nation itself will be labouring under the same apprehensions. It appears to me, that if, under these circumstances, you were to concentrate all your forces between the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the Rhine, and make a candid declaration that you would not overstep those natural frontiers, you might then command both the wishes and the arms of the nation in defence of your empire; and certes, this empire would still be the finest and most powerful in the world; it would still be sufficient for your glory and the prosperity of France. I am convinced that you can never procure a real peace, but at this price. I tremble at being the only one to hold this language to you! Beware of the lying lips of your sycophants; experience should have taught you to appreciate them. These are they, who induced you to march into Spain, Poland, and Russia; who persuaded you to remove your real friends; and who, still more recently, dissuaded you from signing a peace at Dresden. These are they who now deceive you, and who exaggerate your resources. You have still enough left to be

happy, and to make France peaceful and prosperous; but you have nothing more, and of this truth all Europe is persuaded: it is even useless any longer to employ delusion—to deceive her is no longer possible.

"I entreat your majesty not to reject my counsels; they are the effusions of a heart which has never ceased to be attached to you. I have not the foolish vanity of affecting to see more or clearer than others; were all equally candid, they would hold the same language to you. They would have spoken as I did, after the peace of Tilsit, after the peace of Vienna, before the war against Russia, and lastly, at Dresden.

"It is mortifying for the dignity of human nature, that I should be the only one who dares to tell you what I think. Should your majesty have to undergo new misfortunes, I shall not have to reproach myself with having suppressed the truth. In heaven's name put an end to the war; let mankind enjoy, at least, a momentary repose."

My letter was scarcely sent off, when Napoleon struck his last *coup-d'état*, the dissolution of the legislative body. From the palace of the Tuileries, which ought to have resounded with nothing but protestations of homage and fidelity, but which was suddenly transformed into an arena for pride, rage, and malice, legislators, magistrates, generals, and public functionaries were seen departing, struck with fear and apprehension. All were pe-

netrated with profound grief, at seeing a separation between the chief of the state and the nation, at the moment when there was the greatest necessity of mutual confidence and assistance. Under what auspices then was the third lustrum of the empire about to be opened? Was this year to be the last of its duration? What a bad omen for the defence of the country, invaded by five foreign armies, marching under the banners of all the potentates of Europe!

In order to continue to impose upon Austria, the emperor, who still thought he had it in his power to detach that power from the coalition whenever he pleased, at the commencement of the decisive campaign, intrusted the regency to Maria Louisa; so that the empire, in its last struggles, had actually two governments, the one in Napoleon's camp, the other at Paris. He soon even increased the absurdity, both in theory and practice, of this regency, by nominating his brother Joseph to the lieutenancy-general of the empire, almost at the very moment he had invested the empress with the executive power. This was only infusing one more ingredient of division into his government.

Such had not been the idea I had formed of a regency, of which, but for the evil destiny of the revolution, which detained me on the other side of the Alps, I could have ensured the success.

I ask, who, in this jumble of power, was the person or authority that could really be considered

as the depositary of Napoleon's will? Joseph was but a counterpoise to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, who himself counterbalanced the empress and Joseph, and the empress was only introduced for form's sake. Cambacérès was the grand pivot of the regency of Paris; but he was subjected to the *surveillance* of the minister of police, a real domestic inquisitor. In itself, the police is nothing but an hidden power, the strength of which consists in the opinion it can impart of its force; then indeed it can become one of the greatest state weapons; but in the hands of a Savary, the talisman of the police had been broken for ever.

From what has been observed, it may be seen that no government was ever ready to fall under so many precautions, perhaps even from excess of precaution. It is, however, due to truth to say that all the authorities were unanimously of opinion on one point, *viz.*, the impossibility of preserving the government in the hands of Napoleon. But no one had the courage to declare this openly, and to act in consequence. How disgraceful it is that so many able and experienced men should have tamely permitted the destruction of the state, and suffered the influence of foreign powers to bring about a revolution, which the country in tears entreated to be permitted to commence.

O you, who have said to me since, after the blow was struck, 'Why were not you there?' how much this expression of your regret betrays your

baseness! I was not there, precisely because I ought to have been there, and because it was foreseen that, by the force of things alone, all the interests of the revolution of which I was now the only representative, would have prevailed, and averted the catastrophe.

I was so little mistaken as to our real situation, that, anxious to hasten my return, and terminate my mission, I wrote the emperor a second letter, in which I represented to him how contrary it was to his dignity that I should remain in the quality of his governor-general at Rome, when invaded by the Neapolitans; besides that it became impossible that Rome, Tuscany, and the Genoese states could be preserved, if the King of Naples acceded to the coalition; and that, in my opinion, sound policy required that he should enter into arrangements with that prince, to abandon to him the provisionary military occupation of the countries which it was impossible for us to guard or defend; that, by this, we should obtain the double advantage of saving our garrison, and indirectly re-attaching the King of Naples to the French cause; that, as to myself, finding my dignity wounded at Rome, where my authority could no longer possess any weight, I had taken the road to Florence, where I should await his final instructions.

I found Florence, like the rest of Italy, unquiet, in suspense, and divided as to the opinion that might be formed of the movements of Murat to-

wards Upper Italy. The adherents of Napoleon asserted, that the Neapolitans, still faithful and devoted to his cause, only marched on the Po, to second our efforts against the common enemy, and that Murat would come to command them in person. The partisans of independence saw nothing in the approach of the Neapolitans, but the near arrival of auxiliaries, who would assist them in throwing off the French yoke. Others, lastly, could not see without uneasiness, upon the theatre of Upper Italy, a new army, which, in their eyes, was nothing but a collection of vagabonds and thieves, forced into the service, and completely undisciplined. 'What,' said they to me, 'is to be expected from a Carascosa, a man who supplies a want of ability by boasting; from a Macdonaldo, formerly the aide-de-camp of the old Cisalpine general Trivulzi, whose mistress he married, and who, not being able to obtain employment, either in France, or in the kingdom of Italy, has entered the service of Murat in despair; from the ex-general Lecchi, a Lombardian, unfortunately notorious for his cruelties, his exactions, and his plunderings in Spain, and who, brought before a council of war in France, was dismissed without employment? Perhaps young Lavauguyon will be panegyrized, recently restored to Murat's favour, who, in a jealous fit, had disgraced him 1811; a time when at the head of the chosen body-guard, he was, according to some, too much noticed by Queen Caroline;

and to others, a still more happy rival to Murat. The other generals possessed neither consistency nor respect. Thus I soon knew to what extent I could rely upon this Neapolitan army: it was composed of forty battalions, and twenty squadrons, in all twenty thousand men, and fifty pieces of artillery; in other respects it was tolerably provided, but its discipline was very bad.

The government of Tuscany was the more uneasy respecting its arrival, as on the 10th of December, the English had effected a landing at Via-Reggio, and had afterwards appeared before Leghorn; but the firmness of the French garrison had compelled them to re-embark. This attempt of theirs, however, appeared to me only to be a first essay of their strength *.

* M. Fouché is quite mistaken here. We know for certain, and from an eye-witness, that the re-embarking of the English troops could not be attributed to the resistance of the French garrison. Lord Bentinck, who commanded this expedition, might have taken Leghorn, if it had been his pleasure, by landing a few pieces of artillery, and attacking the weakest part of that town. One single hour would have rendered him master of the place. In fact, it was expected he would do so, and nothing could equal the surprise of the French and inhabitants, when, on the morning of the 12th, at the moment they thought the battery would begin, they heard the English had left altogether. The place was so weakly supplied with troops (there were not five hundred men, and even most of these were young conscripts), that all those persons who held any employment in the administration were obliged to take the musket. A deputation, composed of the notable inhabitants of Leghorn (Italians), went on board the English squadron, to make it

It was in the midst of these circumstances that I presented myself at the court of the grand duchess, where I met with a most gracious reception. In the duchess I found a very singular woman; and this time I had leisure to study her character. Without beauty or charms, Eliza was not void of wit, and the first impulse of her heart was good; but an incurable defect in judgment, added to very amorous propensities, continually betrayed her into errors and even excesses. Her mania consisted in imitating the habits of her brother, affecting his *brusquerie*, his predilection for pomp and military parade, and neglecting the arts of peace, and even literature, of which formerly she had professed herself the protectress. In a country where agriculture and commerce had flourished to so great a degree, she was solely occupied in forming a splendid and servile court, in organizing whole battalions of conscripts, and appointing and cashiering generals. There, where formerly the universities of Pisa and Florence, and the academies della Crusca, del Cimento, and del Disegno had shed so great a lustre, she permitted learning to lan-

known that the French commander refused to surrender. The reply made by Lord B. was, "That he would try what cannon would do." It would appear that his Lordship's motive for retiring, was his unwillingness to injure a town, which had always been a favourite residence with the English, and which, according to the then state of affairs, could not fail soon to be liberated from the French domination.—*English Editor.*

guish and decay, granting her protection solely to actors, rope-dancers, and musicians. In short, Eliza was feared, but not beloved.

As to myself, far from having reason to complain of her, I found her attentive, affectionate, resigned even to the crosses with which she was threatened, and willingly yielding her own opinions to my experience and advice. From that moment I directed her politics. She allowed me to see how much shew as hurt that Napoleon was about to lose, not only his empire, through his obstinacy, but even to sacrifice without hesitation the establishments of which his family was in possession. I then guessed all her fears, and well understood that she was alarmed at the precarious situation of Tuscany, which it grieved her to think was about to escape from her hands. I did not conceal from her, that, at Dresden, I had given Napoleon the most sincere and wholesome advice; that I warned him he was about to stake his crown against the whole of Europe; that he ought to give up Germany, and then entrench himself upon the Rhine, calling the nation to his assistance; that he would be compelled against his own inclination to have recourse to this; but that then he would adopt, too late, a measure exacted by necessity.

In the mean time, the different *corps d'armée* of Murat successively arrived at their destination, either at Rome, or in the Marches. General Lavauguyon, his aide-de-camp, who was at Rome

at the head of five thousand Neapolitans, suddenly announcing himself as commander-in-chief of the Roman States, took possession of the country. General Miollis, who had only eighteen hundred Frenchmen under his command, shut himself up in the castle of St. Angelo. Lavauguyon immediately summoned him to surrender, and invested the castle; he demanded an interview with Miollis, which the latter decidedly refused.

But, shortly afterwards, Murat himself, who had left Naples on the 23d of January, made his entry into Rome with all that pomp to which he was so fondly attached; and was received by the independents with great demonstrations of joy.

Murat caused it to be proposed to General Miollis, as well as to General Lasalcette, who defended Civita Vecchia with two thousand men, to return to France with their garrisons; both generals rejected his offer, and the king left a corps of observation to blockade both these places. At the same time he had caused the siege of Ancona to be commenced, a citadel into which General Barbou had retired. However, as yet there had been no open hostilities; but the King of Naples, at the head of nine thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry, having entered Bologna, occupied Modena, Ferrara, and Cento. His equivocal conduct, and the movement of his troops, which were advancing upon Parma and Tuscany, no longer left any doubt upon his intended defection.

Joachim entered Bologna on the first of February. That very day he detached from his army General Minutolo, with eight hundred men, to take possession of Tuscany, to the government of which he nominated General Joseph Lecchi. Intelligence of this had no sooner arrived, than the utmost consternation reigned in the court of the grand duchess, who complained bitterly of being thus despoiled by her brother-in-law. Being summoned to the council, and having been previously informed that the people everywhere met the Neapolitans with open arms, I advised the grand duchess to yield to the storm, and to retire either to Leghorn or Lucca. This resolution being taken, she enjoined her husband, Prince Felix Baciocchi, to evacuate Tuscany.

I was a witness to this convulsion, which, upon a smaller scale, was but the rehearsal of what was soon to take place at Paris. But in Tuscany there was no effusion of blood,—on one side it was nothing but a flight, and on the other but a sarcastic war of words, with which the Florentines pursued the chiefs and inferior agents of the government. Thus Baciocchi, upon his accession of fortune, had thought proper to change his name, and to adopt that of *Felice* (the happy), instead of *Pasquale*, a name as ridiculous in Italy as that of *Jocrisse** in

* The character of *Jocrisse*, in the French plays, to which Brunet, of the *Théâtre des Varietés*, has given such celebrity, is somewhat like the *Peter* of the Stranger, or Liston's *Tony Lumpkin.—English Editor.*

France. The Florentines, therefore, in allusion to this, upon his forced retreat, indulged this *jeu de mots, Quando eri Felice, eravamo Pasquali; adesso che sei ritornato Pasquale, saremo felici.*

The prefect of Florence, my intimate friend, was not spared in squibs of this kind. He was very strict in matters of conscription, and whenever a conscript alleged some reason for being excused, he generally dismissed him with this formula, "fit for marching," (*bon à marcher*). When the authorities, therefore, were obliged to leave the city, he found written on his door, in large characters, *bon à marcher.*

Whilst the grand duchess and I had retired to Lucca, Baciocchi was still in possession of the citadel and fortifications of the cities of Florence and Volterra. I expected, from day to day, the powers I had requested for the military evacuation of Tuscany and the Roman States. The grand duchess was equally desirous of seeing Tuscany delivered from the French troops, in the hope of coming to some arrangement with Murat, whose fortune appeared to her to offer more favourable chances than that of Napoleon. She was especially mistrustful of little Lagarde, whom the emperor had set over her in quality of commissary-general of police, and who was indebted to me for his fortune. She even went so far as to suspect that he sent Napoleon accounts injurious to her as well as to me. Elisa spoke very openly on the subject, and, one day, ex-

pressed her anxious wish to get the *portefeuille* of this commissary into her possession, in order to see if her suspicions were well founded. Being myself persuaded that Lagarde's correspondence would be more unfavourable to me than to the grand duchess, I did not attempt to dissuade her from it, when she told me that she intended employing him on a mission to Pisa, and that she would afterwards have him stopped upon the road by men hired and masked for that purpose. I was much gratified in seeing a commissary-general of police thus robbed upon the highway—one, too, who while affecting bluntness and extreme goodnature, boasted of possessing more cunning than the most wily Italian. It was necessary to undeceive him. In fact, upon his return from Pisa, the persons hired for the purpose stopped him, made him alight from his coach, and whilst two of them held him on the edge of a ditch, with their guns levelled at him, the others carried off his money, jewels, and even his papers, which were in a trunk in the front of the carriage. When we saw people in the greatest alarm come to inform us of the misfortune of the commissary-general, the grand duchess and myself had great difficulty to preserve our gravity, and we were obliged to withdraw aside to give vent to our inclination for laughter. This *opera seria*, however, disappointed us; the pretended papers of the commissary-general which were brought us, consisted of a set of numbers of the *Moniteur*, which Lagarde, having a coach

with a false bottom, where he concealed his secret papers, had placed in the box in front. He escaped with the loss of his money, and his jewels; and, according to every probability, with fear alone, for he could not fail to indemnify himself either at Florence or Paris.

Murat, in the mean time, who now kept the diplomatists in full play, endeavoured to fill all Italy with his name. He wrote me letter after letter, repeating that his alliance with the coalition appeared to him the only means of preserving the throne, and requiring me to tell the emperor the whole truth upon the actual state of Italy. I answered, that I had anticipated him, in that point, and that he had no need to encourage me to tell the emperor the truth; that I had always thought that to conceal it was to betray princes; I insisted upon the necessity of the King of Naples keeping up a good army as a means of influence with the coalition; above all I recommended him to avoid all irresolution; it was extremely essential to his interests, I told him, to create for himself a great respect, and to make his character an object of esteem; and since his resolution appeared wavering, I owed it to the friendship he had testified for me, to own to him that the least hesitation would be fatal; that it would draw upon him general want of confidence; that he could besides promote the interests of his country by contributing to the general pacification, and by supporting the dignity of

thrones and the independence of nations. I added that I saw with regret the risings in the country; that those passions which could not be gratified ought not to be excited. Being also requested by this prince to send him, in writing, the reflections which I had communicated to him at Naples upon the constitutions required of him by the partisans of liberty, I warned him against suffering himself to be induced to throw into the midst of the Neapolitan people ideas for which they were not at all prepared; in short, said I to him, I fear that the word 'constitution,' which I hear everywhere upon my road, is nothing with the majority but a pretext for throwing off all obedience.

The troops of Murat had arrived on the southern banks of the Po. By taking possession of Tuscany and the Roman States, he had declared against the emperor, his brother-in-law, in favour of Austria. He had bound himself, without binding the opposite party; for the treaty he had signed at Naples on the 11th of January, with the Count de Neyperg, was not ratified.

In consequence of the seriousness of events, I judged it expedient again to confer with Murat in person, and I had a secret interview with him at Modena. There I convinced him, since he had taken a decisive part, that he ought to announce it. "If you had," said I to him, "as much firmness of character as excellence of heart, you would be superior in Italy to the coalition. You can only con-

quer it here by much decision and frankness." He still hesitated; I communicated to him the latest news I had received from Paris. Determined by this, he confided to me his idea of a proclamation, or rather declaration of war, in which I suggested some alterations, which he made. This proclamation, dated from Bologna, was conceived in the following terms:—

"Soldiers! so long as I thought the Emperor Napoleon fought for the peace and the happiness of France, I fought at his side; but now illusion is impossible; the emperor's whole wish is for war. I should betray the interests of my former country, those of my dominions, and yours, did I not immediately separate my arms from his, to unite them with those of the allied powers whose magnanimous intentions are to re-establish the dignity of thrones and the independence of nations.

"I know that attempts are made to warp the patriotism of the Frenchmen who compose a part of my army, by false sentiments of honour and fidelity; as if any honour and fidelity were shown in subjecting the world to the mad ambition of the Emperor Napoleon.

"Soldiers!—There are no longer but two banners in Europe: upon one you read—Religion, Morality, Justice, Moderation, Laws, Peace, and Happiness!—upon the other, Persecution, Deceit, Violence, Tyranny, War, and Grief, in every family: choose."

I had also to treat with Murat upon a particular business, in which my own affairs were interested; I had to claim, as governor-general of the Roman states and afterwards of Illyria, the arrears of my salary, amounting to the sum of one hundred and seventy thousand francs. The King of Naples, having seized the Roman states and the public revenues, became responsible to me for my debt. He gave an order for it, the execution of which was attended with some delay; however, before leaving Italy, I was enabled to say that I had not made war at my own expense.

At Lucca, I again found the grand duchess in much trouble, and extremely uneasy respecting the aspect of affairs. I announced to her that Murat was at length determined upon raising troops, but that I, nevertheless, doubted whether his operations would be directed by sufficient vigour and rectitude, to command the confidence of his new allies; that the Austrian ministers reproached him with being a Frenchman, and, above all, of being too much attached to the emperor; that the revolutionists, who at this moment governed Florence, affirmed openly that the King of Naples was in intelligence with France, and that he was deceiving the Italians; that they even went so far as to impute to my advice the inaction of the Neapolitan troops, whom the Austrians were impatient to see marched against the viceroy, who was about to be immediately attacked by General

Count Bellegarde. I lastly informed her that I had left Murat ill with vexation; that he was aware of the critical situation in which he was placed; but that, henceforth, it would be difficult for my councils to reach him.

A few day after, I received from the minister at war a despatch, containing the emperor's instructions relative to the evacuation of the Roman and Tuscan states. To these was added a letter for the King of Naples, which I was ordered to deliver to him in person; I was also instructed to make him, at the same time, certain confidential communications, to be modified according to the position in which I found that prince. I immediately set off for Bologna, where Murat then was. As far as Florence I experienced no difficulty; but, on my arrival in that town, the new authorities notified to me, that I could neither continue my journey nor stop at Florence, and that I must retire to Prato, there to await the king's answer. I immediately despatched a courier to him, and returned to Lucca, preferring a residence in that town, Prato being already in insurrection. I soon received Murat's answer, who informed me that he had already ordered his generals to treat with me respecting the evacuation of Tuscany, and the Roman states.

The powers with which the emperor had invested me came very *à propos*. The greater part of the French troops which were in Tuscany were

concentrated at Leghorn; those who were at Pisa seemed to make a show of resistance. The Neapolitan general, Minutolo, had already marched with a column of Murat's army from Florence to Leghorn; at Pisa there had been some hostilities between this troop and a French detachment; they were now about to become more serious. Informed of this event, I left Lucca with the utmost expedition, and presented myself at the advanced posts. Having made known my powers, I immediately stipulated a convention, by which the French troops were to give up the posts and fortresses they occupied, and return to France; I immediately gave orders to the garrisons of Leghorn and Tuscany to fall back upon Genoa.

A few days afterwards, in virtue of the same powers, I treated with Lieutenant-General Lecchi, the King of Naples' governor in Tuscany, for the evacuation of the Roman states. This new convention stipulated the giving up of the castle of St. Angelo and of Civita Vecchia to the Neapolitans. The French garrisons were to be conveyed by sea to Marseilles, at the expense of the King of Naples.

Thus ended my mission in Italy, the termination of which I so much wished for, in order to re-enter my country, at that time, in so wretched a condition; it was inundated by foreign troops, who were advancing nearer and nearer towards the capital, the approaches even to which Napoleon

was reduced to defend. At such a distance, I had some difficulty in accounting for the progress of certain events; thus, why the two allied armies again separated after having beaten Napoleon at La Rhotière, instead of marching directly and without delay to Paris. Such a movement would have anticipated by two months the events which occurred at the close of March, and consequently avoided many disasters, and prevented the useless effusion of much blood and many tears. But the allies had nothing ready, at that time, in Paris; and the cabinets, who were not inclined for the regency, prolonged, doubtless with much regret, the calamities of war, in order to form other plans, and produce different results. As to the congress of Chatillon, I imagined it would terminate as that of Prague had done. Every thing announced that the catastrophe of this grand drama would soon arrive.

Before setting off for France, I proceeded to Volta, the head-quarters of the prince Viceroy; he had effected his retreat upon the Mincio; and, upon the King of Naples' declaration of war against France, had fought with the Austrians one of those battles, which, being of no decisive effect as to politics, are only productive of military glory. I had two private conferences with the viceroy, in which I represented to him that fighting battles was now the more useless, as every thing would be decided within the environs of Paris; I dissuaded him from

obeying the emperor's orders to march the army of Italy upon the Vosges: first, because it was now too late for a junction to be effected; and secondly, because by crossing the Alps, he would for ever lose his Lombardian possessions. Eugene owned to me that Murat had made him a secret proposal to unite their forces, for the purpose of sharing Italy, after having sent away the French troops, and that he had rejected this absurd offer; that his declaration of war had placed him, Eugene, in the greatest embarrassment; and that he feared he could hold out no longer, if Murat should serve the Austrians with any degree of zeal. I made him easy upon this point, being well acquainted with the uncertain character of Murat, and knowing, besides, that his wishes for the independence of Italy had already been counteracted by the allies. I was at Eugene's head-quarters, when Faypoult, formerly a prefect, a man in whom Murat placed some confidence, arrived. He had been sent by Napoleon to Murat, as well as to Eugene, with the intelligence of the recent successes he had obtained at Briey and at Montereau. These advantages were purposely exaggerated, for the double object of keeping up Eugene's hopes, and damping Murat's zeal in the cause of his new allies. Count Tacher, one of Eugene's aides de-camps, whom he had despatched to Napoleon, had returned also with the utmost expedition, and reported to him the very words which the emperor, intoxicated

with some brilliant but transient success, had addressed to him: "Return to Eugene," said Napoleon, "tell him how I have trimmed these scoundrels; they are a set of rabble whom I will whip out of my dominions." The most general joy prevailed at head-quarters. I took Eugene aside, and told him that such bombast ought to inspire with confidence only such as were mad enthusiasts, but that they could have no effect upon reasonable people; that these latter saw, in its full extent, the imminent danger which threatened the imperial throne; that arms were not wanting to defend the government, but rather the sentiments to set them in action; and that by separating himself from the nation, the emperor, by his despotism, had destroyed all public spirit. I gave Eugene some advice, and began my journey to Lyons, leaving Italy a prey, so to speak, to four different armies, the French, Austrian, Neapolitan, and English; for this time Lord Bentinck had really landed at Leghorn: from that place, having signified to Eliza, that he acknowledged neither the authority of Napoleon, nor her's, as grand duchess, and in this manner dictating the law to Tuscany, he formed a junction with the Neapolitans who occupied Bologna, Modena, and Reggio. Thus I left Italy in a most uncertain and embarrassed situation; nothing could be then more precarious than our possessions beyond the Alps. Neither the Viceroy, nor Murat, and certainly neither of them were deficient in

valour, had sufficient political talents, nor even consistency enough in the eyes of the Italians to prescribe the wrecks of our power in Italy, especially as both proceeded in opposite directions.

To own the truth, I was much more uneasy about the alarming condition of France, than about the tottering situation of the viceroy, and even of Murat; in fact, the fate of Italy was about to depend on the result of the contest, then proceeding in so vigorous a manner, between Napoleon and the allied monarchs, who endeavoured to establish themselves between the Seine and the Marne.

It was in the midst of these circumstances that I entered Lyons, towards the beginning of March. Every thing there was in a state of confusion and uncertainty, as to the result of the campaign. The prefect, the commissary-general of police, and some subordinate generals, were inclined to defend Lyons, as a consequence of the universal persuasion that Paris would also be defended; and it was by throwing up earthen outworks that they thought they could arrest the enemy's progress before the second city of the empire, which was threatened by the arrival of a reinforcement of 45,000 Germans. Augereau was gained; he who depreciated Napoleon, but who possessed little skill as a politician, and who, in this crisis, yielding to evil counsels, could discover no benefit for France, except by identifying her with his destiny. A line of fortifications was hastily traced, and all kind of

means employed, to impart a national character to this popular resistance. But the same inclinations, whicht hen were beginning to disclose themselves at Paris, the seat of government, prevailed also at Lyons. The prefect Bondy did his utmost to animate the patriotism of the lethargic Lyonnese, which was extinguished by the same causes which caused it to languish in other parts of France.

The very night of my arrival, I was admitted to a conference with the chief public functionaries, which took place every evening at the house of Marshal Augereau. I perceived, from the first moment, that all desperate measures were acceded to by no one but the prefect, a few of the general officers, who had arrived with a corps from the army of Arragon, and Saulnier, commissary-general of police. I announced, without disguise, the defection of the King of Naples, and that a million of men were about to rush into France, which it was no longer possible to save, except by some masterstroke of policy. I saw that my opinions as well as my disclosures were in opposition to the functionaries, who, carried away by their zeal for the emperor, did not shrink from the horrors of a siege. They did not disguise the mortification which my presence gave them, and I soon perceived that they had received secret instructions about me. Augereau, having refused to listen to the only prospect of deliverance which was in harmony with the interests of the revolution, of which,

nevertheless, he was a zealous partisan, concluded by acceding to the measure proposed by the prefect and commissary-general of police, the object of which was to compel me to quit Lyons, and to reside, provisionally, at Valence. I yielded, though with reluctance, and took the road to Dauphiné; casting, at the same time, a longing look on that of Paris, which was the only one whereon I could have wished to have travelled post.

It was at Valence that I learnt the arrival of Monsieur, Count d'Artois, at Vesoul, and the terrors of Napoleon at the first day-break of royalism which had just burst forth at Troyes, in Champagne. I learnt, a few days after, and in succession, the arrival of the Duke d'Angoulême at the head-quarters of Lord Wellington; the loss of the battle of Orthez by Soult; the loss of the battle of Laon by Napoleon; and the entry of the Duke d'Angoulême into Bordeaux. How much deeper my regret then became, to behold myself more than a hundred leagues from the capital, where a political revolution was of necessity to be expected as a consequence of so many disasters. The occupation of Lyons by the Austrians almost immediately followed; and Marshal Augereau withdrawing his head-quarters to Valence, I departed for Avignon, in order to wait the issue of events, and in full readiness to hurry to Paris at the first signal. But surrounded by different *corps d'armée*, reduced to the uncertainty of conjectures, and to

depend upon vague rumours, by the interruption of the couriers and by the difficulty of communication, I doubtless hesitated too long in taking the decisive step. How much I subsequently repented of not having clandestinely proceeded to Paris, through the centre of France, which was at that time free from foreign invasion! One single consideration was calculated to dissuade me; I had reason to fear that secret instructions, referring to me, were transmitted to each prefect individually.

I was residing at Avignon, without any political character, and I inhabited the same apartment in which the unfortunate Brune was assassinated a year afterwards. There I found the public mind so greatly opposed to Napoleon, that I had it publicly announced that I would receive all the public bodies and constituted authorities, to whom I announced the approaching downfall of the imperial government, adding that Murat, in Upper Italy, was labouring for the good cause. In a greater extent than at Lyons and Valence, an inclination to see the fall of Napoleon followed by some kind of authority was manifested at Avignon. At length, the news of the events of the 31st of March reached me. Compelled to make a long circuit, in order to follow the road of Toulouse and Limoges, I did not arrive at Paris till towards the beginning of April; but it was already too late. The establishment of a provisional government, of which I ought to have constituted a part; the deposition of

Napoleon, which I was ambitious to pronounce, but which was effected without my aid; in short, the restoration of the Bourbons, which I would have opposed, in order to substitute my plan of a regency—annihilated all my projects, and replunged me into a state of political nullity, in the presence of princes to whom I had given matter of offence. I was aware that clemency might be in harmony with the goodness of their hearts, but I was also aware that it was not less incompatible with the principle of legitimacy.

I subsequently heard this double question agitated:—If the Duke of Otranto had been at Paris, would he have formed a part of the provisional government; and, if he had done so, what would have been the result of the revolution of the 31st of March?

I owe in this place some elucidations to my contemporaries, relative to secret circumstances which I have not judged fitting to parcel out in my narrative, in order to exhibit them to the light in a better form; for there are some confessions which are only to be justified by conjunctures, and which ought not to be hazarded, except when circumstances justify them. I will admit, in the first instance, that impressed with the necessity of preventing an European re-action, and of saving France by the assistance of France, the events of 1809—that is to say, the war with Austria and the attack of the English on Antwerp—were only the first steps to-

wards the execution of a plan of revolution, the object of which was the dethronement of the emperor. I confess, moreover, that I was the moving soul of this plan, which was alone capable of reconciling us with Europe, and of bringing us back to a reasonable state of government. It required the concurrence of two statesmen, one directing the cabinet of Vienna, and the other that of St. James's, I mean Prince Metternich and the Marquess of Wellesley, to whom I had sent for that purpose M. de Fagan, an old officer in the Irish regiment of Dillon, and whose insinuating character was adapted for so delicate a mission.

Before proceeding to overtures of this description, I had not neglected, in the interior of France, to reconcile myself with the only man whose co-operation was indispensable to me. It will be easily guessed that I allude to Prince Talleyrand. Our reconciliation had taken place in a conference at Surêne, at the house of the Princess of Vaudémont. From the first moment of interview, our political ideas sympathized; and a kind of coincidence was established between our future plans. I had not, however, been able to escape from the epigrammatic mordacity of my noble and new ally, who, being questioned by his intimate friends, after our interview, as to what his opinion was with regard to me, replied:—"*Oui, oui, j'ai vu, Fouché; c'est du papier doré sur tranche.*"

The observation was of course brought to me; I

did not show that I was offended at it; political considerations, in my case, have always superseded the irritability of wounded self-love.

I had been equally aware of the necessity of placing myself in direct communication with one of the most influential of the senators, M. de S——, who was himself in close connexion with the secretaryship of state, by means of Maret, an old fellow-prisoner.

An acquisition of this description was so much the more valuable to me, as, since the disgrace of Bourienne, I had no one in my interest in the secretary's office, but inferior agents, who often suffered the thread of the higher class of intrigues to escape from their grasp. But how was I to obtain the confidence of a person, whom I had reckoned for a considerable time among the number of my declared antagonists. The senatorship of Bourges had just become vacant; that I resolved should be the price of our reconciliation; I manœuvred in consequence; S—— obtained it; and from that moment I gained a friend in the senate, and, as it were, an additional eye for ever on the watch in the cabinet of Napoleon.

But another individual was still wanting for my plans; Marshal M——, chief of the *gendarmerie*. Up to that time he had been opposed to me. Appointed to the command of a *corps d'armée* in Catalonia, he was unprovided, although in the highest offices, with the necessary funds for his outfit. I

knew his embarrassment, and sent him, by the advice of a friend, eighty thousand francs, which I had in reserve, and which it was in my power to dispose of, having obtained the emperor's sanction. In this manner, in the space of a very few months, I made friends of all enemies. I had two ministries on my hands; the home department and that of the police. I had the *gendarmerie* at my disposal, and a multitude of spies at my command; as a lever of public opinion, I had also the immense patronage of the old republicans, as well as of the determined royalists, who found protection in my power. Such were the elements of that power, when Napoleon, engaged in the double war of Spain and Austria, and thenceforth considered as an incorrigible disturber, appeared to me to be involved in so inextricable a position, that I concerted the plan which I have disclosed in a preceding passage. Whether it was that Napoleon's sagacity divined what I was about, or that indiscretion inherent in the native character of Frenchmen had awakened his suspicions (for as to being betrayed, I certainly was not), my disgrace, which was almost sudden, as I have related at the end of the events of 1809, postponed for five years the subversion of the imperial throne. And it was under the protection of feelings such as these, and under the support of a body of public opinion, which had never abandoned me either at the time of my disgrace or of my exile; it was, moreover, while fortified by the reputation

of a statesman, who, with the precision of cool and calculating foresight, had prophesied the fall of Napoleon, that I found myself overtaken by the events of the 31st of March. If I had been at Paris at that time, the weight of my influence, and my perfect knowledge of the secret bearings of parties, would have enabled me to impart an entirely contrary direction to the bias of those extraordinary events. My preponderance and prompt decision would have prevailed over the more mysterious and tardy influence of M. de Talleyrand. That distinguished individual was incapable of making any progress, unless when yoked with me to the same car. I should have revealed to him all the ramifications of my political plan; and in spite of the odious policy of Savary, the ridiculous administration of Cambacérès, the lieutenant-generalship of the puppet Joseph, and the total prostration of the senate, we should have re-kindled fresh life in the *caput mortuum* of the revolution; and degraded patriots would have no longer thought, as they have done when it was too late, of preserving nothing but themselves. Impelled by me, they would, before the intervention of foreign powers, have pronounced the downfall of Napoleon, and proclaimed a regency, according to the forms which I had laid down. This *dénouement* was the only one capable of imparting security to the revolution and its principles. But the fates had otherwise

decreed*. Napoleon himself conspired against his own blood. What shifts, what pretexts, did he not employ to keep me at a distance from the capital, where he even feared the presence of his son and of his wife; for the order which he left to Cambacérès, to cause the immediate departure of the empress and the King of Rome, at the earliest appearance of the allies, cannot, without great misrepresentation, be imputed to any other motive, than that of averting such a revolution as might be effected by the establishment of a national regency. After having suffered himself to be juggled out of his capital by the Emperor Alexander, he wished to have recourse to the regency as a last shift. But it was then too late. The combinations of M. de Talleyrand had prevailed, and it was when a provisional government was already framed, that I arrived, to make my appearance before the restoration. What a position, just Heaven, was mine! Impelled by the consciousness of the many claims which I possessed to power, and withheld by a sentiment of remorse; impressed at the same time

* Rather say, that in spite of so many intrigues of all the military power of Bonaparte, and of the protracted aberrations of European policy, Providence at length determined that our native princes should resume the sceptre of France. We are now at length consoled for so many wars and calamities, by the reign of Charles X., which the wise foresight of Louis XVIII. enabled him to prepare for our advantage.—*Note by the French Editor.*

with the grandeur of a spectacle perfectly new to the generation which witnessed it—the public entrance of a son of France, who, after being the sport of fortune for twenty-five years, reviewed, in the midst of acclamations and universal rejoicing, the capital of his ancestors adorned with the standards and emblems of royalty. Moved, I confess, by the affecting picture of royal affability, intermingling with royalist intoxication, I was subjugated by the feeling*. I neither dissembled my regret nor my repentance; I revealed them in full senate, while I urged the senators to send a deputation to S. A. R. Monsieur; at the same time declaring myself unworthy to form a part of it, and of appearing in my own person before the representative of monarchy; and withstanding to the utmost of my influence such of my colleagues, as wished to impose restraints upon the Bourbons.

A month had not yet elapsed when, tormented by the secret disquietude with which the residence of Napoleon at the isle of Elba inspired me, a residence which I foresaw might prove fatal to

* Another effect of the same providence. What a sublime and affecting spectacle was that return of a son of France on the immortal day of the 12th of April, 1814. That spectacle affected the soul of a regicide; the feeling of remorse overcomes him; he recognises, in the great catastrophe, the hand of Divine Providence, which prepared, ten years before, the way for the mild and paternal rule of Charles X., of that chivalrous king, who was saluted by the acclamations of the Parisians on the very threshold of our restoration.—*Note by the French Editor.*

France, I took up my pen, and addressed him in the following letter, which I surrender to the impartial judgment of history.

"SIRE,—When France and a portion of Europe were at your feet, I never flinched from telling you the truth. Now that you are in misfortune, I entertain more fear of wounding your sensibility while I address you in the language of sincerity; but it is a duty which I owe to you, because it is useful, and even necessary to your own welfare.

"You have accepted the isle of Elba and its sovereignty for your retreat. I lend an attentive ear to all which is dropped on the subject of that sovereignty and of that isle. I think it is my duty to assure you, that the situation of that isle, in Europe, is not adapted for you, and that the title of sovereign of a few acres of land is still less fitted for him, who has been the master of an immense empire.

"I entreat you to weigh well these two considerations, and you will perceive that they are well founded.

"The isle of Elba is at a very short distance from Africa, Greece, and Spain; it nearly touches the shores of Italy and France. From that island, tides, winds, and a little felucca may suddenly bring you in those countries most exposed to agitation, to chances, and revolutions. There is as yet stability no where; and, in this general condition of national instability, a genius like yours may always excite disquietude and suspicion among

European powers. Without being criminal you may be accused, and without being criminal you may also do mischief, since a state of alarm is a great evil for governments as well as for nations.

" A king who ascends the throne of France must desire to reign exclusively by justice; but you know well what numerous passions besiege a throne, and with what ingenuity malice gives the colour of truth to defamation.

" The titles which you preserve, by constantly recalling what you have lost to your mind, can only serve to aggravate the bitterness of your regret; they will not appear the wrecks but a vain imagery of passed grandeur. I will go farther; without doing you honour, they will expose you to the greatest danger. It will be said that you preserve your titles, only because you retain your pretensions; it will be said that the rocky island of Elba is the *point d'appui* on which you will fix your lever, in order, a second time, to shake the whole world.

" Permit me, Sire, to express with frankness all that passes in my mind. It would be more glorious and more consolatory for you to live in the character of a private individual; and the more secure asylum for a man like yourself is the United States of America. There you will recommence your existence in the midst of a nation still in its youth, and which can admire your genius without standing in dread of its effects. You will be under

the protection of laws, equally impartial and inviolable, like every thing else in the country of Franklin, Washington, and Jefferson. You will prove to the Americans that, if you had been born among them, you would have thought and voted as they had done, and that you would have preferred their virtues and their liberty to all the sovereignties on earth."

This letter, which I am disposed to consider as creditable to my character, was subsequently submitted, by the royalists, to Monsieur Comte d'Artois, in conjunction with the following letter, which I addressed to his royal highness :—

" Monseigneur,—It has been my wish to offer a last service to the Emperor Napoleon, whose minister I was for ten years. I think it my duty to communicate to your royal highness the letter which I have just written. His welfare cannot be a matter of indifference to me, since it has excited the generous pity of the powers which have conquered him. But the greatest of all interests for France and Europe, that to which all others ought to give way, is the tranquillity of nations and governments after so many storms and misfortunes ; and that repose, even though established upon solid bases, will never be sufficiently guaranteed, will never, in short, be permanently enjoyed, as long as the Emperor Napoleon remains in the isle of Elba. Napoleon, residing on that rock, may be regarded, with respect to Italy,

France, and the whole of Europe, with the same feelings as Vesuvius by the side of Naples. I see no place but the New World and the United States which he will never shake."

The prince, whose sagacity is certainly unquestionable, was enabled by this letter to judge, what he but imperfectly knew before, that I was not to be reckoned among the adherents of Napoleon.

On being consulted by ministers and courtiers, I frequently repeated to them, "Be silent on all wrongs; place yourself at the head of the good which has been done for the last twenty-five years; reject all the evil on preceding governments, or, more justly, to the force of events; profit by the virtue which oppression has engendered, the energy which our discords have developed, and the talents which popular ferment has struck out. If the king do not make the nation his *point d'appui*, his authority will diminish, his courtiers will be reduced to the necessity of extorting barren tributes of homage on his behalf, which will be his ruin. "Take care," I added, "not to touch upon the colour of the national cockade and flag; that question is not yet entirely understood; it is frivolous only in appearance, but it will decide on every thing; the question is, as it were, to decide under which standard the nation will rally; the colour of the riband may, also, decide the colour of the reign. A sacrifice like this, on the part of the king, resembles that made by Henry IV., with regard to the

mass." It may be seen from this, that, in my advice, I did not hesitate to constitute the king into a head of the revolution, to which, by this measure, a guarantee, much stronger than that of the charter itself, would be presented; my opinions, and the interests of my country, as well as my own, prescribed this course. But if, on the one hand, I possessed numerous partisans, either among the royalists, or among the men of the revolution; I had, on the other hand, against me the Bonapartists, and the relics of Savary's police. The latter represented me as devoured by chagrin, at not having been able to assist in the overthrow of an edifice which I had taken pleasure in erecting; and as hurrying to the legitimate throne, making a parade of my remorse, and offering my services to the august family, which I had outraged, at any price which they chose to fix. The former, on the contrary, depicted me as the only man calculated to maintain the security of the Bourbons; as a most sagacious minister, capable of disposing of a portion of the elements of the political body. I do not think that I deceive myself, when I affirm that such was the prevailing opinion in the Faubourg St. Germain.

I commenced a correspondence with several important personages of the court; among others, with my friend Malouet, who, since his exile at Tours, had been appointed by the king to the department of the navy. All the letters which I

wrote to him were placed under the king's eye. I recommended to him, as well as to all those who came on his majesty's behalf to ask my advice, not to establish a warfare between old and new opinions, between the nation and the emigrants; but there was not energy enough to follow any part of my recommendation; and the torrent of opposite opinions was suffered to prevail.

Towards the end of June, the king having desired M. de Blacas to have a conference with me, I had a visit from that minister, whom I coldly received. I knew him to be surrounded by persons who were my enemies, and who enjoyed no credit with the public; such as Savary, Bourienne, the old prefect of police Dubois, and a certain Madame P——, a woman in bad repute, and very notorious; I knew that the whole of them, united, exerted themselves to delude and circumvent M. de Blacas. His unconciliating manner, and his inexperience in business, joined to the aversion with which his cabal inspired me, prevented him from fully comprehending me, while it precluded me from speaking openly to him. However, as Louis XVIII. would be informed that I had shown reserve and want of confidence in my communications with his minister, I took up my pen, and, the next day, wrote a detailed letter to M. de Blacas, under the conviction that the king would be shortly made acquainted with it. I said that the agitation of France was caused among the people by a dread

of the re-establishment of feudal rights; by disquietude respecting their acquisitions, on the part of the possessors of emigrant property; by a doubt as to their personal security on the part of those who had firmly declared themselves either for the republic, or for Bonaparte; by the loss of, and regret for, so many prospects of glory and fortune, on the part of the army; and, finally, by the astonishment produced on the publication of the charter (which the king had chosen to characterize as an emanation from his hereditary power) on the minds of the constitutionalists. Among these causes, the most dangerous of all was precisely that, the action of which all the wisdom of the king and of his ministers could not entirely foresee nor prevent: I mean the discontent of the army, and I explained its motives; among others, I stated that an army, and more especially an army raised by conscription, always imbibes the general feeling of the nation in which it lives, and that it always ends with being either contented or discontented, like the nation, and in conjunction with the nation. With this cause of discontent, I added, that the genius of Bonaparte still interfered. "A nation," I observed, "in which, for five-and-twenty years, opinions and feelings have been thrown into so strong an action as to shake the universe, cannot, without long gradations of interval, return to a tranquil and peaceable condition; to attempt to stop the force of that activity would be impolitic;

new fuel must be found for its rapacity; the boundless careers of industry in all the branches of commerce, of the arts, of the sciences, and of the discoveries which they may effect, must be thrown open and enlarged as much as possible; in short, every thing which extends the faculties and the power of man. The nineteenth century has scarcely begun; it ought to bear the name of Louis XVIII., as the the seventeenth bore the name of Louis XIV." I equally pleaded the cause of the liberty of the press and individual liberty; and I concluded in the following terms:—" Great numbers of Frenchmen, who devoted themselves to participate in the misfortunes of the Bourbons, as they had in their prosperity, have returned with the dynasty of their kings; they can no longer pretend to the re-acquisition of their estates, without exciting violent troubles and a civil war;—then let one of the king's ministers, with the logic of a reflecting mind, and imbued with the eloquence of a soul alive to what is due to great misfortunes and great virtues, ask of the two chambers the allotment of an annual sum for the purpose of indemnifying calamities and privations so deserving of succour, at the hands of a feeling and heroic nation; I will take upon myself to answer, that such a project in the chambers would be passed into a law by acclamation."

But such advice could only be fruitless, as long as it came from an individual out of the sphere of power. Supported and urged by a numerous party

of royalists, the ramifications of which extended as far as the court, I confess that I was led to hope that I might again come into office as minister, for the purpose of exerting an influence over events; but I had opposed to me M. de Blacas, who had subjected himself to the crafty influence of Savary; and the latter, being sold to Bonaparte, trembled at the idea of a door of access to the king's councils being opened to me. I had, moreover, too many recollections, interests, and especially rival pretensions, to struggle with. I did not disguise from myself, that the main argument which was constantly reiterated against me was undeniable. I felt my real position, and departed with my family for my château of Ferrières, whence I proposed to cast an observing eye upon events. It was necessary to oppose the wishes of my friend, in order to station myself, in this manner, at a distance from the capital.

I was convinced, beforehand, that the feeble and incompetent individuals who held the helm of government would continue to follow erroneous maxims in politics, and to impart a false direction to affairs.

What serious reflections, therefore, assailed my mind, with regard to the equivocal and inconsistent position of the new government! As a statesman, it could not escape my notice, that a restoration had been effected without a revolution; since all the springs of the imperial government still sub-

sisted, and nothing was changed, if I may so express it, but the *individuality* of power. And, in fact, what could be found, after the lapse of twenty years, in an immovable condition? Clergy, nobility, institutions, municipalities, hereditary property, nothing had escaped the general overthrow. The Bourbons, in re-ascending the throne, found support in public inclination, but not in national interest. Such was the origin and first cause of the commotion, the first indications of which already began to exhibit themselves to my eyes. France was participated between the votaries and adversaries of the restoration. Louis XVIII. reigned over a suffering and divided nation; all who had shared in the deeds of imperial despotism, all the individuals who had distinguished themselves in our revolutionary crisis, feared to be obliged to share their dignities with the ancient nobility; they had required securities, and they had obtained them, or imagined they had obtained them, by that declaration claimed from the king, and promulgated by that prince before his entrance into his capital.

But, on the other hand, the reverses of Napoleon had succeeded each other with so much rapidity, that the possessors of high offices and great incomes had not had sufficient time to retrench the luxury of their establishments. When the Bourbons were recalled, some calculation was necessary on their part, and it was indispensable to put a sudden stop to the unlimited course of their expenses.

Here was a plentiful source of discontent and irritation among the upper ranks of the social order. Another still more alarming cause of instability for the new government, was to be found in the army, as yet intact, it had not yet been disbanded, (an enormous error,) for all the old soldiers, and all the prisoners, who were restored to France, were imbued with a spirit at variance with the restoration, and devoted to the interests of the ex-emperor.

The king, instead of accepting the charter, had granted it; another subject of discontent to that great body of Frenchmen, whose political era dated from the revolution. The charter, it is true, confirmed titles, honours, and in some respects, places; it legalized the acquisition of national property; but that was not entirely satisfactory for so many restless and prejudiced individuals. The charter, moreover, had a multitude of objectors. According to one party, it was not sufficiently liberal; according to the partisans of the ancient *régime*, the old constitution of the kingdom was preferable. To this state of things must be added the laxity and uncertainty of the ministers, who, without being either royalists or patriots, took it into their heads that they could render France ministerial. The general apprehension must also be borne in mind, which was entertained of the congress of Vienna, which, while employed in the reconstruction of Europe, menaced such states as had become the seat of revolution with subjection to an anti-revolu-

tionary *régime;* in this manner the interests produced by twenty-five years of troubles were thrown into alarm. The royalists enfeebled, became divided, in proportion as their adversaries, shuddering at the very name of the Bourbons, exhibited more pertinacity in disputing their rights. The possibility of Napoleon's return, considered at first as a chimera, became the favourite idea of the army; plots were formed, and the royal police countermined. It is easy to conceive, that having occupied so many elevated posts in the state, and still preserving such numerous links of connexion with public affairs, and with so devoted a body of clients in the capital, my observations extended over all the intrigues which were preparing.

I was in this disposition of mind, when an individual, who had possessed much influence, and who was then losing it daily, wrote to prevail upon me to make one of a secret committee, the object of which was a change of government. I wrote upon the very note of invitation the following answer, which afterwards was made known: "I do not work in secrecy (*en cherres chaudes*); I will not do any thing that may not appear in open air, (*au grand air*)."

In the mean time affiliations were forming; and influential men were contracting political engagements to each other. It was soon obvious to me, that the state was proceeding towards a crisis, and that the adherents of Napoleon had coalesced in

order to accelerate its advent. But no success was possible without my co-operation; I was everything but decided to concede it to a party, against whom I entertained a grudge of long standing. Repeated applications were made to me, and many plans suggested; all tended to the dethronement of the king, and the subsequent proclamation either of another dynasty, or of a provisional republic. A military party made me a proposal of offering the dictatorship to Eugene Beauharnois. I wrote to Eugene, under the impression that the matter had already assumed a substantial form; but I only received a vague answer. In the interim, all the interests of the revolution congregated round myself and Carnot, whose letter to the king produced a general sensation, which attested still more efficaciously against the unskilfulness of the ministry. The affair of Excelmans gave additional strength to the persuasion that a considerable party, the focus of which was in Paris, desired the re-establishment of Napoleon and the imperial government.

When, as winter approached, I returned to the capital, the royal government appeared to me undermined by two parties, hostile to legitimacy, and itself thenceforward without resource. The king had, in his wisdom, commissioned the Duke d'Havré to supersede M. de Blacas in his confidential communications with me. The true nobility of this nobleman's character, as well as his frank deport-

ment, gained him my entire confidence; I opened my whole heart to him; and found myself disposed to a freedom of communication which I had never before known. Never had I, in any moment of my life, felt so little inclination to reserve; never before did I find myself endowed with an eloquence so true, and a sensibility so intense, as those which accompanied the recital of the circumstances, by which I had been fatally induced to vote for the death of Louis XVI. I can say it with truth, that this confession extorted from my feelings was imbued at once with remorse and inspiration. I cannot, indeed, at this time, recal to mind, without profound emotion, the tears which I observed in the eyes of my virtuous interlocutor—of that illustrious duke, who was a personification of true and loyal French chivalry.

Our political conversations were minuted, for the purpose of being subsequently communicated to the king. But the wounds of the state were beyond remedy, and a great crisis was inevitable. Placed, on the one hand, between the Bourbons, who only conceded to me a demi-confidence, whose system closed all the avenues of power and honour against me, and with regard to whom I was in a false position, while, at the same time, I had no kind of engagement towards them; and on the other hand, between the party to which I was indebted for my fortune, and to which a community of opinions and interests attracted me, at the moment when a pro-

longed state of doubt on my part might have isolated me from both, I threw myself entirely into the arms of the last. It was not against the Bourbons that I resolved within myself to wage war, but against the dogma of legitimacy. I was, however, thwarted in my combinations, by the existence of a Bonapartist party, which exerting all its influence over the army, kept us all in a state of dependence. It was my ancient colleague Thibaudeau, who first disclosed to me the progress of the faction in the Isle of Elba, whose principal agent he was. I saw that there was no time to lose; I, moreover, considered that Napoleon would, at all events, serve as a rallying point for the army, which we might the more easily overthrow afterwards, as the emperor, in my eyes, was nothing but a worn-out actor, whose first performance could not be re-enacted. I then consented that Thibaudeau should make overtures to some of Napoleon's friends, and I allowed Regnault, Cambacérès, Davoust, S——, B——, L——, C——, B— de la M——, and M. de D——, to be admitted to our conferences. But I demanded concessions and securities, refusing to unite with that party, if their chief, abjuring despotism, did not adopt a system of liberal government. Our coalition was cemented by the reciprocal promise of an equal participation of power, either in the ministry, or in the provisional government, at the moment of the explosion. According to the plan arranged with Thibaudeau, I hastened to de-

spatch my emissary, J——, to Murat, to induce him to declare himself the arbiter of Italy; at the same time the great committee despatched Doctor R—— to the Isle of Elba. Lyons and Grenoble became the two pivots of the enterprise in the South; in the North, a military movement, directed by d'Erlon and Lefebvre-Desnouettes was to determine the flight or capture of the royal family, which measure would require the formation of a provisional government, of which I was to form a part, with Carnot, Caulaincourt, Lafayette, and N——. To resume the supreme power in the midst of the general confusion, such was the drift of our combinations. Impatient to reconcile himself with Napoleon, and hoping to remain master of Italy, Murat, although the ally of Austria, was the first to take up arms on some insidious pretences; this show of hostilities apparently directed against Louis XVIII., caused great sensation in the king's council. Thirty thousand men were immediately marched towards Grenoble and the Alps, or rather thrown in Napoleon's way. The adroitness of this manœuvre was not discovered. In the meanwhile the disembarkation of the emperor took place at Cannes; and it may be alleged in proof that we are not a nation of conspirators, that for the preceding fortnight, the overthrow of the Bourbons had been publicly avowed by all parties, and had been a subject of universal conversation. The court alone

persevered in refusing to see what was evident to every body else.

Before touching on the events of the 20th of March, let us throw a retrospective glance. It will have been seen that I had, at first, no intention of joining the rebellious party; my only aim was to induce the cabinet of the Tuileries to seize the reins of the revolution, and hold them with a vigorous hand through the midst of surrounding obstacles. I think I may avow, without arrogating too much to myself, that I alone was capable of heading and superintending such a system; at the court, in Paris, and in the provinces, I was selected by all parties as fittest for this bold attempt. I had to contend against rivals, to whom the past appeared to furnish with invincible arms; but, up to the latest moment, I never ceased seeking for some *mezzo-termine*, some mode of conciliation, which might do away with the necessity of recurring to the desperate expedient of the emperor's return. It has been seen, how in yielding to it I yielded to the necessity of the case. It was only at the moment of Napoleon's landing, that I was thoroughly informed of the fatal combination which brought him back to our shores. Its object embraced three distinct sub-divisions; the return of Napoleon to Paris; the captivity of the king and the royal family; and the evasion of Maria Louisa and her son from Vienna. The first part of the plan was that, the execution of which was the

easiest, considering the disposition to defection manifested by almost all the troops. The same could not be said of the seizure of the king and the royal family; for that purpose it would have been necessary for an army to have suddenly marched on the capital, an expedient which precluded the possibility of a secret; and it was on that account that the attempt of Lefebvre-Desnouettes failed. As to the evasion of Maria Louisa and her son, that also was attempted and had nearly succeeded.—Shrinking, with a kind of horror, from the idea of sacrificing to a military *coup de main* the family of a monarch who had shown such a high opinion of me as to take my advice, I requested an audience of the king, as soon as I learnt that Napoleon was marching upon Lyons. This interview was not granted me; but two gentlemen came, on his majesty's behalf, to receive my communications. I apprized them of the danger which Louis XVIII. incurred, and I engaged to stop the progress of the fugitive from the Isle of Elba, if the court would consent to the terms which I required. My proposals resulted from the actual nature of the events which were in the act of being unfolded. A patriotic party, not less inimical than myself to imperial despotism, had just completed its sudden organization; it had for its chiefs MM. de Broglie, Lafayette, D'Argenson, Flaugergues, Benjamin Constant, *&c.* They had agreed to require of the king, the dismissal of his ministers; the nomination of forty new

members selected from men of the revolution, to the chamber of peers; and that of M. de Lafayette to the command of the National Guard. It was, moreover, proposed to send, into the provinces, patriotic commissioners, in order to stop the defection of the troops, and kindle a national energy in their hearts. I was no stranger to the motions of this party, by means of which I was subsequently to become minister. I was, however, aware that it was indispensable to rally all the elements of the revolution, in order to oppose them in one body to the power of the sword; that it was necessary to oppose one name against another, and the charm of those recollections, which the heir of the first mover of the revolution would excite in the hearts of freemen, against that of a glory, which, by its sudden resurrection, dazzled the genius of the camp. When the king's ministers desired to know what were the means which I proposed to employ in order to prevent Napoleon from reaching Paris, I refused to communicate them, being disinclined to disclose them to any person but the king himself; but I protested that I was sure of success. The two chief conditions which I exacted, was the appointment of the first prince of the blood to the lieutenant-generalship of the kingdom, and the consignment of power and the direction of affairs into my hands and those of my party. This experiment of my political measures was declined, and we therefore found ourselves necessitated, in some sort, to se-

cond the impulse of the party which I had wished to paralyse; conceiving myself, besides, in a condition to substitute a more popular government in the room of that which Napoleon threatened to revive.

The alarm in the palace of the Tuileries hourly increasing in proportion as the march of Napoleon became more rapid and more certain, the court again turned its looks towards me. Some royalists interfered to obtain, at least, for me, an interview with *Monsieur*, the king's brother, in the apartments of the comte d'Escars. I only required permission to go clandestinely to the Tuileries by night; the publicity of such a proceeding being otherwise calculated to compromise my influence with my party. Every thing was regulated accordingly. *Monsieur* did not keep me waiting long; he was only attended by the comte d'Escars. The affability of this prince, his condescending deportment, his polite attentions, in which solicitude for the destinies of France and of his family was depicted, to sum up all, his generous and affecting language touched my heart, and doubled my regret that an interview of so vital an importance had been decided upon too late. I declared, with grief, to this frank and loyal prince, that it was too late, and that it was now impossible to serve the king's cause. It was at the conclusion of an interview, which will never be erased from my mind, that subjugated by the charm of so august a confidence, and finding in the painful

conviction of my own powerlessness a sudden inspiration, I exclaimed as I took leave of the prince, "Take measures to save the king, and I take upon me to save the monarchy."

Who could have imagined, that, after communications of so great an importance, there should almost immediately be set on foot against me, and against my liberty, a kind of plot, for plot it was, and a plot totally at variance with the genuine sentiments of the magnanimous sovereign and his noble brother. Its authors I will reveal. But, however it may be, I was without the least suspicion, in my own house, when some agents of the Parisian police, at the head of which Bourienne had just been placed, suddenly made their appearance, accompanied by *gendarmes* to arrest me. Having timely intelligence, I hastily took measures for my escape. The agents of police were already proceeding to an active search in my apartments, when the *gendarmes* commissioned to execute the order of the new prefect presented themselves before me. These men, who had so long obeyed my orders, not daring to lay their hands on my person, contented themselves with presenting me the written warrant. I took the paper, opened it, and pretending to read it, said, "This order is not regular; stay a moment while I write my protest against it." I entered my closet, seated myself at my desk, and began to write. I then rose with a paper in my hand, and making a sudden turn, I precipitately descended

into my garden by a secret door; there I found a ladder resting against a wall contiguous to the mansion of Queen Hortense. I lightly climbed it; one of my people raised the ladder, which I took and let fall on its feet on the other side of the wall; this I quickly scaled, and descended with still more promptitude. I arrived, in the character of a fugitive, at the house of Hortense, who received me with open arms; and, as in a wonderful Arabian tale, I suddenly found myself in the midst of the *élite* of the Bonapartists, in the head-quarters of the party, where I found mirth, and where my presence caused intoxication.

This *impromptu* circumstance completed the dissipation of that mistrust which the party entertained towards me; and the same individuals who, till then, had considered me in the light of an almost acquired partisan to the Bourbons, now beheld in me nothing more than an enemy proscribed by the Bourbons.

Let it be here understood that political considerations had nothing to do with the attempt to arrest me. His royal highness *Monsieur* went so far as to say to some influential members of the lower house, that it was against his knowledge that the attempt had been made to arrest me, and that he would answer for the safety of my person.

This attempt was nothing but the result of an interested contrivance between Savary, Bourienne, and B——; whatever might be the issue of the

20th of March, this triumvirate, or rather the three members of this tripot, had determined to secure to themselves the profits arising from the gambling houses, and they were convinced that it was necessary to sacrifice me, in order that their ambitious cupidity might acquire a kind of guarantee and consistence.

If I had once fallen into their hands, what would they have done with me? It has been said, that their object was to transfer me to Lille; but no! it was not Lille; this I have learnt since; but it was to the castle of Saumur; and there, I repeat my question, what was the lot they intended for me? If I may rely on discoveries that my return to power elicited, one of my enemies (for all the three were not capable of crime) would have caused my assassination, and subsequently imputed my death to the royalists, who would have borne the odium.

Such was my singular position, that the departure of Louis XVIII. and the arrival of Napoleon were requisite to restore me entirely to liberty. Being one of the first to obtain intelligence that the Tuileries were vacant, I learnt, at the same time, that Lavalette had sent an express to Fontainbleau, where Napoleon had just arrived, to apprize him of the king's departure. Madame Ham——, who had intrigued so much in producing this innovation, was mortified that others should get the start of her, and, despatching an express with

orders to overtake the preceding one, obtained by that means the honour of conveying the first intelligence.

Carried onward by his soldiers and a portion of the populace, Napoleon resumed possession of the Tuileries in the midst of his partisans, who exhibited symptoms of the most clamorous joy. I was not present at first among the other dignitaries of the state, with whom he conversed on the present aspect of affairs. But Napoleon sent for me: "So they wanted to carry you off," he said, as I approached him, "in order to prevent you from being useful to your country? Well! I now offer you an opportunity of doing her fresh service; the period is difficult, but your courage, as well as mine, is superior to the crisis. Accept once more the office of minister of police." I represented to him that the office of foreign affairs was more the object of my ambition than any other, persuaded as I was that I could, in that quarter, more than elsewhere, do my country effectual service. "No," rejoined he, "take the charge of the police; you have learnt to judge soundly of the state of the public mind; to divine, prepare, and direct the progress of events; you understand the tactics, the resources, and the pretensions of the various parties; the police is your forte." There was no way of receding. I gave him to understand, in all its extent, the dangerous posture of affairs; and, as if he wished to engage me more deeply in his in-

terest, he assured me that Austria and England, in order to balance the preponderance of Russia, secretly favoured his escape and return to France. Without giving credit to this assurance, I accepted the office.

The next day I learnt, through Regnault, who was devoted to me, that Bonaparte, always suspicious and mistrustful with regard to me, would have wished to keep me out of the circle of government; but that he had yielded to the solicitations of Bassano, Caulaincourt, and of Regnault himself, and his chief partisans, who in disclosing their engagements with me, impressed upon his mind the importance of strengthening himself by my popularity and the adherence of the party which I directed.

Cambacérès, who foresaw the fatal issue of this new interlude, did not accept, till after much hesitation, the office of minister of justice; the *portefeuille* of war was given to Davoust, who was much more attached to his fortune than to Napoleon.

Caulaincourt, in the conviction that no intercourse could be established with foreign powers, at first refused the office for foreign affairs. Napoleon offered it to Molé, who declined having any thing to do with it, and refused the home department at the same time. Too much devoted to the emperor to leave him without a minister, Caulaincourt at length acceded. From hand to hand, the

home departmant at length passed into the possession of Carnot, a nomination which was considered as a national guarantee. The navy was given again to the cynical and brutal Decrès; and the secretaryship of state to Bassano, notorious for the reputation of thinking with Napoleon's thoughts, and seeing with his eyes. Out of deference to public opinion, Savary was omitted; however, Moncey having refused the *gendarmerie*, it was given to him; at least, he was so far in his proper place. Champagny and Montalivet, who had appeared invested with the highest employments when Napoleon, almost master of the world, did not stand in so vacillating a position, modestly contented themselves, the one with the superintendence of public buildings, and the other with that of the civil list. Bertrand, equally amiable, insinuating, and zealous, superseded Duroc in the function of grand marshal of the palace. Napoleon restored to their duty about his person almost all the chamberlains, grooms, and masters of the ceremonies, who surrounded him before his abdication; but ill cured of his old unfortunate passion for noblemen of the *ancient régime*, he must have them at any price; he would have thought himself in the midst of a republic if he had not contrived to be environed by the ancient *noblesse*.

Yet, nevertheless, those who had assisted him in crossing the Mediterranean, pretended that he had thought as much of re-establishing the re-

public or the consulate as the empire. But I knew what to believe on that head; I knew also what trouble I had had among the adherents, in getting them to force him to abandon his oppressive system, and to engage him to give pledges to the liberties of the nation. His decrees from Lyons had not been voluntary; he had there pledged himself to give a national constitution to France. "I return," he then said, "in order to protect and defend the interests which our revolution has engendered. It is my wish to give you an inviolable constitution, which shall be the joint work of the people and myself." By his decrees from Lyons, he had abolished the chamber of peers by a single stroke of his pen, and annihilated the feudal nobility. It was also from Lyons that, in the hope of averting the resentment of foreign powers, he had commissioned his brother Joseph, then in Switzerland, to make known to them, through the intervention of their ministers to the Helvetic confederation, that he was positively determined on no longer troubling the repose of Europe, and on faithfully maintaining the treaty of Paris.

This compulsory disposition, on his part, the mistrust which he met with in the interior of France, as to the sincerity of his secret thoughts, and, I may add, my own repulsive attitude, put a stop to the impulse of a man who was ready to rekindle the flames of war throughout Europe. In fact, on the very night of his arrival at the Tuile-

ries, he commenced a deliberation as to the expediency of renewing the scourge of war by an invasion of Belgium. But a feeling of dislike having exhibited itself among those who surrounded him, he found it necessary to abandon this project; he succumbed beneath the hand of necessity, although once more armed with his military power. That power, however, since the Lyons decrees, had changed its nature.

By a decree of the 24th of March, suppressing the censorship and the regulation of publications, he consummated what it was agreed to call the imperial restoration. The liberty of the press, so tumultuous in France, and which is, nevertheless, the mother of all other immunities, had been reconquered. I had much contributed to it, even in the presence of its greatest enemy. Napoleon objected to me that the royalists, on one side, would employ it to aid the cause of the Bourbons,—and the jacobins, on the other, to render his sentiments and projects suspected. "Sire," I rejoined, "the French require victory, or the nourishment of liberty." I insisted, also, that his decrees should contain no other epithets than that of emperor of the French, inducing him to suppress the *et cætera*, remarked with uneasiness in his proclamations and decrees from Lyons.

But the idea of being indebted to the patriots for his re-installation at the Tuileries was repugnant to him. "Some intriguers," said he to me

with bitterness, "wanted to take all the credit to themselves, and turn it to their own advantage. They now lay claim to having prepared my progress to Paris; but I know what to think about it,—the people, the soldiers, and the sub-lieutenants, have effected every thing; it is to them and them only that I owe the whole." I felt what was meant by these words, and that they were intended as a reproof for my party and myself.

It must be obvious that, with such feelings, it it was indispensable for him to make himself certain of a police different from mine. He sent for Réal, whom he had just invested with the office of prefect of police; and after having allured him with fine promises and more substantial gifts, sent him to Savary, in order to devise means of tracing and counteracting my designs—but I was on my guard.

In the mean while, he learnt with anxiety that Louis XVIII. proposed remaining in observation, on the frontiers of Belgium. He had, besides, another cause of vexation; Ney, Lecourbe, and other generals, wished him to purchase their services, and even to make him pay his ransom; he grew indignant at this. The result of the royalist enterprise rather contributed to tranquillize him. He was astonished by the courage which the Duke d'Angoulême exhibited in La Drome, and especially Madame at Bourdeaux. He admired the intrepidity of this heroic princess, whom the desertion of

an entire army had not been able to dispirit. I must here do justice to Maret. On being informed that Grouchy had just made the Duke d'Angoulême prisoner, in contempt of the capitulation of Palud, to which the ratification of Napoleon was alone wanting, and which was in fact obtained, but not sent off, Maret concealed the arrest of the prince from Napoleon, transmitted his original orders, and only apprized him of the nullification of the convention, when the obscurity of night rendered all telegraphic communication impossible.

The next day, it was proposed in council to obtain the crown diamonds, which were worth forty millions, in exchange for the Duke d'Angoulême. I recommended the emperor to throw M. de Vitrolles into the bargain, if the restitution could be obtained. "No," said Napoleon, angrily: "he is an intriguer and an agent of Talleyrand; it was he who was despatched to the Emperor Alexander, and who opened the gates of Paris to the allies. This man has been arrested at Toulouse, in the act of conspiring against me; if he had been shot, Lamarque would have done no more than his duty." I, however, represented to him, that if military executions had been resorted to on both sides, France would soon have been covered with blood; that political reasons prescribed a more temporizing system; and that in restoring the Duke d'Angoulême to liberty, some stipulation could be made for M. de Vitrolles, who was only the

avowed agent of the Bourbons. To this he at length acceded, and I instantly set on foot a negotiation on the subject.

We had many other causes of inquietude. Caulaincourt had just had an interview, at the house of Madame de Souza, with Baron de Vincent, the Austrian minister, whose passport was designedly delayed. This minister did not disguise that it was the resolution of the allied powers to oppose Napoleon's retention of the throne; but he suffered it to be perceived that Napoleon's son did not inspire the same repugnance. It has been seen that it was upon this same basis that I had previously modelled the plan of an edifice, which I now considered myself in better condition to erect.

Napoleon caused the Emperor Alexander and Prince Metternich to be written to by Hortense, and also to the latter by his sister, the Queen of Naples, hoping in this way to deaden the force of the blows which he was not yet prepared to ward off. He at the same time commissioned Eugene, and the Princess Stephanie of Baden, to neglect nothing, in order to detach them from the coalition. Meanwhile, he caused overtures to be made to the cabinet of London by an agent whom I pointed out to him. And, finally, he hoped to ingratiate himself with the English parliament and nation, by a decree abolishing the negro slave trade.

Meanwhile, all our external communications were

intercepted by order of the various cabinets. The proceedings of the congress of Vienna were for the Tuileries a subject of expectation and the most painful anxiety. We at length heard, in an unquestionable manner, what the public already knew, the declaration of the congress of Vienna, dated the 13th of March, which pronounced the outlawry of Napoleon. France was from that time alarmed at the evils which were preparing for her; she groaned at the thoughts of being exposed to the horrors of a new invasion, for the sake of a single man. Napoleon affected not to be moved; and told us in full council, "This time, they will find that they have not to deal with the France of 1814; and their success, if they obtain it, will only serve to render the war more sanguinary and obstinate; while, on the other hand, if victory favour me, I may become as formidable as ever. Have I not on my side Belgium, and the provinces on this side the Rhine. With the aid of a proclamation and a tricoloured flag, I will revolutionize them in twenty-four hours."

I was far from allowing myself to be lulled into security by such gasconades as these. The moment I obtained knowledge of the declaration, I did not hesitate to request the king, by means of an agent, on whom I could rely, to permit me to devote myself, when opportunity occurred, to his service. I demanded no other condition in return, but the right of preserving my repose and fortune in my

seclusion of Pont Carré. Every thing was acceded to, and sanctioned by Lord Wellington, who arrived just then at Ghent from the congress at Vienna; the same kind of convention had already been concluded, as far as I was concerned, between Prince Metternich, Prince de Talleyrand, and the generalissimo of the allies.

It will not be irrelevant to explain, in this place, the cause of that kindness which I met with from the Wellesley family, not only on the part of the marquis, but also on that of Lord Wellington. It had its origin in the zeal which I manifested at the period of my second ministry, in putting an end to the captivity of a member of that illustrious family, who was detained in France in consequence of the rigorous measures enforced by Napoleon's orders.

The treaty of the 25th of March, by which the great powers engaged again not to lay down their arms while Napoleon was on the throne, was only the natural consequence of the decision of the 13th. All indirect overtures had completely failed. "No peace, no truce, with that man," replied the Emperor Alexander, to Queen Hortense; "any thing but him." Flahaut, who was sent to Vienna, was not allowed to pass Stutgard; and Talleyrand refused to enter the service of Napoleon. Notwithstanding, however, the manner in which his first overtures had failed, he decided on making new applications to the Emperor of Austria. At the same time that he sent the Baron de Stassart

to him, he despatched to M. de Talleyrand, MM. de S. L. and de Monteron, well known by their connexion with that statesman, and the last being his most intimate and devoted friend. But these attempts of the second order could scarcely produce any effect upon the general course of things.

I daily became an object of greater umbrage to Napoleon, especially as I never let slip any occasion of repressing his despotic inclination, and the revolutionary measures which he promulgated. I was designated by no other name among his partisans, than that of the *minister of Ghent.* I am also going to explain the cause of his new displeasure. M. de Blacas, deaf to all advice, having suffered the affair of the 20th of March to ripen, without believing it, and without troubling his head about it, forgot in the hurry and anxiety of his departure, a mass of papers, which might have compromised a great number of respectable individuals. On being informed of this fact, I had been prompted by an instinctive foresight, as early as the 21st of March, to authorize *M. Lainé*, a notary and a colonel of the national guard, to take possession of M. de Blacas' cabinet, arrange all the papers, and burn all those which might have been a cause of inquietude to the persons who had signed them. Savary and Réal having detected me in this operation, the emperor desired me to deliver up those papers, which I presented to him in a

bundle. Finding nothing among them but unimportant matters, he did not fail to suspect me of having withdrawn those which he had an interest in seeing.

On the 25th of March, he exiled, by a decree, to the distance of thirty leagues from Paris, the royalists, the Vendean chiefs, and the royal volunteers and *gardes du corps.* As I was opposed to this general measure, I sent for the principal persons among them, and after having testified the sympathy I felt for their situation, and explained the attempts I had made to prevent their exile, I authorized most of them to remain at Paris.

The vexation which the royalist intrigues gave Napoleon, and the disposition I showed to mitigate every thing, induced him to promulgate his famous decree, which is thought to have been prepared at Lyons, though it only saw the light in Paris, by which he ordained the trial and sequestration of the property of MM. de Talleyrand, Raguse, d'Alberg, Montesquieu, Jaucourt, Beurnonville, Lynch, Vitrolles, Alexis de Noailles, Bourienne, Bellard, Laroche-Jacquelein, and Sosthène de Larochefoucauld. Among this list was also found the name of Augereau; but it was erased, at the entreaty of his wife, and in consideration of his proclamation on the 23d of March. I expressed myself very openly in the council, on the subject of this new proscription list; in getting up which, all private deliberation had been eluded. I main-

tained it was an act of vengeance and despotism, an early infraction of the promises made to the nation, and which would not fail to be followed by public disapprobation. In fact, some echoes of it had already been heard within the palace of the Tuileries.

Meanwhile, England and Austria were on the point of successively adopting an open system of politics, the object of which was to isolate more and more the position of Napoleon. In her *memorandum* of the 25th of April, England declared, "that, by the treaty of the 9th of March, she had not engaged to replace Louis XVIII. on the throne, and that her intention was not to prosecute the war with a view of imposing any government whatever upon France." A similar declaration, on the part of Austria, appeared on the 9th of May following. In the interim, I was very near finding myself compromised, in a serious manner, with respect to Austria. A secret agent of Prince Metternich having been despatched to me, that individual, in consequence of some imprudence, was suspected, and the emperor ordered Réal to have him arrested. Terror was of course employed to extort confessions from him. He declared that he had delivered a letter to me from the prince, and a sign of mutual recognition, which was to be employed by the agent whom I was about to despatch to Bâle, in order to confer with M. Werner, his confidential delegate. The emperor instantly sent for me, as if

he wished to transact business with me. His first thought had been to have my papers seized, but that he quickly abandoned, in the persuasion that I was not a man to leave traces of what might compromise me. Not having the slightest intimation that Prince Metternich's envoy had been arrested, I neither exhibited embarrassment nor anxiety. The emperor, inferring from my silence on the subject of this secret correspondence, that I was betraying him, convoked his partisans, told them I was a traitor, that he had proofs of it, and that he would have me shot. A thousand exclamations were immediately raised against it; it was suggested to him that proofs clearer than daylight were indispensable, in order to warrant an act, which would produce the most violent sensation in the public mind. Carnot, seeing that he persevered, told him, "It is in your power to have Fouché shot, but, to-morrow at the same hour, your power will have ceased."—"How?" cried the emperor.—"Yes, Sire," returned Carnot; "this is not the time for dissembling: the men of the revolution will only suffer you to reign as long as they have security that you will respect their liberties. If you cause Fouché to be put to death, by martial law, Fouché, whom they consider as their strongest guarantee, you may be assured of it, that to-morrow you will no longer possess any influence over public opinion. If Fouché be really guilty, you must obtain convincing proofs of it, denounce him subse-

quently to the nation, and put him on his trial according to form." This advice was approved by every one; it was decided that steps should be taken to detect the intrigue, and that an agent should be sent to Bâle, in order to obtain the necessary proofs for my conviction. The emperor confided this mission to his secretary Fleury *. Supplied with all the necessary signs of recognition, he immediately departed for Bâle, and subsequently opened communications with M. Werner, as if he had been sent by myself.

It may be easily guessed, that the first question he put to him, was about the means on which the allies calculated for the destruction of Napoleon. M. Werner said, that nothing certain was decided on the subject; that the allies would have wished to have recourse to force only at the last extremity: that they had hoped that I might be able to find some means for delivering France from Bonaparte, without new effusion of blood. Fleury, continuing to act his part, said, "There only remain, then, two methods to pursue; to dethrone him, or assassinate him."—"To assassinate him!" exclaimed M. Werner, with indignation; "never did such an idea present itself to the mind of M. de Metternich and the allies." Fleury, notwithstanding all his artifices, and his captious queries, could obtain no other proof against me, except the con-

* Baron Fleury de Chaboulon.—*Note by the French Editor.*

viction which M. de Metternich felt, that I hated the emperor, and that this conviction had prompted him to open communications with me.

I had taken so little pains to disguise my opinion in that respect from Prince Metternich, that the preceding year, (1814,) at a similar epoch, on seeing him at Paris, I reproached him warmly with not having caused Bonaparte to be confined in a fortress, predicting that he would return from Elba to renew his ravages in Europe. Fleury, and M. Werner separated, one to return to Vienna, and the other to Paris, in order to provide themselves with fresh instructions, and with a promise of meeting at Bâle again in eight days.

But Fleury had scarcely began his journey to Bâle, when another direct emissary gave me reason to suspect, and enabled me to discover, what was passing: I put the letter of Prince Metternich in my *portfeuille;* and after having transacted business with the emperor, feigning a sudden recollection: " Ah, Sire," I said to him, with the tone of a man awaking from a long forgetfulness, " how overwhelmed I must be with the state of public affairs. I am positively besieged in my cabinet; and so it is that, for several days, I have forgotten to lay a letter of Prince Metternich under your eye. It is for your majesty to decide, whether I shall send him the agent which he requires. What can be his object? I can scarcely doubt that the allies,

in order to avert the calamities of a general war, wish to induce you to abdicate in favour of your son. I am satisfied, that such is the especial desire of M. de Metternich: indeed, I must reiterate that such is mine: I have never concealed it from you; and I am still persuaded that it will be impossible for you to resist the arms of united Europe." I instantly perceived by the play of his physiognomy, that he was suffering an internal struggle between the vexation which my candour occasioned him, and the satisfaction he derived from the explanation of my conduct.

When Fleury returned, the emperor sent him to me to make a confession of the whole proceeding, as if his intention had been to gain my confidence. It was no great difficulty for me to play upon this young man, so full of enthusiasm and activity, who most seriously employed all his poor cunning to conceal from me the second appointment he had made at Bâle. I suffered him to depart; he arrived there post-haste, and had the fatigues of his journey and the heat of his vehement zeal for his pains. Meanwhile, Monteron and Bresson, who came from Vienna, commissioned to bring me confidential communications on behalf of M. de Metternich and M. de Talleyrand, renewed the feeling of distrust which Napoleon entertained towards me. He sent for them both: questioned them for a considerable time; and could extract nothing positive from either. Urged by his uneasy feelings,

he wanted to place them under *surveillance;* but he learnt, with much vexation, that Bresson had suddenly departed for England, apparently commissioned by Davoust, to purchase forty thousand muskets proposed to him by a ship owner. He did not fail to suspect a secret intelligence between Davoust and me, and that Bresson was our tool.

Situated as I was, it was incumbent on me to neglect nothing to preserve the favour of the public opinion: I also possessed my vehicles of popularity, in my circulars and anti-royalist reports. I had just established throughout France, lieutenants of police, who were devoted to me; the choice of secret agents was entirely left to me; I got hold of the journals, and thus became master of public opinion. But I had soon upon my hands an affair of much greater importance; the unseasonable insurrection of La Vendée, which disconcerted all my plans. It was of great moment for me to have the royalists on my side, but not to suffer them to meddle with our affairs. In this particular, my views corresponded with the interests of Napoleon. He was apparently much chagrined at this new fermentation of the old leaven. I hastened to make him easy, by assuring him that I would soon put an end to it; that he had only to give me *carte blanche,* and to place twelve thousand of the old troops at my disposal. In the conviction that I should not sacrifice them to the Bourbons, he left me at full

liberty to take my own measures. I easily persuaded some idiots of the royalist party, whose opinions I modelled after my own fashion, that this war of some few fanatics was unseasonable: that the measures which it would suggest would reproduce the reign of terror, and occasion the revolutionary party to be let loose; that it was absolutely necessary to obtain an order from the king, to cause this rabble to lay down their arms: that the grand question could not be decided in the interior, but on the frontiers. I immediately despached off three negotiators, Malartic, Flavigny, and Laberaudière, furnished with instructions and orders to confer with such of the chiefs as the public effervescence had not yet involved in this party; and who would be glad to be supplied with a plea for waiting the course of events. All was soon arranged; the affair was brought to a conclusion, after a few skirmishes, and, at the decisive moment, La Vendée was both repressed and composed.

The commencement of war by Murat caused me another description of uneasiness, and so much the more serious, as neither the emperor nor myself were possessed of efficacious means of supporting or directing him. Unfortunately, the impulse came from us, for it was absolutely necessary that some one should *bell the cat.* But that individual, who always overstepped moderation, was not able to stop in proper time; I wrote to him in vain at a later period, as well as to the queen,

begging him to be moderate, and not to urge events too violently, which we should, probably, too soon be obliged to obey. When I learnt that his troops were already engaged with the troops of Austria, I said to myself, "That man is lost; the contest is not equal." The issue was, that he was struck by the storm he had excited.

Towards the end of May, he disembarked, as a fugitive, in the gulf of Juan. This news had all the sinister effect of a fatal omen, and threw the partisans of the emperor in consternation.

On the other hand, Napoleon found himself involved in a labyrinth of affairs, more and more serious, and in the midst of which, all his feelings were absorbed in the sole idea of facing the armaments of Europe. He would have wished to transform France into a camp, and its towns into arsenals. The soldiers appertained to him, but the citizens were divided. Besides, it was not without fear that he set the instruments of the revolution in motion, by authorizing the re-establishment of popular clubs, and the formation of civic confederations; circumstances which gave him occasion to fear that he had regenerated anarchy—he who had boasted so much of having dethroned it. What solicitudes, what anxieties, and what constraint he was compelled to infuse into his measures, in order to mitigate the violence of associations, the management of which was so dangerous!

This affectation of popularity had upheld him in

public opinion until the moment of his *acte additionnel aux constitutions de l'empire.* Napoleon considered the latter as his title-deeds to the crown, and in annulling them he would have considered himself in the light of commencing a new reign. He who could only date from possession, *de facto,* preferred to model his system, in a ridiculous manner, after the fashion of Louis XVIII., who computed time according to the data of legitimacy. Instead of a national constitution, which he had promised, he contented himself with modifying the political laws and the *senatus-consulta* which governed the empire. He re-established the confiscation of property, against which almost all his councillors protested. In fine, he persevered, in a council held upon this subject, not to submit his constitution to public debates, and to present it to the nation, as an *act additionnel.* I strongly contended against his resolution, as well as Decrès, Caulaincourt, and almost all the members present. He persisted, in spite of our exertions, to comprise all his concessions within the compass of this irregular design.

The word *additionnel* disenchanted the friends of liberty. They recognised in it the ill-disguised continuation of the chief institutions created in favour of absolute power. From that moment Napoleon to their view became an incurable despot; and I, for my part, regarded him in the light of a madman delivered, bound hand and foot, to the

mercy of Europe. Confined to that description of popular suffrage which Savary and Réal directed, he caused some of the lowest classes to be assembled, who, under the name of *Federés*, marched in procession under the windows of the Tuileries, uttering repeatedly exclamations of *Vive l'Empereur!* There he himself announced to this mobocracy that, if the kings dared to attack him, he would proceed to encounter them on the frontiers. This humiliating scene disgusted even the soldiers. Never had that man, who had worn the purple with so much lustre, contributed so greatly to degrade it. He was no longer, in patriotic opinion, considered in other light than as an actor subjected to the applauses of the vilest of the populace.

Scenes of this humiliating description made a strong impression on my mind; well assured, moreover, that all the allied powers, unanimous in their resolution, were preparing to march against us, or, rather, against him, I proceeded early the next day to the Tuileries; and a second time I represented to Napoleon, in still stronger colours, that it was an absolute impossibility for France, in her divided condition, to sustain the assault of universal and united Europe; that it was incumbent upon him to explain himself without disguise to the nation; to assure himself of the ultimate intentions of the allied sovereigns, and that if they persisted, as every thing gave reason to infer, there would then be no room for hesitation; that

his interests, and those of his country, imposed upon him the obligation of withdrawing to the United States.

But, from the reply which he stammered, in which he mingled plans of campaigns, punishments, battles, insurrections, colossal projects, decrees of destiny, I perceived that he was resolved to trust the fate of France to the issue of war, and that the military faction carried the day in spite of my admonitions.

The assembly of the Champ-de-Mai was nothing but a vain pageantry, in which Napoleon, in the garb of a citizen, hoped to mislead the populace by the charm of a public ceremony. The different parties were not more satisfied with it, than they had been with the *acte additionnel;* one faction wished that he had re-established a republic; and the other that in divesting himself of the crown, he had left the sovereign people in possession of the right of offering it to the most worthy; and, finally, the coalition of statesmen, of whom I constituted the soul, reproached him with not having availed himself of that solemnity to proclaim Napoleon II.—an event which would have given us a *point d'appui* in certain cabinets, and, probably, would have preserved us from a second invasion. It will not be denied that, in the critical position of France, the last expedient would have been most reasonable.

As soon as we had acquired the conviction that all attempts to produce this result in the interior of

France would be unsuccessful, without proceeding to the extremity of a deposition, which the military party would not have suffered, it was necessary to make up our minds to the expectation of seeing all the gates of war thrown open. My impatience then augmented, and I laboured to accelerate the march of events. It was in vain that Davoust, in council, had reiterated to Napoleon that his presence with the army was indispensable; relying too little on the capital to leave it behind him for any length of time without mistrust, he did not resolve on his departure till every thing was ready to strike an effectual blow on the frontiers of Belgium, in the hope of making his debut by a triumph, and of re-conquering popularity by victory. He departed; he departed, I say, leaving the care of his *federés* to Réal; large sums of money to get them to cry "Napoleon, or Death;" and authority as to the publication of his military bulletins, with a plan of the campaign arranged for the offensive, and the secret of which was communicated to me by Davoust.

In so decisive a moment, my position became very delicate, as well as very difficult; I wished to have nothing further to do with Napoleon; yet, if he should be victorious, I should be compelled to submit to his yoke, as well as the whole of France, whose calamities he would prolong. On the other hand, I had engagements with Louis XVIII.; not that I was inclined to his restoration; but prudence required that I should procure for myself before-

hand something in the shape of a guarantee. My agents, moreover, to M. de Metternich and Lord Wellington had promised mountains and marvels. The generalissimo, at least, expected that I should divulge to him the plan of the campaign.

In the first impulse—but the voice of my country, the glory of the French army which now appeared to me in any other light than that of the nation, in short, the dictates of honour, startled me at the thought, that the word traitor might ever become an appendage to the name of the Duke d'Otranto; and my resolution remained unsullied. Meantime, in such a conjuncture, what resolution was to be taken by a statesman, who ought never to be left without resources? This is the resolution I took. I knew positively that the unexpected onset of Napoleon's force would occur on the 16th or 18th, at latest; Napoleon, indeed, had determined to give battle, on the 17th, to the English army, then separated from the Prussians, after having previously routed the latter. He was so much more justified in expecting that his plan would be successful, that Wellington, deceived by false reports, thought it possible to delay the opening of the campaign till the 1st of July. The success of Napoleon rested, therefore, on the success of a surprise; I took my measures accordingly. On the very day of Napoleon's departure, I provided Madame D—— with notes, written in cipher, disclosing the plan of the campaign, and sent her off. At the same time I

occasioned impediments on that part of the frontier which she was to pass, in such a manner as to prevent her reaching the head-quarters of Wellington, till after the result. This is a true explanation of the inconceivable supineness of the generalissimo, which occasioned so universal an astonishment, and conjectures of so opposite a description.

If, therefore, Napoleon fell it was owing to his own destiny; treason had nothing to do with his defeat. He, himself, did all that could be done in order to conquer; but his fall was divested of dignity. If I am asked what I think he ought to have done, I will reply, as old Horace did—*Qu'il mourût!*

It was on condition of his coming out of the contest as a victor, that the patriots had consented to give him their support; he was vanquished, and they considered the compact at an end. I learnt, at the same moment, the circumstance of his nocturnal arrival at l'Elysée, and that at Laon, after his defeat, Maret, at his instigation, had broached the advice of his quitting the army, and proceeding, without loss of time, to Paris, in order to avert a sudden re-action. I was also informed in the morning, that Lucien, keeping up his courage, endeavoured to derive resources from a desperate resolution; that he urged him to seize the dictatorship,—to surround himself with nothing but military elements,—and to dissolve the chamber.

It was then that I was impressed with the necessity of setting in motion all the resources of my

position, and my experience. The defeat of the emperor, his presence at Paris, which occasioned a universal indignation, provided me with a favourable opportunity of extorting from him an abdication, which he had declined when it might have saved him. I set in motion all my friends, all my adherents, and all my agents, whom I provided with the watch-word. For myself, I communicated, before attending the council, with the principal members of all the parties. To the unquiet, suspicious, and fearful members of the chamber, I said, "It is now necessary to act; we must say little, and resort to force; he is returned raving; he is determined upon dissolving the chamber, and seizing the dictatorship. I trust we shall not suffer such a return to tyranny as this." I said to the partisans of Napoleon, "Are you not aware that the ferment against the emperor has reached the highest pitch, among the majority of the deputies. His fall is desired; his abdication is demanded. If you are bent on serving him, you have but one certain path to follow, and that is to make head vigorously against them, to show them what power you still retain, and to affirm that one single word will be sufficient to dissolve the chamber." I also entered into their language and views; they then disclosed their secret inclinations, and I was enabled to say to the heads of the patriots, who rallied round me; "you perceive that his best friends make no mystery of it; the danger is pressing; in

a few hours the chambers will exist no longer; and you will have much to answer for, in neglecting to seize the only moment when you could prevent a dissolution."

The council being assembled, Napoleon caused Maret to read the bulletin of the battle of Waterloo; and concluded by declaring, that in order to save the country, it was indispensable that he should be invested with larger powers; in short, with a temporary dictatorship. That he might seize it, but that he thought it more useful and more national to wait for its being conferred on him by the chambers. I left to such of my colleagues who thought and acted with me, the task of contending against this proposition, which had already fallen into disrepute and ruin.

It was then that M. de Lafayette, apprized of what was passing in the council, and sure of the majority, brought his motion for the permanency of the chambers, a motion which disconcerted the whole military party, and, rallying the patriotic party, conferred upon it a considerable moral force.

Kept in check by the chambers, Napoleon did not dare to take any step; he sounded Davoust as to the feasibility of effecting its dissolution by military means; but Davoust declined.

The next day, we all manœuvred to extort his abdication. There was a multitude of messages backwards and forwards, parleys, objections, replies—in a word, evolutions of every description;

ground was taken, abandoned, and again retaken. At length, after a warm battle, Napoleon surrendered, in full council, under the conviction that longer resistance was useless; then turning to me, he said, with a sardonic smile, "Write to those gentlemen to make themselves easy; they shall be satisfied." Lucien took up the pen, and drew, under Napoleon's dictation, the act of abdication, such as it was afterwards made public.

Here then was a change of scene; the power having passed away from the hands of Napoleon, who was to remain master of the field? I soon detected the secret designs of the cabinet; I discovered that the Bonapartist party, now under the guidance of Lucien, intended, as a consequence of the abdication, to countenance the immediate proclamation of Napoleon II., and the establishment of a council of regency. This would have been to have suffered the hostile camp to triumph. In fact, that regency which had been for so long a time the drift of all my calculations, and the object of all my desires, being now about to be organized under another influence than mine, excluded me from a share in the government. It was necessary, therefore, to recur to new combinations, and to man counter-batteries, in order, with equal address, to defeat the system of the regency and the restoration of the Bourbons. I therefore conceived the creation of a provisional government, established in conformity with my own suggestions, and which, in consequence, I should be

able to direct according to my own views. I presented myself to the chamber with a view of inducing it to act with decision in consecrating the principles and the laws of the revolution.

The chamber having accepted the abdication of Napoleon without noticing the condition it contained, Lucien exerted himself to procure the proclamation of Napoleon II. He had in his favour the *federés*, the soldiers, the populace, and a large part of the chamber of peers. I had on my side the majority of the lower chamber, a party also in the chamber of peers, the national guard, the greater part of the generals, and the royalists, who courted and surrounded me in the hope that I should direct the throw of the die in favour of the Bourbons.

Lucien had already sent Réal to the Elysée in order to assemble the *federés* under the windows of Napoleon. It was with great difficulty that the assent of the ex-emperor was obtained; it was only procured by remarking that my party intended to consider his abdication as a single and unqualified act; that if he did not at least preserve some shadow of his power, neither his security by flight, nor the conveyance of his wealth could be answered for; that, moreover, the abdication in favour of his son might probably induce Austria to obtain more favourable conditions from the rest of the allies in his behalf. Réal immediately entered the field, and raked together all the *canaille* of Paris in the *Champs Elysées*; while Lucien, on his side, entered

his carriage, and hurried to the chamber of peers, where he exclaimed, in an harangue got up for the occasion: "*The emperor is dead; long live the emperor; let us proclaim Napoleon II.!*" The majority appeared to accede to this proposal. Lucien returned in triumph to the *Champs Elysées*, instructed the two or three thousand *brigands* whom Réal had assembled round the palace in their part, and got them to promise to proceed to the chamber of representatives, in order to determine the proclamation of Napoleon II. He *re-entered the Elysée*, and returned upon the terrace with his brother, whose countenance betrayed evident marks of depression. There Napoleon saluted the band of fanatics, waving his hand, as they defiled before him with acclamations of "*Long live our emperor and his son; we will have no other!*"

But these demonstrations of their zeal gave me little uneasiness. I had my eye upon the most inconsiderable movements, and the only staunch political string was in my hands. I had, moreover, secured to myself an initiative influence; and at the very moment of this ridiculous hubbub, the chamber were naming an executive provisional committee, the presidentship of which devolved upon me.

Meanwhile Réal had given the pass-word to the *federés*, ordering them to march in procession before the palace of the legislative body; they flocked thither in crowds; but it was too late; the terrified

legislators had just abandoned the hall, after having appointed a committee. Night dispersed the mob, which, in passing through the streets of Paris, affrighted the citizens with the discharge of their muskets, and set up loud cries of "Death to all who refuse to recognise Napoleon II.!"

The agitation of the day was terminated by nocturnal meetings, the preludes of one of the most animated of public sittings which was to occur on the following day. Next morning, I and my colleagues, Caulaincourt, Carnot, Quinette, and General Grenier, entered on our new possession of the reins of government. We were proceeding in the task of our organization, when I learnt that the deputy Bérenger, at the opening of the sitting, had just demanded that the members of the committee should be held collectively responsible. The obvious drift of this proposal was to engage each of them to separate themselves from my vote, and to watch my proceedings, which was a consequence of the suspicions which I occasioned among the Bonapartist faction. As if he had not said enough, Bérenger added, "If these men be inviolable, you will, in case any one of them should betray his duty, possess no means of punishing him."

I cared very little for these under-handed attacks; as I have before said, my party was the strongest.

The councillor of state, Boulay de la Meurthe, one of the most zealous partisans of Bonaparte,

went so far as to deliver a philippic, in which he pointed out and denounced the Orleans faction; this was apprizing the friends of the Bourbons and the Bonapartists, that a third party was making its appearance in favour of the doctrine of *de facto* government, which for three months we had been opposing to the doctrine of legitimacy.

It is certain, that, finding myself embarked with a new party, more accordant with my principles than those, which offered no other prospect than an absolute government or counter-revolution; and, feeling the impossibility of preserving the throne of Napoleon II., I felt more inclined to second the efforts of this new party, provided the cabinets should not exhibit too hostile a feeling towards it. The declamation of Boulay had for its principal object to cause the proclamation of Napoleon II. by the chamber. The party was strong, and it required some address to avert its attack. M. Manuel undertook the delicate task in a discourse which obtained universal applause, and in which it was fancied that the stamp of my policy was discernible. He concluded by opposing himself to the design of investing any member of the Bonaparte family with the regency; that was the decisive point, and that was abandoning the field of battle to me. The assent of the chamber was a new guarantee to the committee of government, and conferred upon me, in my character of pre-

sident, an incontestable preponderance in public affairs.

Our first operation, after being installed on the 23d of June, was to cause the war to be declared national, and to send five plenipotentiaries* to the head-quarters of the allies, with powers to negotiate peace, and to signify assent to any species of government but that of the Bourbons. Their secret instructions went to the effect of conferring the crown, in default of Napoleon II., on the King of Saxony, or the Duke of Orleans, whose party had been reinforced by a great number of deputies and generals.

I confess that I, in this measure, made rather a large concession to the actual leaders, and that I secretly entertained strong doubts as to their attainment of the object they proposed. I had also so much the more reason to believe that the cause of the Bourbons was far from desperate, as one of my secret agents shortly arrived to inform me of Louis XVIII.'s entry into Cambray, and to bring me his royal declaration. Our plenipotentiaries, therefore, were at first amused with dilatory answers.

My position may be conceived. The party of

* These plenipotentiaries were M. de Lafayette, Laforet, Pontécoulaut, d'Argenson, and Sébastiani. M. Benjamin Constant accompanied them in quality of secretary to the embassy. *Note by the French Editor.*

Napoleon, always in activity, was recruited, if I may use the term, by eighty thousand soldiers, who arrived to make a stand under the walls of Paris; while the allied armies rapidly advanced on the capital, driving before them all the battalions and divisions which attempted to obstruct their passage. It was incumbent upon me, at one and the same time, to secure the generals, in order to control the army; to counteract the new plans of Bonaparte, which tended to nothing short of replacing him at the head of the troops; and to repress the impatience of the royalists, whose wish it was to open the gates of Paris to Louis XVIII.—and all this in the midst of the unloosing of so many contending passions, whence terrible convulsions were likely to be engendered.

I will not occupy the reader with narrating, in this place, a multitude of minor intrigues, of accessory details, of disappointments and disputes, which, during the tornado, inflicted upon me all the tribulations of power. Previous to the abdication, I was spied upon, and continually kept on the *qui vive* by the zealous partisans of Napoleon, such as Maret, Thibaudeau, Boulay de la Meurthe, and even Regnault, who was sometimes in my favour, and sometimes opposed to me; now, I had to guard myself against the pretensions of another party; I had to fortify myself against the mistrust of my own colleagues, of Carnot among the rest, who, from having been a republican, had

become so attached to the emperor, that he had bewailed him with a flood of tears in my presence, after having stood alone, and that abortively, against the measure of his abdication.

It may be easily conceived, that I did not succeed in muzzling this mob of high functionaries, marshals, and generals, by any other means than pledging my head, if I may so express myself, for the safety of their persons and fortunes. It was in this manner that I obtained *carte blanche* to negotiate.

I began with sending to Wellington's head-quarters my friend M. G——, a man of probity, and on whom I placed entire reliance. He was the bearer of two letters, sewed in the collar of his coat, one for the king, and the other for the Duke of Orleans; for up to the latest moment, and while involved in protracted uncertainty, as to the intention of the allies, no means could justifiably be neglected for returning into safe harbour. My emissary was immediately introduced before Lord Wellington, and told him that he wished to see the Duke of Orleans. "He is not here," the generalissimo replied; "but you can address yourself to your king." And, in fact, he took the road to Cambray, and presented himself before his majesty. Finding that he did not return, I despatched General de T—— on the same errand; a man of courage and intelligence, whom I expressly commissioned to sound the intention of Lord Welling-

ton, to apprize him of my peculiar situation, to state how much the public mind was exasperated, and public feeling inflamed; and that I could not answer for the preservation of France from the scourge of fire and sword, if the design of re-seating the Bourbons on the throne was persevered in. I offered to treat directly with him on any other basis. The reply of the generalissimo was on this occasion peremptory and negative; he declared that he had orders not to treat on any other terms than the re-establishment of Louis XVIII. As to the Duke of Orleans, he could only be considered—so Lord Wellington expressed himself—in the light of a royal usurper. This reply, which I carefully concealed from my colleagues, rendered my position still more embarrassing.

On the other hand, our plenipotentiaries, having left Laon on the 26th of June, arrived on the 1st of July at the head-quarters of the allied sovereigns at Haguenau. There the sovereigns, not considering it proper to grant them an audience, appointed a commission to hear their proposals. To the question, which I had foreseen could not fail of being addressed to them; "By what right does the nation pretend to expel its king, and choose another sovereign?" they replied, "By an example derived from the History of England itself."

Apprized by this question of the disposition of the allies, the national plenipotentiaries exerted

themselves less to obtain Napoleon II., than to repel Louis XVIII. They insinuated, in fact, that the nation might accept the Duke of Orleans or the King of Saxony, if it was not permitted to secure the throne to the son of Maria Louisa. After several unimportant parleys, they were dismissed with a note, implying, that the allied court could not, for the present, enter into any negotiation; that they considered it as a *sine qua non*, that Napoleon should be placed for the future out of a condition to disturb the repose of France and Europe; and that, after the events which had occurred in March, the allied powers found it their duty to demand that he should be placed under their superintendence.

The committee of government then found itself frustrated in its hope of obtaining the Duke of Orleans or Napoleon II. Even before the return of the plenipotentiaries, I was directly informed of the real intentions of the allied powers.

I employed myself from that time in imparting such a direction to the course of events as should cause them to terminate in a result at once most favourable to my country and to myself. I had demanded an armistice, and with that view sent commissioners * to the allied generals, who had just commenced the siege of the capital. Blucher and Wellington eluded every proposal on the sub-

* MM. Andréossy, Bossy-d'Anglas, Flaugergues, Valence, and Labesnardière.—*Note by the French Editor.*

ject, raising more than objections against the government of Napoleon II.; adverting to Louis XVIII. as the only sovereign who appeared to them calculated to unite in his person all the conditions which would prevent Europe from exacting future pledges for its security; and vehemently complaining of the presence of Bonaparte at Paris, in contempt of his abdication. That personage, as if a fatality impelled him to plunge into the abyss which yawned before him, had, in the first instance, persevered, instead of precipitately gaining one of our sea-ports, in remaining at the palace of the Elysée; and subsequently at Malmaison, in the protracted hope of repossessing himself of authority, if not as emperor, at least as general. Urged by fanatical friends, he even went so far as to address to us a formal demand of that description. It was then that I exclaimed, before a full meeting of the committee: "This man is mad to a certainty! Does he wish, then, to involve us in his ruin?" And here I am bound to say, that the whole committee, even Carnot himself, voted with me for a definitive resolution to be taken with respect to him. His actions were superintended, and Davoust was determined to arrest him on the least attempt which he might make to seduce the army from us. It was so much the more incumbent upon us to take a decisive step with reference to him, as the enemy's cavalry, pushing their detachments even as far as the environs of Malmaison, might capture

him from one moment to another; and some share in such an event would not have failed to be imputed to myself. It was necessary to negotiate for his departure, and to send a general officer to superintend it. The result is known. This short explanation of facts will be sufficient to rebut the accusations of blind and malicious detractors, who, perceiving some resemblance between the captivity of Napoleon and that of Perseus, King of Macedonia, have attributed the former to treacherous combinations, which, computing days and hours, delivered him into the hands of the English through the operation of an underhanded and skilfully-conducted intrigue.

We hoped, after the departure of Napoleon, to be able to obtain an armistice,—but it was not so. It was then that I wrote the two letters, which have been made public, to each of the generals-in-chief of the besieging armies. It may be remarked in those letters, wherein I feigned, in conformity with the necessity of the case, to plead the cause of Napoleon II., that I considered the question irrevocably decided in favour of the Bourbons; but, in order to lull the vigilance of parties, it was indispensable for me to exhibit the appearance of alternately leaning towards the younger branch and the reigning branch. I hoped, moreover, that by aiding Louis XVIII. to remount the throne, I should induce that prince to detach some dangerous individuals from his presence, and to make

new concessions to France, reserving to myself, if I could obtain nothing, the means of subsequently recurring to other combinations.

I had, at that time some nocturnal interviews with M. de Vitrolles, whose liberty I had just procured, and with several other eminent royalists, as well as two marshals, who inclined towards the Bourbons. I despatched emissaries at the same time to the King, the Duke of Wellington, and M. de Talleyrand. I knew that M. de Talleyrand, after quitting Vienna, had proceeded to Frankfort, and subsequently to Wisbaden, in order to be nearer at hand for the purpose of negotiating either with Ghent or Paris. Decided as he was against Napoleon, he, however, thought it proper, on his return to Paris, to come to an understanding with me, promising, on his side, to secure my intere with the Bourbons, whose re-establishment, after the battle of Waterloo, appeared to him infallible. I thought that he would at that time be near the person of the king, and I knew, beyond a doubt, that, in order to retain the control over affairs, he would require the dismissal of M. de Blacas. I arranged my measures accordingly; but it was almost impossible to avoid exciting the distrust of my colleagues. My proceedings were watched, and I was obliged to support reproaches and indignant declamations from some revolutionary and Bonapartist partisans, whose imputations I coldly repelled. Such was my position, that I was obliged

to have negotiations with all parties, and compromise with all sorts of opinion either for my own interest or that of the state. I did not disguise from myself, that conduct such as this, which of necessity comprised something mysterious and underhanded, was calculated to rouse all kinds of suspicion against me, as well as all kinds of resentment on the part of factions wounded in their dearest hopes. The formidable moment would naturally be that when light should dawn on this chaos of multitudinous and conflicting intrigues.

A more serious and dangerous consideration still, was the ferment of the *federés*, and the violence of the fanatics in the chamber, who by turns excited against me the individuals of my own party, the soldiers, and the populace. I wrote to Lord Wellington, that it was high time to put a stop to their ravings and excesses, or that they would shortly leave me without the capability of acting. But Wellington was thwarted by his intractible colleague, Blucher; that Prussian general, impelled by his native impatience and irritability, wished to penetrate into Paris, in order, as he said, to secure the better class of citizens from the pillage with which they were menaced by the mob; and he professed that it was only within the walls of the capital he would consent to the conclusion of an armistice. His letter exasperated us; but what could we do? It was necessary to sustain a siege, and give battle under the walls of Paris, or capi-

tulate. Discouraged by the abdication, the soldiers appeared irresolute, and even the generals were intimidated by the uncertainty of their prospects. The minister of war and general-in-chief of the army, Davoust, wrote to me that he had conquered his prejudices, and was now persuaded that no other means of safety remained than that of instantly proclaiming Louis XVIII. I laid my answer before the committee. The members thought that I looked at the question of the recal of Louis XVIII. in too implicit a manner, and that I gave Davoust too great a degree of latitude. I got over this trivial difficulty, the marshal's determination having appeared to me so important, that I had promised him safe conduct, on behalf of the king, through the intervention of M. de Vitrolles.

Compelled to deliberate upon our military position, the committee, in conformity with my advice, appealed to the intelligence, the counsel, and the responsibility of the most experienced individuals in the art of war. The principal generals were convoked in presence of the presidents and committees of the two chambers. A report of the situation of Paris was made through the medium of Carnot, who had himself visited our positions, and those of the enemy. Carnot declared, that the left bank of the Seine was entirely uncovered, and offered a wide field to the enterprise of the generals-in-chief of the two combined armies, who had just marched the major part of their forces in that

direction. I confess that I attached great national importance to the circumstance of preventing a protracted defence of Paris. We were in a desperate condition; the treasury was empty, credit extinct, and the government at the last extremity; in short, Paris, in consequence of the existence and collision of so many different opinions, stood over the mouth of a volcano. On the other hand, its neighbourhood was daily inundated by new arrivals of foreign troops. If, under circumstances like these, the capital should be carried by main force, we had nothing further to hope; neither capitulation, arrangement, nor concession. In one single day, which would have thus completed what Leipsic and Waterloo left undone, all the interests of the revolution might be for ever ingulfed in a torrent of French blood. This, nevertheless, was what the fanatics of a party, in its last death-struggles, desired.

In such a crisis, was it not deserving well of the country, to replace France, without effusion of blood, under the authority of Louis XVIII.? Were we to wait till foreign armies delivered us bound hand and foot into the hands of our adversaries? I succeeded, by dint of insinuations and promises, in persuading men, who, till that moment, had been intractable.

It was decided that the military question should be submitted, the night following, to a council of war convoked by Marshal Davoust. The possi-

bility of defending Paris was thus about to be determined. To capitulate would save Paris, but compromise the national cause; to give battle would be attended by great and inevitable dangers, to a capital distracted by all the excesses of popular fury, in case we should be vanquished. And in fact, to what tremendous risks would those whose wish it was to give battle have exposed that immense city, and France itself, in the event of a defeat.

The discussions were solemn; and in consequence of the negative and unanimous resolution of the council of war, the committee decreed, that Paris should not be defended, and that the town should be delivered into the hands of the allies, since they would not consent to suspend hostilities on any other condition. But Blucher required also the surrender of the army; such a clause could not be accepted; it was to require that every thing should be delivered up to fire and sword. I hastily despatched to the two hostile generals, MM. Tromeling and Macirone, to whom I consigned, unknown to the committee, a confidential note conceived in these terms: "The army is dissatisfied because it is unfortunate; comfort it, it will become faithful and devoted. The indocility of the chambers arises from the same cause. Tranquillize every one, and every one will be in your favour. Let the army be removed; the chambers will assent to this, if they are promised that the guaran-

tees specified by the king will be added to the charter. In order to understand each other well, mutual explanation is necessary; do not therefore make your entrance into Paris, before three days are elapsed. In that space of time, every body will have come to an agreement. The chambers will be gained over; they will conceive themselves to be independent, and sanction every thing under that impression. Force must not be employed with them, but persuasion."

Blucher soon became more manageable; and consent was given to negotiate the military surrender of Paris, which was concluded at Saint Cloud, on the 3rd of July. I objected to the name of capitulation being given to this treaty; and I caused that of *convention* to be substituted for it, which appeared to me less harsh, and therefore more unobjectionable.

Faction was still in too exasperated a state to allow of security from tumult and disorder. It was necessary to oppose the national guard to the *federés*, who were not restrained without difficulty, by the mass of peaceable citizens. Réal, who had the direction of the *federés*, and who, I knew, was very easily frightened, yielded to my advice, affecting to be taken ill, and abandoned his office of prefect of police. The faction gave the post to Courtin, a *protegé* of Queen Hortense, who, exhibiting herself the greatest energy during the whole of the great crisis, vainly endeavoured to support

the relics of the expiring Bonapartist party. All these manœuvres ended in their own defeat, by the greatest of all interests, the interest of all. It was not long before imputations were made against the generals and the committee, of having sacrificed Paris, and betrayed the army. In order to justify the conduct of the government, I addressed an explanatory proclamation to the French, in which I pointed out the vital necessity of an union of all ranks, without which there was no probability of reaching the term of our misfortunes.

After having capitulated with the foreigners, it was necessary to capitulate with the army, who, at the very moment of marching to the Loire, mutinied, in order to extort from us their arrears of pay; thanks to a few millions, advanced by the banker Lafitte, the mutineers were disarmed, and the needy satisfied. Meantime, all the emissaries and agents of the king, and among the rest, M. de Vitrolles, with whom Davoust and myself conferred, assured us, that the king would shut his eyes upon all that had passed, and that a general reconciliation would be the earnest of his return. I had already conquered many unfavourable feelings by the aid of these promises, when the royal proclamations, dated from Cambray, and printed by order of the chambers, made their appearance.

This event created a new embarrassment in my position, with regard to the chamber of representatives, who exhibited an increasing hostility against

the Bourbons. We soon learnt, at the return of our agents and commissioners, that Wellington and Blucher declared, in an unqualified manner, that the authority of the chambers and the commissions proceeded from an illegitimate source, and that consequently the best thing they could do was to dissolve themselves, and proclaim Louis XVIII.

The commission, then, at the instance of Carnot, deliberated, if it would not be proper to join the chambers and the army behind the Loire. I vehemently contended against this proposal, which would infallibly have rekindled the flames of foreign and domestic war. I maintained that so desperate a project would ruin France; that I was, moreover, satisfied that the greater part of the generals would not subscribe to it, and affirmed that I would be the last to quit Paris. Induced by my arguments, the commission took the more wise and prudent course, of waiting the issue of events in Paris.

As soon as the convention of Paris was signed, the Duke of Wellington being informed of my wish to confer with him, expressed an inclination to come to an understanding with me respecting the execution of the convention. The Commission of the government did not object to an interview which took place at the *Château de Neuilly*. On that occasion, I frankly opened my mind to the generalissimo of the allies. I well knew the power of the words moderation and clemency on noble minds; and, without seeking to diminish the culpability of those

who had betrayed the Bourbons, I maintained that the re-established throne could only derive consolidation from an entire oblivion of the past. I represented how formidable and menacing the energy of the patriots still was, and referred to the moderate means which would be necessary, in order to calm their effervescence; I did not disguise the weakness of the royalists, their intractability and their prejudices; and I affirmed that there was no other means of restoring tranquillity, than by opposing re-actions and resentments, and by leaving no faction to indulge the hope of predominating in the state. I claimed the execution of the two authentic declarations of England and Austria, purporting that their intention was not to continue the war with a design of re-establishing the Bourbons, or imposing on France any government whatsoever. The generalissimo replied, that that declaration had no other object but that of preventing war, and was resorted to, in the hope that France would not take up arms in the cause of Napoleon, after he had been outlawed by the congress; but that, as we had risen in his favour, we had by that means liberated the allies from an engagement purely conditional. This sophistry did not leave a doubt upon my mind that we had been played upon. Lord Wellington declared to me, without qualification, that the allied powers had formally decided in favour of Louis XVIII., and that that sovereign would make his entry into Paris on the 8th of July. General Pozzo

di Borgo, who was present, repeated the same declaration on behalf of the Emperor of Russia; he communicated to me a letter from Prince Metternich and the Count de Nesselrode, expressive of a determination to recognise no one but Louis XVIII., and not to admit of any proposal at variance with the rights of that monarch. I then insisted on a general amnesty, and required guarantees. On these conditions I consented to serve the king, and even to give him such pledges as might be consistent with my reputation and honour. The generalissimo answered me, that he was determined to dismiss M. de Blacas, and that I should compose a part of the council, as well as M. de Talleyrand, the king having condescended to continue me in my office of general police; but he did not disguise from me that all kinds of measures were taken, in order that Napoleon might fall, as a hostage, into the power of the allies, and that it was required of me, that I should do nothing to favour his escape. It was also required that the army should submit itself to the king, and that, for the sake of example a few of its chiefs should be subjected to punishment. To this I objected; I protested, that if Bonaparte had not made his appearance, a crisis would have equally ensued. All my objections failed in shaking a thoroughly made up resolution. I regarded the evil to be without remedy, but at all events capable of being palliated by my presence in the council. The duke announced to me, that the next day he

would himself present me to his majesty, or at least convey me in his carriage to the Château d'Arnouville. I replied, that it was my intention to address a letter to the king, which I had composed, and which I communicated to him. It was conceived in the following terms:—

"Sire,—The return of your majesty leaves no other duty to be performed by the members of the government, than that of divesting themselves of their functions. For the exoneration of my conscience, it is my request that I may be permitted faithfully to describe the state of public opinion and feeling in France.

"It is not your majesty who is dreaded, since you have seen, during the space of eleven months, that a confidence in your majesty's moderation and justice sustained the French people, in the midst of the terror which the proceedings of a portion of your court were calculated to inspire.

"It is universally known, that intelligence and experience are not wanting in your majesty; you understand France and the times; you understand the power of opinion; but your condescension has too often induced you to listen to the pretensions of those who followed you into adversity.

"From that time, France was divided into two nations. It was, doubtless, a painful task for your majesty to be continually obliged to repress the above pretensions by acts resulting from your own will. How many times must you have regretted,

that it was not in your power to oppose them by national laws.

"If the same system be reproduced, and, if deriving all your powers from hereditary title, your majesty will not recognise any rights of the people but such as originate from concessions of the crown, France, as she was before, will be uncertain as to the nature of her duties; she will continue to waver between her love for her country and her love for her prince; between her inclination and her experience. Her obedience will have no other basis than her personal confidence in your majesty; and, if that confidence be sufficient to maintain respect, it is likewise by such means that dynasties acquire consolidation, and that dangers are averted. Sire, your majesty has experienced that those who urge the steps of power beyond its proper limits are very inadequate to sustain it when it is shaken; that authority impairs itself by a continual contest, which compels it to retrograde in all its proceedings; that the fewer rights are left to the people, the more its well-founded distrust prompts it to preserve those which cannot be disputed; and that it is always by such means as these that loyalty becomes enfeebled, and that revolutions are matured.

"We conjure you, Sire, deign for this once to consult nothing but your own sense of justice and your own enlightened judgment. Be persuaded that the French people attach in these days as much importance to their liberty as to their life.

They will never consider themselves free, if there be not rights, equally inviolable, interposed between them and the claims of power. Have we not had, under your dynasty, states-general independent of the monarch?

"Sire, your wisdom cannot wait for events, in order to make concessions. Under such circumstances, they would be prejudicial to your interests, and probably, increase in their extent. Concessions made now would soothe and pacify the public mind, and give force to royal authority—at a later period, concessions would only prove its weakness: they would be extorted by disorder; and the public mind would retain its anger."

This letter was addressed, on that very day to his majesty. At my return to Paris, I declared to the commission, that the return of Louis XVIII. was inevitable; that such was the determined resolution of the allied powers, and that the time was even fixed for the second day following. I concealed from them that I was retained in office; a circumstance which, instead of being considered in the light of a guarantee to the patriots, and a species of transition, which would enable the legitimate government, with a less violent shock, to succeed a *de facto* government, would have appeared in the eyes of the fanatics in no other light than the wages of my treason, when, in fact, it was nothing but a well-deserved reward for the safety of Paris. On that very evening, the news was spread, and the

same individuals loaded me, in their harangues, with insults and maledictions; the royalists alone addressed me in the language of congratulation... Yes! I repeat, the royalists; and, among the most distinguished writers of that party, there are some who have since confessed, that there was a universal exclamation from all parts, that, had it not been for me there would have been neither security for the king nor safety for France; and that all parties had come to an understanding, to confer the ministry of the police on me.

The next day I repaired to St. Denis, and presented myself at the Château d'Arnouville, in order to have my first audience of the king. I was introduced into his closet by the president of the council, who leant upon my arm. I entreated the king to tranquillize the public mind, by securing to all individuals their personal safety; I represented to him, that clemency was no doubt attended with disadvantages, but that the capitulation, just concluded, appeared to demand that any other system should be rejected; that a full and entire amnesty, and without any conditions, appeared to me the only method to impart stability to the state, and durability to the government; that, in this instance, pardon was little more than another word for justice; and that by an amnesty I understood not only an oblivion of offences, but also a preservation of places, property, honours, and titles.

My discourse seemed to make an impression on

the king, who listened to it with unbroken attention. That prince was fully aware of the need in which we stood of skilfulness and tranquillity, in order to re-assemble the elements, which time and circumstances had dispersed. I thought I perceived that he saw the necessity of throwing a veil over past faults, and of gaining confidence, by exemplary moderation and good faith. I made a point of rendering this interview as public as possible, in order to give public opinion an opportunity of foreseeing a probable term to our discords and calamities.

I did not confine myself to entreaties, I went so far as to represent to the king, that Paris was in the most violent state of agitation; that there would be danger to his person, in showing himself at the gates of the capital, with the white cockade, and attended exclusively by the emigrants of Ghent. My plan consisted in maintaining the continuance of the chambers, in prevailing upon the king to assume the tricolor cockade, and to dismiss all his military household. In a word, it was my wish, as it always had been, to see Louis XVIII. heading the march of the revolution, and so contributing to its consolidation.

These different views were submitted to deliberation in the council; my proposals were only rejected by the majority of a single vote. The king, besides, remained inflexible. Sooner than consent, he declared he would rather return to

Hartwell. Accordingly, his military household was not dissolved, and it was decided that the representatives should be expelled next day from the chamber. That chamber had just laid down, in a new bill of rights, the fundamental principles of the constitution which, according to the views it entertained, could alone satisfy the public desire. Although I had not expected much success from my proceedings, because my tact in public affairs had sufficiently apprized me of their tendency, it appeared to me that I ought to neglect nothing for the acquittal of my conscience.

The very evening of the 7th of July, several Prussian battalions forced the gates of the Tuileries, and invaded the courts and the avenues of the palace. The commission of the government, being no longer free, discontinued its functions, and announced the fact by a message. One particular circumstance made this separation of my colleagues remarkable. Carnot, the most incensed of all in seeing me continued in my office, and placed as it were, under my *serveillance*, until a place of residence was appointed for him, wrote me the following note; "*Traitor!* where dost thou require me to go?" I answered in the same laconic manner; "Fool! where you please." It must be confessed that I had, in the council, several altercations with Carnot, who never forgave me for having called him an old woman.

The next day, as early as eight o'clock in the

morning, the deputies made their appearance, in order to enter the hall of their deliberations; but finding the doors closed, surrounded by guards and *gendarmes*, they withdrew. A few of them repairing to the house of their president, there subscribed a protest.

The king made his public entry into Paris; nothing disturbed the excessive joy of the royalists, who hurried to meet their monarch, and appeared in very considerable numbers. I must confess that my presentiment was, in some degree, deceived, and that all my apprehensions did not receive conformation. Thus finished the reign of a hundred days, and thus re-commenced a reign, which had been interrupted during its first year. But what were the omens which accompanied this new accession? Passions in a state of ferment; resentments thirsting for satiation; interests struggling and contending together; minds in a state of phrensy and rage; in short, ulcerated feelings ready for re-action! In so deplorable a conjuncture, I did not withhold from my country the benefit of my labours and exertions.

The surrender of Bonaparte, the successive submission of all the towns and all the provinces in France, soon announced that the country was pacified in all such respects as could interest the allied sovereigns; but it could not be perfectly so, as regarded the repose and welfare of the king, unless every thing was forgotten; unless there was an

equal restraint upon all extreme opinions, from whatsoever source those opinions might be derived; and unless, in short, all the parties of the state enjoyed the protection of the laws, with the same certainty and the same security.

Such was the moderation and clemency, which I recommended to Louis XVIII. (as I had previously done with Napoleon), at the same time, that I proposed efficacious measures, for averting the results of all such causes as tended to re-plunge France into the abyss of a new revolution. But every one, either in or out of the council, did not share my views; examples and punishments were considered necessary. I had already, for a fortnight, constituted a part of the royal administration, when the *ordonnance* of the 24th of July made its appearance; fifty-seven individuals, divided into two categories, were therein proscribed, without trial. It will be asked, how I could countersign such an act, which affected individuals, who had pursued the same line of politics as myself. Let it be known, then, that ever since the day following the 8th of July, the desire of proscribing had possessed all classes of the royalist party, from the *salons* of the Faubourg St. Germain, to the antichambers of the palace of the Tuileries, and that thousands of names, obscure as well as notorious, were pointed out to the police department for the purpose of being involved in a general measure of proscription. Heads were demanded of the minis-

ter of police, as pledges of his sincere devotion to the royal cause. There only remained two paths for me to follow; that of making myself an accomplice in acts of vengeance, or that of giving up my office. To the first I could not subscribe; the second, I was too deeply compromised to adopt. I discovered a third expedient, and that was to reduce the list to a small number of names, selected from persons who had acted the most conspicuous part during the late events; and here, I must confess, that I met, in the council, and, more especially, in the eminently French feelings of the monarch, with every thing that was calculated to mitigate those measures of excessive rigour, and to diminish the number of the victims.

But the torrent of re-action threatened to sweep away all the barriers opposed to it. I had conceived the design of acting the part of mediator between the king and the patriots. I soon perceived that the only intention was to make use of me as a necessary instrument for the re-establishment of a royal power without counterpoise and limit, and which would have offered no guarantee to the men of the revolution. The two *ordonnances*, with regard to the electoral colleges and the elections which were about to furnish France with the chamber of 1815, left me no longer a shadow of doubt upon this point. It has been thought that I exhibited a culpable neglect in the formation of the electoral colleges; and it has been said, that it was

not excusable, in a statesman like myself, grown old in experience and the exercise of important functions, to commit such a political error, nor to be mistaken as to the bias which the royalist faction, now re-possessed of influence, exerted itself to impart to public opinion. My principles, and my anterior conduct, ought to have secured me from similar imputations. This accusation as to imprudent carelessness and fatal indifference, in such grave conjunctures, must be laid to the amiable selfishness and the *nonchalante* supineness of the president of the council, who indulged himself in sensual illusions, and did not wish to see any thing else in the *fauteuil* of a minister, but a resting-place.

I was roused by this; it was then that my notes, addressed to the allied powers, and my reports, presented to the king in full council, appeared to the world. I had drawn them, in conformity with the wishes of the allied sovereigns, in order to supply them with materials for judging of the actual condition of France. The publication of those documents produced a profound sensation on enlightened minds; but their contents exasperated to the highest degree the *ultra-royalist* party*, who regarded its influence as lost, if my disclosures led to a change of system. The king himself was displeased at the publicity given to reports of a con-

* It was Fouché who first made use of this expression, which has since become familiar, and which indeed has been quite worn out.—*Note by the French Editor.*

fidential nature: but I had pre-considered my position; deceived by M. de Vitrolles, whom I had introduced into the king's cabinet, deserted by the president of the council, whom the past did not oblige to sacrifice the present, I perceived that my fall was inevitable, unless I could succeed in giving preponderance to my designs.

Shall I confess it in this place! Yes;—I have promised to disguise nothing. My notes and my reports were intended to impart unity and integrity to the dislocated and scattered members of the revolution, and especially to give Europe cause to fear a national insurrection; by that means, I hoped to intimidate her so much, on the score of an explosion, that she would consent to grant us, as the price of a definitive treaty of peace, that which I had never ceased soliciting since the congress of Prague—the dynasty of Napoleon, which had become the single object of our secret demands, of our desires, and of our efforts. The interview of two powerful monarchs contributed to disperse hopes which were not without foundation. It belongs to history to collect and compare circumstances which it does not appertain to me to elucidate. I may say I am summing up my whole life, when I declare, that it was my wish to conquer for the revolution, and that the revolution has been conquered in me.

THE END.

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